rename test -> tests

author: Adam Janovsky 2021-05-10 18:42:00 +0200
committer: Adam Janovsky 2021-05-10 18:42:00 +0200
commit: 4c927448a4ff1d1e889e735a50465616e34e4682 (patch)
tree: e5ea6db542280756688ad4315bf58b272781fec8 /test/data
parent: f684f704dd970fb3101e273d6d634f413db15067 (diff)
download: sec-certs-4c927448a4ff1d1e889e735a50465616e34e4682.tar.gz
sec-certs-4c927448a4ff1d1e889e735a50465616e34e4682.tar.zst
sec-certs-4c927448a4ff1d1e889e735a50465616e34e4682.zip
10 files changed, 0 insertions, 2927 deletions
diff --git a/test/data/certs.csv b/test/data/certs.csv
deleted file mode 100644
index 0cfaa57f..00000000
--- a/test/data/certs.csv
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-cert,st
-0143a.pdf,0143b.pdf
-ANSSI-CC_2009-62fr.pdf,ANSSI-CC-cible_2009-62en.pdf
-c0478_erpt.pdf,c0478_est.pdf
-bariyer cr.pdf,HVL-BARIYER-ASE-ST-lite_v2.5.pdf
-Aruba NMCv6.4.2.0-1.3_2017_107_CRv1.0.pdf,Aruba NVM Controller OS 6.4.2.0-1.3 FIPS_STv1.0.pdf
-ANSSI-CC-En_2016_45en.pdf,anssi_cible_2016_45_LITE.pdf
-ANSSI-CC-En_2016_52en.pdf,anssi_cible_2016_52_LITE.pdf
-Aselsan_Digital Tachograph-CR.pdf,Aselsan_Digital Tachograph-ST-Lite.pdf
-0519V2a_pdf.pdf,0519V2b_pdf.pdf
-0596V2a_pdf.pdf,0596V2b_pdf.pdf
-KECS-CISS-1003-2020_CR_EN.pdf,KECS-CISS-1003-2020_ST_EN.pdf
-ATES v1.0 Certification Report.pdf,ICT_ATES_ST_v2.9.pdf
-0589a_pdf.pdf,0589b_pdf.pdf
-KECS-CISS-0924-2019_CR_EN.pdf,KECS-CISS-0924-2019_ST_EN.pdf
-\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/test/data/test_cc_oop/cc_products_active.csv b/test/data/test_cc_oop/cc_products_active.csv
deleted file mode 100644
index a361ba35..00000000
--- a/test/data/test_cc_oop/cc_products_active.csv
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-"Category","Name","Manufacturer","Scheme","Assurance Level","Protection Profile(s)","Certification Date","Archived Date","Certification Report URL","Security Target URL","Maintenance Date","Maintenance Title","Maintenance Report","Maintenance ST"
-"Access Control Devices and Systems","NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7","NetIQ Corporation","SE","EAL3+,ALC_FLR.2","","06/15/2020","06/15/2025","http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org:443/files/epfiles/Certification Report - NetIQŽ Identity Manager 4.7.pdf","http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org:443/files/epfiles/ST - NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7.pdf","","","",""
-"Access Control Devices and Systems","Magic SSO V4.0","Dreamsecurity Co., Ltd.","KR","None","KECS-PP-0822-2017 SSO V1.0","11/15/2019","11/15/2024","http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org:443/files/epfiles/KECS-CR-19-70 Magic SSO V4.0(eng) V1.0.pdf","http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org:443/files/epfiles/Magic_SSO_V4.0-ST-v1.4_EN.pdf","","","",""
-\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/test/data/test_cc_oop/cc_products_active.html b/test/data/test_cc_oop/cc_products_active.html
deleted file mode 100644
index 6c44e3c0..00000000
--- a/test/data/test_cc_oop/cc_products_active.html
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,633 +0,0 @@
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-<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" lang="en">
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-<head>
-   <meta name="description" content="" />
-   <meta name="keywords" content="" />
-   <meta name="classification" content="Internet" />
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-   <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8" />
-   <meta http-equiv="Accept-Encoding" content="compress, gzip" />
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-   <title>Certified Products : New CC Portal</title>
-
-
-   <link href="/assets/css/main.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" />
-   <link href="/assets/css/print.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" media="print" />
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-<![endif]-->
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-   <script src="/assets/js/jQuery/js/jquery-1.7.2.min.js" type="text/javascript"></script>
-   <script src="/assets/js/jQuery/js/jquery-ui-1.8.4.custom.min.js" type="text/javascript"></script>
-   <script src="/assets/js/jQuery/plugins/metadata/jquery.metadata.js" type="text/javascript"></script>
-
-   <script src="/assets/js/jQuery/plugins/tabs/jquery.tools.min.js" type="text/javascript"></script>
-
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-   <!-- jstablesorter sppt -->
-   <script src="/assets/js/jQuery/plugins/tablesorter/jquery.tablesorter.min.js" type="text/javascript"></script>
-   <link href="/assets/js/jQuery/plugins/tablesorter/css/style.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" />
-   <!-- END jstablesorter sppt -->
-
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-   <link rel="alternate" title="Protection Profiles" href="../rss/pps.xml" type="application/rss+xml" />
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-   <link rel="Shortcut Icon" type="image/ico" href="/assets/images/cc.ico" />
-
-
-   <!--  assets/includes/SQL_Check.cfm -->
-   <!--  ??? ????????             -->
-   <!--  2012.03.15 - 2012.XX.XX  -->
-
-   <!--  This page creates and manages a list of IP addresses to be blocked due -->
-   <!--  to dangerous requests which may be SQL Injection Attacks               -->
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-   <!--  2012.07.11 - Last mod before 2016//???                                 -->
-   <!--  2016.06.23 - Cleanup, minor edits, and comments added//KC              -->
-
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-</head>
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-<!-- 2017.09.07 - Adjusted jstablesorter sppt//KC                            -->
-
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-<body>
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-   <div id="wrap">
-
-
-      <div id="banner">
-         <p class="topNav">
-            <a href="/sitemap/" title="View the sitemap"> Sitemap</a> &nbsp; | &nbsp;
-
-            <a href="/contact/message/" title="Contact us">Contact</a>
-            &nbsp;&nbsp;
-         </p>
-
-         <!-- Google CSE Search Box Begins -->
-
-         <div id="searchbox">
-            <form id="016233930414485990345:f_zj6spfpx4" action="/search/" style="margin:0;padding:0">
-               <span style="white-space:nowrap">
-                  <input type="hidden" name="cx" value="016233930414485990345:f_zj6spfpx4" />
-                  <input type="hidden" name="cof" value="FORID:11" />
-                  <input type="hidden" name="ie" value="UTF-8" />
-                  <input name="q" type="text" size="30" />
-                  <input type="submit" name="sa" value="Search" />
-               </span>
-            </form>
-         </div>
-         <script type="text/javascript" src="//www.google.com/coop/cse/brand?form=searchbox_016233930414485990345:f_zj6spfpx4"></script>
-
-         <!-- Google CSE Search Box Ends -->
-
-      </div>
-      <div id="logo">
-
-         <p>
-
-            <a href="https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/members/account/login/">Login &nbsp; <img src="/assets/images/icon_arrow.png" /> </a>
-
-
-         </p>
-      </div>
-      <!--[if gte IE 9]>
-  <style type="text/css">
-    .gradient {
-       filter: none;
-    }$(function() {
-
-    $( "#menutabs" ).menutabs();
-
-
-  </style>
-<![endif]-->
-      <!-- >
-  <style type="text/css">
-    .trad-blink {
-      animation: blinker 1.5s cubic-bezier(.5, 0, 1, 1) infinite alternate;
-    }
-    @keyframes blinker {
-    	from { opacity: 1; }
-        to { opacity: .2;}
-        }
-  </style>
-< -->
-
-      <div id="menutabs">
-
-         <ul class="menutabs menuitem">
-            <li><a href="/news/" title="News">
-                  NEWS</a></li>
-            <li class="inline-code trad-blink"> <a href="/iccc/" title="ICCC">
-                  ICCC</a></li>
-            <li>
-               <a href="/pps/" title="Protection Profiles">
-                  PROTECTION PROFILES </a>
-            </li>
-            <li>
-               <a href="/pps/?cpp=1" title="Collaborative Protection Profiles">
-                  COLLABORATIVE PPS </a>
-            </li>
-
-            <li> <a href="/products/" title="Certified Products">
-                  CERTIFIED PRODUCTS </a></li>
-            <li>
-               <a href="/communities/index.cfm" title="Technology Communities">
-                  TECHNICAL COMMUNITIES</a>
-            </li>
-            <li>
-               <a href="/cc/">
-                  PUBLICATIONS</a>
-            </li>
-            <li><a href="/ccra/index.cfm">
-                  ABOUT THE CC</a></li>
-            <li><a href="/">HOME</a></li>
-
-         </ul>
-
-
-
-
-      </div>
-
-
-      <div id="slides">
-         <div class="slides_container">
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-            <div><img src="/assets/images/slides/certified_products_banner.jpg"></div>
-
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-            <br />
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-      </div>
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-      <!--[if gte IE 9]>
-  <style type="text/css">
-    .gradient {
-       filter: none;
-    }
-  </style>
-<![endif]-->
-      <div id="content">
-
-
-         <h1 id="page_title">Certified Products</h1>
-
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-
-
-         <!-- --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-	For those of you poking around in the page source, the following URL parameters are available on this page:
-	expand - auto-expand the tables after the page loads
-	names - display filenames for the certification report and security target files for easier (F)inding
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -->
-
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-         <style type="text/css">
-            .gridTable thead,
-            .gridTable tbody,
-            .gridTable tfoot {
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-                  function () { openAll() },
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-               );
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-                  $(".gridTable#tbl" + tbl + " caption").css({ 'background': '#333' });
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-                  $(".gridTable#tbl" + tbl + " thead").show();
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-                  $(".gridTable#tbl" + tbl + " tfoot").show();
-                  $("a#toggle" + tbl + " img").attr("src", "/assets/images/minicon.gif");
-               }
-               function closeTbl(tbl) {
-                  $(".gridTable#tbl" + tbl + " caption").css({ 'background': '#fff' });
-                  $(".gridTable#tbl" + tbl + " caption a").css({ 'color': '#333' });
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-         </script>
-
-         <div class="noprint" style="float:right;margin-top:-3.5em;margin-right:1em;white-space:nowrap">
-
-            <a href="./stats/" title="View the Certified Products Statistics" class="button2">Statistics</a>
-            &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
-            <a href="certified_products.csv" title="Download the Certified Products List as a CSV file" class="button2">
-               <img src="/assets/images/icon_csv.gif" height="16" width="15" alt="" align="top"> Download CSV
-            </a>
-            &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
-            <a href="index.cfm?archived=1" title="View the Archived Certified Products List" class="button2">Archived
-               Certified Products</a>
-
-         </div>
-
-
-         <!-- Blurb for the active list -->
-         <p>
-            The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement covers certificates with claims of compliance against Common
-            Criteria assurance components of either:&nbsp;
-         </p>
-         <ol>
-            <li /> a collaborative Protection Profile (cPP), developed and maintained in accordance with CCRA Annex K,
-            with assurance activities selected from Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including level 4 and ALC_FLR,
-            developed through an International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee; or
-            <li /> Evaluation Assurance Levels 1 through 2 and ALC_FLR.&nbsp;
-         </ol>
-         <p class="b">
-            Where a CC certificate claims compliance to Evaluation Assurance Level 3 or higher, but does not claim
-            compliance to a collaborative Protection Profile, then for purposes of mutual recognition under the CCRA,
-            the CC certificate should be treated as equivalent to Evaluation Assurance Level 2.&nbsp;
-         </p>
-         <p>
-            The CCDB has approved a resolution to limit the validity of mutually recognized CC certificates over
-            time.&nbsp;
-            Certificates will remain on the CPL for five years.&nbsp;
-            Effective 1 June 2019, certificates with an expired validity period (that is, 5 years or more from the date
-            of certificate issuance) will be moved to an Archive list on the CCRA portal, unless the validity period has
-            been extended using the appropriate procedures.&nbsp;
-         </p>
-         <!--
-   <p>
-      The CCDB has approved a resolution to limit the validity of mutually recognized CC certificates over time.&nbsp; 
-      Certificates will remain on the CPL for five years.&nbsp; 
-      Effective 1 June 2019, certificates with an expired validity period (that is, 5 years or more from the date of certificate issuance) will be moved to an Archive list on the CCRA portal
-   </p>
-   <p>
-      The CCDB has approved a resolution to limit the validity of mutually recognized CC certificates over time.&nbsp; 
-      Certificates will remain on the CPL for five years.&nbsp; 
-      Effective 1 June 2019, certificates with an expired validity period (that is, 5 years or more from the date of certificate issuance) will be moved to an Archive list on the CCRA portal.&nbsp; 
-      Certificates fully recognized under the CCRA must claim conformance to either a collaborative Protection Profile (cPP) or EAL1-2.&nbsp; 
-   <p>
-   -->
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-         <h4 id="operations">
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-                        Date&nbsp;Certificate<br />Issued</th>
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-                        Certificate<br />Validity<br />Expiration<br />Date</th>
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-                     <th id="col_6" class="text " style=";text-align:center;width:5%;max-width:5%">Compliance</th>
-
-
-                     <th id="col_7" class="text last_th" style=";text-align:center;width:10%;max-width:10%">Scheme</th>
-
-
-                  </tr>
-               </thead>
-               <!--  2017.09.06 - Copied to CC Portal from NIAP site//KC                    -->
-               <!--  2017.09.06 - Converted tabs to spaces//KC                              -->
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-               <tfoot class="hilite7">
-                  <!-- hilite1 -->
-                  <tr class="">
-                     <td colspan="7" class="txt1 c i">
-                        This list was generated on Wednesday, November 11, 2020, at 10:47 AM
-                     </td>
-                  </tr>
-               </tfoot>
-
-               <!--  2017.09.06 - Copied to CC Portal from NIAP site + mods//KC             -->
-
-
-               <caption style="font-weight:bold;font-size:larger">
-                  <a name="AC" href="#AC" id="toggleAC" class="toggle"><img src="/assets/images/plusicon.gif" border="0" height="11" width="11" class="toggle" style="margin-right:.5em" />Access Control Devices and
-                     Systems &ndash; 27 Certified Products</a>
-               </caption>
-               <thead>
-
-
-               </thead>
-               <tfoot></tfoot>
-               <tbody>
-
-                  <tr class="">
-                     <td class="b">
-                        <!-- ID:  2020.1111 -->
-                        NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7<a name="2020.1111" style="text-decoration:none;">&nbsp;</a><span title="2020.1111">&nbsp;</span>
-                        <div class="none">
-                           <!-- <a href="https&#x3a;&#x2f;&#x2f;www.netiq.com&#x2f;" title="Vendor's web site" target="_blank">NetIQ Corporation</a> -->
-                           <img src="/assets/images/spacer.gif" width="600" height="1" class="" align="top"> <br />
-                           <!-- ------ ------ ------ Document Links ------ ------ ------ -->
-                           <div style="line-height:2.5em">
-                              <a href="/files/epfiles/Certification Report - NetIQÂŽ Identity Manager 4.7.pdf" title="Certification Report: Certification Report - NetIQÂŽ Identity Manager 4.7.pdf" target="_blank" class="button2">Certification Report</a>
-                              <a href="/files/epfiles/ST - NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7.pdf" title="Security Target: ST - NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7.pdf" target="_blank" class="button2">Security Target</a>
-
-                           </div>
-                           <!-- ------ ------ ------ END Document Links ------ ------ ------ -->
-                           <!-- ------ ------ ------ Product Updates ------ ------ ------ -->
-
-                           <!-- ------ ------ ------ END Product Updates ------ ------ ------ -->
-                        </div>
-                     </td>
-                     <!--end-product-cell-->
-                     <td>
-                        <a href="https&#x3a;&#x2f;&#x2f;www.netiq.com&#x2f;" title="Vendor's web site" target="_blank">NetIQ Corporation</a>
-                     </td>
-                     <td>
-
-                        <a href="/files/epfiles/Certifikat CCRA - NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7_signed.pdf" title="Certifikat CCRA - NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7_signed.pdf" target="_blank" class="button2">CCRA Certificate</a>
-
-                     </td>
-                     <td style="text-align:center"><span title="2020.1111">2020-06-15</span></td>
-
-                     <td style="text-align:center">2025-06-15</td>
-
-
-                     <td>
-
-
-                        EAL3+
-                        <br />ALC_FLR.2
-                     </td>
-
-                     <td style="text-align:center">
-                        <a href="/ccra/members/#SE">
-                           <img src="/assets/images/flags/se.png" alt="SE &ndash; Swedish Certification Body for IT Security FMV/CSEC" title="SE &ndash; Swedish Certification Body for IT Security FMV/CSEC" height="32" width="32" style="margin-bottom:-1em" /><br />SE</a>
-                     </td>
-                  </tr>
-
-                  <tr class="even">
-                     <td class="b">
-                        <!-- ID:  2019.1265 -->
-                        Magic SSO V4.0<a name="2019.1265" style="text-decoration:none;">&nbsp;</a><span title="2019.1265">&nbsp;</span>
-                        <div class="none">
-                           <!-- <a href="https&#x3a;&#x2f;&#x2f;www.dreamsecurity.com&#x2f;" title="Vendor's web site" target="_blank">Dreamsecurity Co., Ltd.</a> -->
-                           <img src="/assets/images/spacer.gif" width="600" height="1" class="" align="top"> <br />
-                           <!-- ------ ------ ------ Document Links ------ ------ ------ -->
-                           <div style="line-height:2.5em">
-                              <a href="/files/epfiles/KECS-CR-19-70 Magic SSO V4.0(eng) V1.0.pdf" title="Certification Report: KECS-CR-19-70 Magic SSO V4.0(eng) V1.0.pdf" target="_blank" class="button2">Certification Report</a>
-                              <a href="/files/epfiles/Magic_SSO_V4.0-ST-v1.4_EN.pdf" title="Security Target: Magic_SSO_V4.0-ST-v1.4_EN.pdf" target="_blank" class="button2">Security Target</a>
-
-                              <!-- how it was before 2017.09
-                           <a href="/files/ppfiles/KECS-PP-0822-2017 Korean National PP for Single Sign On V1.0(eng).pdf" target="_blank" class="button2" title="PP: Korean National Protection Profile for Single Sign On V1.0">Protection Profile</a> -->
-                              <!-- ------------------------------------ -->
-                              <!-- Set the display text for the link to the PP -->
-
-                              <!-- ------------------------------------ -->
-                              <br /><a href="/files/ppfiles/KECS-PP-0822-2017 Korean National PP for Single Sign On V1.0(eng).pdf" target="_blank" class="button2" title="">Korean National Protection Profile for Single
-                                 Sign On V1.0</a>
-
-                           </div>
-                           <!-- ------ ------ ------ END Document Links ------ ------ ------ -->
-                           <!-- ------ ------ ------ Product Updates ------ ------ ------ -->
-
-                           <!-- ------ ------ ------ END Product Updates ------ ------ ------ -->
-                        </div>
-                     </td>
-                     <!--end-product-cell-->
-                     <td>
-                        <a href="https&#x3a;&#x2f;&#x2f;www.dreamsecurity.com&#x2f;" title="Vendor's web site" target="_blank">Dreamsecurity Co., Ltd.</a>
-                     </td>
-                     <td>
-
-                        &nbsp;
-
-                     </td>
-                     <td style="text-align:center"><span title="2019.1265">2019-11-15</span></td>
-
-                     <td style="text-align:center">2024-11-15</td>
-
-
-                     <td>
-
-
-                        PP&nbsp;Compliant
-                     </td>
-
-                     <td style="text-align:center">
-                        <a href="/ccra/members/#KR">
-                           <img src="/assets/images/flags/kr.png" alt="KR &ndash; IT Security Certification Center&#x28;ITSCC&#x29;" title="KR &ndash; IT Security Certification Center&#x28;ITSCC&#x29;" height="32" width="32" style="margin-bottom:-1em" /><br />KR</a>
-                     </td>
-                  </tr>
-
-               </tbody>
-            </table>
-
-
-         </div><!-- END white, i think -->
-
-
-
-
-
-         <!--  2017.07.10 - Added blurb to active list re. archiving in 2019//KC      -->
-         <!--  2017.09.06 - 2017.09.08 - Big cosmetic changes per NIAP's request//KC  -->
-         <!--  2017.09.06 - Code clean-up in areas I touched//KC                      -->
-         <!--  2017.09.08 - Converted page to one paired CFoutput tag//KC             -->
-         <!--  2018.04.03 - 2018.04.05 - Put compliance column back w a few changes//KC -->
-         <!--  2018.10.04 - Added new text//KC                                        -->
-         <!--  2019.12.16 - Replaced Application.WebRoot w Application.CodeBase//KC   -->
-         <!--  2019.12.19 - Added product ID to comment & span title//KC              -->
-
-
-         <div id="footer" class="copy">
-            <p>&nbsp;</p>
-
-         </div>
-
-
-         <script type="text/javascript" src="/assets/js/searchhi.js"></script>
-
-
-
-
-         <!-- jstablesorter sppt -->
-         <!-- zxcv - Should be w/in JSTableSorter -->
-
-         <script type="text/javascript">
-            $(document).ready(function () {
-               $.tablesorter.defaults.widgets = ['zebra']; // add stripes
-               $.tablesorter.defaults.sortList = [[3, 1]]; // default sort column(s)
-               $('table').tablesorter({ headers: { 5: { sorter: false } } }); // enable sort & disable sort on specific column(s)
-            });
-         </script>
-         <!-- END jstablesorter sppt -->
-
-
-         <!--[if lt IE 8]>
-<script src="/assets/js/ie7-js/IE8.js" type="text/javascript"></script>
-<![endif]-->
-
-
-         <!-- Google Analytics -->
-         <script type="text/javascript">
-            var _gaq = _gaq || [];
-            _gaq.push(['_setAccount', 'UA-1394658-2']);
-            _gaq.push(['_trackPageview']);
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-               ga.src = ('https:' == document.location.protocol ? 'https://ssl' : 'http://www') + '.google-analytics.com/ga.js';
-               var s = document.getElementsByTagName('script')[0]; s.parentNode.insertBefore(ga, s);
-            })();
-         </script>
-
-
-
-
-
-         <!-- 2017.09.07 - Added jstablesorter sppt//KC                               -->
-
-
-      </div>
-   </div>
-</body>
-
-</html>
-\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/test/data/test_cc_oop/fictional_cert.json b/test/data/test_cc_oop/fictional_cert.json
deleted file mode 100644
index dd106e74..00000000
--- a/test/data/test_cc_oop/fictional_cert.json
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
-{
-    "_type": "CommonCriteriaCert",
-    "dgst": "9cf077f8b3c4a825",
-    "status": "archived",
-    "category": "Sample category",
-    "name": "Sample certificate name",
-    "manufacturer": "Sample manufacturer",
-    "scheme": "Sample scheme",
-    "security_level": [
-        "Sample security level"
-    ],
-    "not_valid_before": "1900-01-02",
-    "not_valid_after": "1900-01-03",
-    "report_link": "http://path.to/report/link",
-    "st_link": "http://path.to/st/link",
-    "src": "custom",
-    "cert_link": "http://path.to/cert/link",
-    "manufacturer_web": "http://path.to/manufacturer/web",
-    "protection_profiles": [
-        {
-            "_type": "ProtectionProfile",
-            "pp_name": "sample_pp",
-            "pp_link": "http://sample.pp"
-        }
-    ],
-    "maintainance_updates": [
-        {
-            "_type": "MaintainanceReport",
-            "maintainance_date": "1900-01-01",
-            "maintainance_title": "Sample maintainance",
-            "maintainance_report_link": "https://maintainance.up",
-            "maintainance_st_link": "https://maintainance.up"
-        }
-    ],
-    "state": {
-        "_type": "InternalState",
-        "st_link_ok": true,
-        "report_link_ok": true,
-        "st_convert_ok": true,
-        "report_convert_ok": true,
-        "st_extract_ok": true,
-        "report_extract_ok": true,
-        "errors": []
-    },
-    "pdf_data": {
-        "_type": "PdfData",
-        "report_metadata": null,
-        "st_metadata": null,
-        "report_frontpage": null,
-        "st_frontpage": null,
-        "report_keywords": null,
-        "st_keywords": null
-    },
-    "heuristics": {
-        "_type": "Heuristics",
-        "extracted_versions": null,
-        "cpe_matches": null,
-        "labeled": false,
-        "verified_cpe_matches": null,
-        "related_cves": null,
-        "cert_lab": null,
-        "cert_id": null
-    }
-}
-\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/test/data/test_cc_oop/report_869415cc4b91282e.txt b/test/data/test_cc_oop/report_869415cc4b91282e.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 0f421a31..00000000
--- a/test/data/test_cc_oop/report_869415cc4b91282e.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,481 +0,0 @@
-Ärendetyp: 6 Diarienummer: 18FMV7705-43:1
-HEMLIG/
-enligt Offentlighets- och sekretesslagen
-(2009:400)
-2020-06-15
-Country of origin: Sweden
-Försvarets materielverk
-Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
-Certification Report NetIQŽ Identity Manager 4.7
-Issue: 1.0, 2020-Jun-15
-Authorisation: Helén Svensson, Lead Certifier , CSEC
-Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
-Certification Report NetIQŽ Identity Manager 4.7
-18FMV7705-43:1 1.0 2020-06-15
-2 (18)
-Table of Contents
-1 Executive Summary 3
-2 Identification 5
-3 Security Policy 6
-3.1 Security Management 6
-3.2 Security Audit 6
-3.3 Identification and Authentication 6
-3.4 User Data Protection 7
-3.5 Trusted Path / Channel 7
-3.6 Cryptographic Support 7
-4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 8
-4.1 Usage Assumptions 8
-4.2 Environmental Assumptions 8
-4.3 Clarification of Scope 8
-5 Architectural Information 9
-6 Documentation 11
-7 IT Product Testing 12
-7.1 Developer Testing 12
-7.2 Evaluator Testing 12
-7.3 Penetration Testing 12
-8 Evaluated Configuration 13
-9 Results of the Evaluation 14
-10 Evaluator Comments and Recommendations 15
-11 Glossary 16
-12 Bibliography 17
-Appendix A Scheme Versions 18
-A.1 Scheme/Quality Management System 18
-A.2 Scheme Notes 18
-Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
-Certification Report NetIQŽ Identity Manager 4.7
-18FMV7705-43:1 1.0 2020-06-15
-3 (18)
-1 Executive Summary
-The TOE is NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7.
-It is a software TOE consisting of the components listed below that can be setup on
-separate hardware platforms, see the [ST], or as a virtual appliances.
-TOE Components:
- Identity Applications (RBPM) 4.7.3.0.1109
- Identity Manager Engine 4.7.3.0.AE
- Identity Reporting Module 6.5.0. F14508F
- Sentinel Log Management for Identity Governance and Administration
-8.2.2.0_5415
- One SSO Provider (OSP) 6.3.3.0
- Self Service Password Reset (SSPR) 4.4.0.2 B366 r39762
-The TOE is delivered as software with documentation and can be installed in a physi-
-cal or virtual environment.
-It is important to verify the integrity of the TOE for secure acceptance of the TOE in
-accordance with the preparative procedures of the guidance, i.e. verify the TLS con-
-nection, the CA certificate and the file hash. It is also important to update the TOE (in-
-cluding 3rd party software) and the operational environment of the TOE in accordance
-with the preparative procedures of the guidance to mitigate known vulnerabilities.
-No conformance claims to any PP are made for the TOE.
-The evaluation has been performed by Combitech AB in Växjö, Sweden and by
-EWA-Canada in Ottawa, Canada. Site Visit and parts of the testing was performed at
-the developer's site in Bangalore, India.
-The evaluation was completed on 2020-06-02. The evaluation was conducted in ac-
-cordance with the requirements of Common Criteria, version 3.1 R5.
-Combitech AB is a licensed evaluation facility for Common Criteria under the Swe-
-dish Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme. Combitech AB is also
-accredited by the Swedish accreditation body SWEDAC according to ISO/IEC 17025
-for Common Criteria evaluation. EWA-Canada Ltd. operates as a Foreign location for
-Combitech AB within scope of the Swedish Common Criteria Evaluation and Certifi-
-cation Scheme.
-The certifier monitored the activities of the evaluator by reviewing all successive ver-
-sions of the evaluation reports, and by observing site-visit and testing. The certifier
-determined that the evaluation results confirm the security claims in the Security
-Target (ST) and the Common Methodology for evaluation assurance level EAL3
-augmented by ALC_FLR.2
-The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
-certificate, and on the condition that all the stipulations in the Security Target are
-met.
-This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by CSEC or any other or-
-ganisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the
-IT product by CSEC or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
-certificate is either expressed or implied.
-Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
-Certification Report NetIQŽ Identity Manager 4.7
-18FMV7705-43:1 1.0 2020-06-15
-4 (18)
-As specified in the security target of this evaluation, the invocation of cryptographic
-primitives has been included in the TOE, while the implementation of these primi-
-tives has been located in TOE environment. Therefore the invocation of crypto-
-graphic primitives has been in the scope of this evaluation, while correctness of im-
-plementation of cryptographic primitives been excluded from the TOE. Correctness
-of implementation is done through third party certification Cryptographic Module
-Validation Program (CMVP) certificate number 1747 referred to in the Security
-Target.
-Users of this product are advised to consider their acceptance of this third party af-
-firmation regarding the correctness of implementation of the cryptographic primi-
-tives.
-Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
-Certification Report NetIQŽ Identity Manager 4.7
-18FMV7705-43:1 1.0 2020-06-15
-5 (18)
-2 Identification
-Certification Identification
-Certification ID CSEC2018013
-Name and version of the cer-
-tified IT product
-NetIQŽ Identity Manager 4.7
-TOE components:
- Identity Applications (RBPM) 4.7.3.0.1109
- Identity Manager Engine 4.7.3.0.AE
- Identity Reporting Module 6.5.0. F14508F
- Sentinel Log Management for Identity Govern-
-ance and Administration 8.2.2.0_5415
- One SSO Provider (OSP) 6.3.3.0
- Self Service Password Reset (SSPR) 4.4.0.2
-B366 r39762
-Security Target Identification NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 Security Target (ST),
-NetIQ Corporation , 2020-06-01, document version
-2.6
-EAL EAL3 + ALC_FLR.2
-Sponsor NetIQ Corporation
-Developer NetIQ Corporation
-ITSEF Combitech AB and EWA-Canada
-Common Criteria version 3.1 release 5
-CEM version 3.1 release 5
-QMS version 1.23.2
-Scheme Notes Release 15.0
-Recognition Scope CCRA, SOGIS and EA/MLA
-Certification date 2020-06-15
-Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
-Certification Report NetIQŽ Identity Manager 4.7
-18FMV7705-43:1 1.0 2020-06-15
-6 (18)
-3 Security Policy
-The security features performed by the TOE are as follows:
- Security Management
- Security Audit
- Identification and Authentication
- User Data Protection
- Trusted Path / Channels
- Cryptographic Support
-3.1 Security Management
-The TOE maintains operator roles. The individual roles are categorized into two main
-roles: the Administrator and the User.
-Administrator - A user who has rights to configure and manage all aspects of the TOE
-User - The user's capabilities can be configured to:
- View hierarchical relationships between User objects
- View and edit user information (with appropriate rights).
- Search for users or resources using advanced search criteria (which can be saved
-for later reuse).
- Recover forgotten passwords.
-Only an Administrator can determine the behavior of, disable, enable, and modify the
-behavior of the functions that implement the Discretionary Access Control SFP. The
-TPE ensures only secure values are accepted for the security attributes listed with Dis-
-cretionary Access Control SFP.
-3.2 Security Audit
-The TOE generates the following audit data:
- Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions (instantiated by startup of the TOE)
- User login/logout
- Login failures
-The TOE provides the Administrator with the capability to read all audit data gener-
-ated within the TOE via the console. The GUI provides a suitable means for an Ad-
-ministrator to interpret the information from the audit log.
-The A.TIMESOURCE is added to the assumptions on operational environment, and
-OE.TIME is added to the operational environment security objectives. The time and
-date provided by the operational environment are used to form the timestamps. The
-TOE ensures that the audit trail data is stamped when recorded with a dependable date
-and time received from the OE (operating system). In this manner, accurate time and
-date is maintained on the TOE.
-3.3 Identification and Authentication
-The IDM console application provides user interfaces that administrators may use to
-manage TOE functions. The operating system and the database in the TOE Environ-
-ment are queried to individually authenticate administrators or users. The TOE main-
-tains authorization information that determines which TOE functions an authenticated
-administrators or users (of a given role) may perform.
-Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
-Certification Report NetIQŽ Identity Manager 4.7
-18FMV7705-43:1 1.0 2020-06-15
-7 (18)
-The TOE maintains the following list of security attributes belonging to individual us-
-ers:
- User Identity (i.e., user name)
- Authentication Status (whether the IT Environment validated the username/pass-
-word)
- Privilege Level (Administrator or User)
-3.4 User Data Protection
-The TOE implements a discretionary access control policy to define what roles can
-access particular functions of the TOE. All access and actions for system reports, com-
-ponent audit logs, TOE configuration, operator account attributes (defined in
-FIA_ATD.1) are protected via access control list. When a user requests to perform an
-action on an object, the TOE verifies the role associated with the user name. Access is
-granted if the user (or group of users) has the specific rights required for the type of
-operation requested on the object.
-Identity Manager can enforce password policies on incoming passwords from con-
-nected systems and on passwords set or changed through the User Application pass-
-word self-service. If the new password does not comply, you can specify that Identity
-Manager not accept the password. This also means that passwords that don't comply
-with your policies are not distributed to other connected systems.
-In addition, can enforce password policies on connected systems. If the password be-
-ing published to the Identity Vault does not comply with rules in a policy, you can
-specify that Identity Manager not only does not accept the password for distribution,
-but actually resets the noncompliant password on the connected system by using the
-current Distribution password in the Identity Vault.
-3.5 Trusted Path / Channel
-The TOE provides a trusted channel between the TOE and external web servers.
-The TOE provides a trusted path for TOE administrators and TOE users to communi-
-cate with the TOE. The trusted path is implemented using HTTPS. The TOE's imple-
-mentation of TLS is described in the previous section (Trusted Channel).
-3.6 Cryptographic Support
-Cryptographic protection of data in transit between the TOE and remote users, and be-
-tween the TOE and external web servers is provided by the OpenSSL FIPS Object
-Module software version 2.0.10 (Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP)
-certificate number 1747) libraries.
-Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
-Certification Report NetIQŽ Identity Manager 4.7
-18FMV7705-43:1 1.0 2020-06-15
-8 (18)
-4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
-4.1 Usage Assumptions
-The Security Target [ST] makes two assumptions on the usage of the TOE.
-A.MANAGE - Administrators of the TOE are assumed to be appropriately trained to
-undertake the installation, configuration and management of the TOE in a secure and
-trusted manner.
-A.NOEVIL - Administrators of the TOE and users on the local area network are not
-careless, willfully negligent, nor hostile, and will follow and abide by the instructions
-provided by the TOE documentation
-4.2 Environmental Assumptions
-The Security Target [ST] makes three assumptions on the operational environment of
-the TOE.
-A.LOCATE - The processing platforms on which the TOE resides are assumed to be
-located within a facility that provides controlled access
-A.CONFIG - The TOE is configured to receive all passwords and associated data from
-network-attached systems.
-A.TIMESOURCE - The TOE has a trusted source for system time via NTP server
-4.3 Clarification of Scope
-The Security Target contains five threats, which have been considered during the eval-
-uation.
-T.NO_AUTH - An unauthorized user may gain access to the TOE and alter the TOE
-configuration.
-T.NO_PRIV - An authorized user of the TOE exceeds his/her assigned security privi-
-leges resulting in unauthorized modification of the TOE configuration and/or data.
-T.USER_ACCESS_DENY - An authorized user may be able to change user authenti-
-cation data and or user access policies and deny their access to it later.
-T.PASSWD_COMPROMISE - An unauthorized user may be able to obtain and use
-user passwords.
-T.PROT_TRANS - An unauthorized user may be able to gather information from
-communications between components.
-The Security Target contains one Organisational Security Policies (OSPs), which have
-been considered during the evaluation.
-P.REMOTE_DATA - Passwords and account information from network-attached sys-
-tems shall be monitored and managed.
-Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
-Certification Report NetIQŽ Identity Manager 4.7
-18FMV7705-43:1 1.0 2020-06-15
-9 (18)
-5 Architectural Information
-The TOE consists of the following components:
- Administration Workstation (Console)2
- Identity Applications (RBPM)
- Designer aka Identity Manager Designer
- Analyzer aka Identity Manager Analyzer
- Identity Manager
- Identity Manager Engine
- Identity Vault
- iManager
- Reporting Server
- Identity Reporting Module
- Log Manager
- Sentinel Log Management for Identity Governance and Administration
- SSO Provider
- One SSO Provider (OSP)
- Self Service Password Reset
- Self Service Password Reset (SSPR)
-Figure 1, TOE Deployment with subsystems
-The TOE provides the following functions: data synchronization, role management,
-auditing/reporting, and management.
-Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
-Certification Report NetIQŽ Identity Manager 4.7
-18FMV7705-43:1 1.0 2020-06-15
-10 (18)
- Data synchronization, including password synchronization, is provided by the
-base components of the Identity Manager solution: the Identity Vault, Identity
-Manager engine, drivers, Remote Loader, and connected applications
- Role management is provided by the User Application
- Auditing and reporting are provided by the Identity Reporting Module
-Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
-Certification Report NetIQŽ Identity Manager 4.7
-18FMV7705-43:1 1.0 2020-06-15
-11 (18)
-6 Documentation
-The TOE includes the following guidance documentation:
- Quick Start Guide for Installing NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 February 2018
-[QSIM]
- NetIQ Identity Manager Setup Guide for Linux February 2018 [SUL]
- NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7, Operational User Guidance and Preparative Proce-
-dures Supplement (AGD-IGS), version 0.6, is supplied for those customers that
-need guidance on how to set the TOE in the evaluated configuration. [AGD]
-Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
-Certification Report NetIQŽ Identity Manager 4.7
-18FMV7705-43:1 1.0 2020-06-15
-12 (18)
-7 IT Product Testing
-7.1 Developer Testing
-There are 30 test cases covering all SFRs with at least one test per SFR. All tests were
-successful with a pass verdict.
-7.2 Evaluator Testing
-Since all SFRs and security function requirements were tested by the developer the
-evaluator focused on repetition of the developer's test cases and penetration testing.
-7.3 Penetration Testing
-Port and vulnerability scan were performed on Identity manager engine, Identity appli-
-cations (RBPM), and Identity reporting module.
-No unforeseen ports or vulnerabilities were found.
-Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
-Certification Report NetIQŽ Identity Manager 4.7
-18FMV7705-43:1 1.0 2020-06-15
-13 (18)
-8 Evaluated Configuration
-The TOE consists of a set of software applications run on one or multiple distributed
-systems. The TOE requires the following software components as part of the evalu-
-ated configuration:
-Component Requirements
-Administration Workstation Mozilla Firefox 65
-Identity Applications (RBPM)
-Designer / Analyzer)
-SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 SP4
-Identity Manager (Identity Man-
-ager Engine)
-SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 SP4
-Reporting Server (Identity Re-
-porting Module)
-SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 SP4
-Log Manager (Sentinel Log Man-
-agement for Identity Governance
-and Administration)
-SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 SP4
-SSO Provider (OneSSO Provider) SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 SP4
-Self Service Password Reset SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 SP4
-In addition to the platform requirements mentioned above, the following hardware re-
-sources are needed in order to install and configure Identity Manager on each plat-
-form:
- A minimum of 8 GB RAM
- 15 GB available disk space to install all the components.
- Additional disk space to configure and populate data. This might vary depending
-on your connected systems and number of objects in the Identity Vault.
-For server-based components, it is recommended that the platform have a minimum of
-2 CPUs or cores.
-Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
-Certification Report NetIQŽ Identity Manager 4.7
-18FMV7705-43:1 1.0 2020-06-15
-14 (18)
-9 Results of the Evaluation
-The evaluators applied each work unit of the Common Methodology [CEM] within
-the scope of the evaluation, and concluded that the TOE meets the security objectives
-stated in the Security Target [ST] for an attack potential of Basic.
-The certifier reviewed the work of the evaluators and determined that the evaluation
-was conducted in accordance with the Common Criteria [CC].
-The evaluators' overall verdict is PASS.
-The verdicts for the respective assurance classes and components are summarised in
-the following table:
-Assurance Class/Family Short name Verdict
-Development ADV: PASS
-Security architecture description ADV_ARC.1 PASS
-Functional specification with complete summary ADV_FSP.3 PASS
-Architectural design ADV_TDS.2 PASS
-Guidance documents AGD: PASS
-Operational user guidance AGD_OPE.1 PASS
-Preparative procedures AGD_PRE.1 PASS
-Life-cycle support ALC: PASS
-Authorisation controls ALC_CMC.3 PASS
-Implementation representation CM coverage ALC_CMS.3 PASS
-Delivery procedures ALC_DEL.1 PASS
-Identification of security measures ALC_DVS.1 PASS
-Developer defined life-cycle model ALC_LCD.1 PASS
-Flaw reporting procedures ALC_FLR.2 PASS
-Security Target evaluation ASE: PASS
-Conformance claims ASE_CCL.1 PASS
-Extended components definition ASE_ECD.1 PASS
-ST introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
-Security objectives ASE_OBJ.2 PASS
-Derived security requirements ASE_REQ.2 PASS
-Security problem definition ASE_SPD.1 PASS
-TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
-Tests ATE: PASS
-Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.2 PASS
-Testing: basic design ATE_DPT.1 PASS
-Functional testing ATE_FUN.1 PASS
-Independent testing - sample ATE_IND.2 PASS
-Vulnerability assessment AVA: PASS
-Vulnerability analysis AVA_VAN.2 PASS
-Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
-Certification Report NetIQŽ Identity Manager 4.7
-18FMV7705-43:1 1.0 2020-06-15
-15 (18)
-10 Evaluator Comments and Recommendations
-None.
-Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
-Certification Report NetIQŽ Identity Manager 4.7
-18FMV7705-43:1 1.0 2020-06-15
-16 (18)
-11 Glossary
-CC Common Criteria version 3.1
-EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
-FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
-IDM Identity Manager
-ITSEF
-IT Security Evaluation Facility, test labora-
-tory licensed to operate within a evaluation
-and certification scheme
-NTP Network Time Protocol
-OSP Organizational Security Policy
-OSP One SSO Provider
-SSO Single Sign On
-SFP Security Function Policy
-SFR Security Functional Requirement
-SSPR Self Service Password Reset
-ST Security Target
-TOE Target of Evaluation
-Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
-Certification Report NetIQŽ Identity Manager 4.7
-18FMV7705-43:1 1.0 2020-06-15
-17 (18)
-12 Bibliography
-ST NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 Security Target (ST), NetIQ
-Corporation, 2020-06-01, document version 2.6
-QSIM Quick Start Guide for Installing NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7
-February 2018
-SUL NetIQ Identity Manager Setup Guide for Linux February 2018
-AGD NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7, Operational User Guidance and
-Preparative Procedures Supplement (AGD-IGS), version 0.6
-CCpart1 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
-Part 1, version 3.1 revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001
-CCpart2 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
-Part 2, version 3.1 revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-002
-CCpart3 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
-Evaluation,Part 3, version 3.1 revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-003
-CC CCpart1 + CCpart2 + CCpart3
-CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
-Evaluation, version 3.1 revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-004
-SP-002 SP-002 Evaluation and Certification, CSEC, 2019-09-24, document
-version 31.0
-Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
-Certification Report NetIQŽ Identity Manager 4.7
-18FMV7705-43:1 1.0 2020-06-15
-18 (18)
-Appendix A Scheme Versions
-During the certification the following versions of the Swedish Common Criteria Eval-
-uation and Certification scheme have been used.
-A.1 Scheme/Quality Management System
-During the certification project, the following versions of the quality management sys-
-tem (QMS) have been applicable since the certification application was received:
-QMS 1.21.5 valid from 2018-11-19
-QMS 1.22 valid from 2019-02-01
-QMS 1.22.1 valid from 2019-03-08
-QMS 1.22.2 valid from 2019-05-02
-QMS 1.22.3 valid from 2019-05-20
-QMS 1.23 valid from 2019-10-14
-QMS 1.23.1 valid from 2020-03-06
-QMS 1.23.2 valid from 2020-05-11
-In order to ensure consistency in the outcome of the certification, the certifier has ex-
-amined the changes introduced in each update of the quality management system.
-The changes between consecutive versions are outlined in "Ändringslista CSEC QMS
-1.23.1". The certifier concluded that, from QMS 1.21.5 to the current QMS 1.23.2,
-there are no changes with impact on the result of the certification.
-Note that the SP-188 Scheme Crypto Policy version 9.0 was introduced in QMS 1.23.
-The certification application was submitted before the SP-188 Scheme Crypto Policy
-version 9.0 was introduced and therefore version 8.0 was used.
-A.2 Scheme Notes
-The following Scheme interpretations have been considered during the certification.
- Scheme Note 15 - Demonstration of test Coverage
- Scheme Note 18 - Highlighted Requirements on the Security Target
- Scheme Note 22 - Vulnerability assessment
- Scheme Note 28 - Updated procedures for application, evaluation and certification
-
-\ No newline at end of file
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-NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7
-Security Target (ST)
-Date: June 1, 2020
-Version: 2.6
-Prepared By: NetIQ Corporation
-Prepared For: NetIQ Corporation
-515 Post Oak Blvd
-Suite 1200
-Houston, Texas 77027
-Abstract
-This document provides the basis for an evaluation of a specific Target of Evaluation (TOE), Identity
-Manager 4.7. This Security Target (ST) defines a set of assumptions about the aspects of the environment,
-a list of threats that the product intends to counter, a set of security objectives, a set of security requirements
-and the IT security functions provided by the TOE which meet the set of requirements.
-June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST
-NetIQ Corporation Page 2 of 36
-Table of Contents
-Table of Contents...................................................................................................................................2
-List of Tables.........................................................................................................................................3
-List of Figures........................................................................................................................................4
-1. Introduction ...........................................................................................................................................5
-Security Target Reference:............................................................................................................5
-TOE Reference..............................................................................................................................5
-Document Organization................................................................................................................5
-Document Conventions.................................................................................................................6
-Document Terminology................................................................................................................6
-TOE Overview..............................................................................................................................7
-TOE Description...........................................................................................................................8
-Administration Workstation (Console):........................................................................................8
-Identity Applications (RBPM)......................................................................................................8
-Identity Manager:..........................................................................................................................9
-Reporting Server:..........................................................................................................................9
-Log Manager:................................................................................................................................9
-OneSSO Provider:.........................................................................................................................9
-Self Service Password Reset:......................................................................................................10
-TOE Delivery:.............................................................................................................................10
-TOE Environment.......................................................................................................................10
-Virtual Machines.........................................................................................................................10
-Hardware and Software Supplied by the IT Environment..........................................................11
-Logical Boundary........................................................................................................................11
-TOE Security Functional Policies...............................................................................................12
-Discretionary Access Control SFP..............................................................................................12
-TOE Vendor Documentation / Guidance....................................................................................12
-Features / Functionality NOT Included in the TOE....................................................................12
-2. Conformance Claims ...........................................................................................................................14
-CC Conformance Claim..............................................................................................................14
-PP Claim .....................................................................................................................................14
-Package Claim ............................................................................................................................14
-Conformance Rationale...............................................................................................................14
-3. Security Problem Definition................................................................................................................15
-Threats.........................................................................................................................................15
-Organizational Security Policies.................................................................................................15
-Assumptions................................................................................................................................15
-4. Security Objectives..............................................................................................................................17
-Security Objectives for the TOE.................................................................................................17
-Security Objectives for the Operational Environment................................................................17
-Security Objectives Rationale.....................................................................................................17
-Mapping of Objectives................................................................................................................18
-5. Extended Components Definition........................................................................................................20
-6. Security Requirements.........................................................................................................................21
-Security Functional Requirements..............................................................................................21
-Security Audit (FAU) .................................................................................................................21
-FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation..........................................................................................21
-FAU_SAR.1 Audit Review.........................................................................................................22
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-Cryptographic Support................................................................................................................22
-FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation...............................................................................22
-FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction..............................................................................22
-FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation (Encryption / Decryption) ..............................................22
-Information Flow Control (FDP) ................................................................................................23
-FDP_ACC.1 Subset Access Control...........................................................................................23
-FDP_ACF.1 Security Attribute Based Access Control...............................................................23
-Identification and Authentication (FIA) .....................................................................................24
-FIA_ATD.1  User Attribute Definition.....................................................................................24
-FIA_UAU.2 User Authentication before Any Action ................................................................24
-FIA_UID.2 User Identification before Any Action....................................................................24
-Security Management (FMT)......................................................................................................24
-FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes .......................................................................24
-FMT_MSA.2 Secure Security Attributes....................................................................................24
-FMT_MSA.3 Static Attribute Initialization................................................................................24
-FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF Data....................................................................................25
-FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions ..............................................................25
-FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles.......................................................................................................25
-Protection of the TSF (FPT)........................................................................................................25
-FPT_TDC.1 Inter-TSF Basic TSF Data Consistency .................................................................25
-Trusted Path / Channel (FTP) .....................................................................................................26
-FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel ........................................................................................26
-FTP_TRP.1 Trusted Path............................................................................................................26
-Security Assurance Requirements ..............................................................................................26
-Security Requirements Rationale................................................................................................26
-Security Functional Requirements..............................................................................................26
-Dependency Rationale ................................................................................................................27
-Sufficiency of Security Requirements ........................................................................................28
-Security Assurance Requirements ..............................................................................................30
-Security Assurance Requirements Rationale ..............................................................................30
-Security Assurance Requirements Evidence...............................................................................31
-7. TOE Summary Specification...............................................................................................................33
-TOE Security Functions..............................................................................................................33
-Security Audit.............................................................................................................................33
-Identification and Authentication................................................................................................33
-User Data Protection...................................................................................................................33
-Security Management .................................................................................................................34
-Trusted Path / Channels ..............................................................................................................35
-Trusted Channel..........................................................................................................................35
-Trusted Path:...............................................................................................................................35
-Cryptographic Support................................................................................................................35
-List of Tables
-Table 1  ST Organization and Section Descriptions...................................................................................6
-Table 2  Acronyms Used in Security Target...............................................................................................7
-Table 3  CAVP Certificate Numbers ..........................................................................................................9
-Table 4  Virtual Machine Environment Requirements .............................................................................11
-Table 5  IT Environment Component Requirements................................................................................11
-Table 6  Logical Boundary Descriptions ..................................................................................................12
-Table 7  IT Environment Components - Not In TOE ...............................................................................13
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-Table 8  Threats Addressed by the TOE...................................................................................................15
-Table 9  Organizational Security Policies.................................................................................................15
-Table 10  Assumptions..............................................................................................................................16
-Table 11  TOE Security Objectives ..........................................................................................................17
-Table 12  Operational Environment Security Objectives .........................................................................17
-Table 13  Mapping of Assumptions, Threats, Policies and ORSP s to Security Objectives.....................18
-Table 14  Mapping of Threats, Policies, and Assumptions to Objectives ................................................19
-Table 15  TOE Security Functional Requirements ...................................................................................21
-Table 16  Cryptographic Standards...........................................................................................................22
-Table 17  Cryptographic Operations.........................................................................................................23
-Table 18  Management of TSF data..........................................................................................................25
-Table 19  Mapping of TOE Security Functional Requirements and Objectives.......................................27
-Table 20  Mapping of SFR to Dependencies and Rationales....................................................................28
-Table 20  Rationale for TOE SFRs to Objectives.....................................................................................30
-Table 22  Security Assurance Requirements at EAL3..............................................................................30
-Table 23  Security Assurance Rationale and Measures ............................................................................32
-Table 24  Roles and Functions..................................................................................................................34
-Table 22  CAVP........................................................................................................................................36
-List of Figures
-Figure 1  TOE Deployment with Subsystems.............................................................................................7
-Figure 2  Sample Download List ..............................................................................................................10
-June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST
-NetIQ Corporation Page 5 of 36
-1. Introduction
-This section identifies the Security Target (ST), Target of Evaluation (TOE), Security Target
-organization, document conventions, and terminology. It also includes an overview of the
-evaluated product.
-Security Target Reference:
-ST Title NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 Security Target:
-ST Revision 2.6
-ST Publication Date June 1, 2020
-ST Author Michael F. Angelo
-TOE Reference
-TOE Reference NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7
-TOE Developer NetIQ Corporation
-Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) EAL3+
-Note: The file download name is: Identity_Manager_4.7_Linux.iso .
-Note: The official name of the product is NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 Advanced Edition. The
-released product can be uniquely identified as: NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7.3. The product name
-may also be abbreviated as Identity Manager 4.7 AE, Identity Manager, IDM 4.7.3AE or IDM 4.7
-or simply IDM . Finally the TOE, if examined for the build number will be identified as NetIQ
-Identity Manager 4.7.3.0.317. For the purpose of this document all of the above references are
-equivalent, and the document may refer to the product simply as IDM or the TOE.
-Document Organization
-This Security Target follows the following format:
-SECTION TITLE DESCRIPTION
-1 Introduction Provides an overview of the TOE and defines the
-hardware and software that make up the TOE as well
-as the physical and logical boundaries of the TOE
-2 Conformance Claims Lists evaluation conformance to Common Criteria
-versions, Protection Profiles, or Packages where
-applicable
-3 Security Problem
-Definition
-Specifies the threats, assumptions and organizational
-security policies that affect the TOE
-4 Security Objectives Defines the security objectives for the
-TOE/operational environment and provides a
-rationale to demonstrate that the security objectives
-satisfy the threats
-5 Extended
-Components
-Definition
-Describes extended components of the evaluation (if
-any)
-6 Security
-Requirements
-Contains the functional and assurance requirements
-for this TOE
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-SECTION TITLE DESCRIPTION
-7 TOE Summary
-Specification
-Identifies the IT security functions provided by the
-TOE and also identifies the assurance measures
-targeted to meet the assurance requirements.
-Table 1  ST Organization and Section Descriptions
-Document Conventions
-The notation, formatting, and conventions used in this Security Target are consistent with those
-used in Version 3.1 of the Common Criteria. Selected presentation choices are discussed here
-to aid the Security Target reader. The Common Criteria allows several operations to be
-performed on functional requirements: The allowable operations defined in Part 2 of the
-Common Criteria are refinement, selection, assignment and iteration.
- The refinement operation is used to add detail to a requirement, and thus further
-restricts a requirement. Refinement of security requirements is denoted by bold text.
-Any text removed is indicated with a strikethrough format (Example: TSF).
- The selection operation is picking one or more items from a list in order to narrow the
-scope of a component element. Selections are denoted by italicized text.
- The assignment operation is used to assign a specific value to an unspecified parameter,
-such as the length of a password. An assignment operation is indicated by showing the
-value in square brackets, i.e. [assignment_value(s)].
- Iterated functional and assurance requirements are given unique identifiers by
-appending to the base requirement identifier from the Common Criteria an iteration
-number inside parenthesis, for example, FMT_MTD.1.1 (1) and FMT_MTD.1.1 (2) refer
-to separate instances of the FMT_MTD.1 security functional requirement component.
-When not embedded in a Security Functional Requirement, italicized text is used for both
-official document titles and text meant to be emphasized more than plain text.
-Document Terminology
-The following table describes the acronyms used in this document:
-TERM DEFINITION
-CC Common Criteria version 3.1
-EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
-IDM Identity Manager
-IDV Identity Vault
-IGA Identity Governance and Administration
-NMAS NetIQ Modular Authentication Service
-NTP Network Time Protocol
-ORSP Organizational Security Policy
-OSP One SSO Provider
-SSO Single Sign On
-SFP Security Function Policy
-SFR Security Functional Requirement
-SLM Sentinel Log Manager
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-TERM DEFINITION
-SSPR Self Service Password Reset
-ST Security Target
-TOE Target of Evaluation
-TSF TOE Security Function
-Table 2  Acronyms Used in Security Target
-TOE Overview
-The TOE is NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7. NetIQ Identity Manager provides data sharing and
-synchronization services which enable applications, directories, and databases to share
-information. It links scattered information and enables you to establish policies that govern
-automatic updates to designated systems when identity changes occur.
-Identity Manager provides the foundation for account provisioning, security, single sign-on,
-user self-service, authentication, authorization, automated workflow, and Web services. It
-allows you to integrate, manage, and control your distributed identity information so you can
-securely deliver the right resources to the right people.
-The following diagram shows a typical TOE deployment:
-Identity Reporting Module
-Operating System
-General Purpose Computing
-Platform
-Reporting Server
-Sentinel Log Management
-for Identity Governance
-and Administration
-Operating System
-General Purpose Computing
-Platform
-Log Manager
-Identity Manager Engine
-Identity Vault
-Operating System
-General Purpose Computing
-Platform
-Identity Applications
-(RBPM)
-Web Browser
-Operating System
-General Purpose Computing
-(GPC) Platform
-Identity Application
-4
-1
-2
-8
-10
-= TOE Component
-= IT Environment Component
-One SSO Provider
-(uname / pass, Kerberos,
-SAML)
-Operating System
-General Purpose Computing
-Platform
-3
-5
-SSO Provider
-Self Service Password
-Reset
-Web Browser
-Operating System
-General Purpose Computing
-Platform
-Self Service Password Reset
-11
-9
-12
-7a
-Identity Manager
-6
-B
-Administration
-Workstation
-(Console) 7b
-Separate communication paths to Sentinel Log Manager
-7a  Identity Vault to Sentinel Log Manager
-7b  iManager to Sentinel Log Manager
-C
-A
-iManager
-Designer / Analyzer
-= TOE Sub Component
-OpenSSL
-Figure 1  TOE Deployment with Subsystems1
-The TOE provides the following functions: data synchronization, role management,
-auditing/reporting, and management.
-11
-Note the Administration Workstation Console is not included in the evaluation as there is no code that is added to it to make it
-explicitly a workstation console. It is included in the document as a component required for access.to the TOE.
-June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST
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- Data synchronization, including password synchronization, is provided by the base
-components of the Identity Manager solution: the Identity Vault, Identity Manager
-engine, drivers, Remote Loader, and connected applications
- Role management is provided by the User Application
- Auditing and reporting are provided by the Identity Reporting Module
-TOE Description
-NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 is a comprehensive identity management suite. It provides an
-intelligent identity framework that leverages your existing IT assets and new computing
-models like Software as a Service (SaaS) by reducing cost and ensuring compliance across
-physical, virtual, and cloud environments. With the NetIQ Identity Manager solution, you can
-make sure that your business has the most current user identity information. You can retain
-control at the enterprise level by managing, provisioning, and de-provisioning identities within
-the firewall and extending to the cloud. Through streamlined user administration and
-processes, Identity Manager helps organizations reduce management costs, increase
-productivity and security, and comply with government regulations.
-The TOE is a software TOE and includes the following functions.
-Each function contains the components as follows:
-1. Administration Workstation (Console)2
-2. Identity Applications (RBPM) 4.7.3.0.1109
- Designer aka Identity Manager Designer 4.7.3.0.20190614
- Analyzer aka Identity Manager Analyzer
-3. Identity Manager
- Identity Manager Engine 4.7.3.0.AE
-o Identity Vault 9.1.4
-o iManager 3.1.4
-4. Reporting Server
- Identity Reporting Module 6.5.0. F14508F
-5. Log Manager
- Sentinel Log Management for Identity Governance and Administration 8.2.2.0_5415
-6. SSO Provider
- One SSO Provider (OSP) 6.3.3.0
-7. Self Service Password Reset
- Self Service Password Reset (SSPR) 4.4.0.2 B366 r39762
-Administration Workstation (Console):
-The Administration Workstation (Console) is used to access the Identity Applications (RBPM),
-Identity Manager, and the Reporting Server. Each of these functions is described below.
-Identity Applications (RBPM)
-The Identity Applications (RBPM) houses the Designer / Analyzer functions. The Identity
-Application is a Web application (browser-based) that gives users and business administrators
-the ability to perform a variety of identity self-service and roles provisioning tasks, including
-managing passwords and identity data, initiating and monitoring provisioning and role
-assignment requests, managing the approval process for provisioning requests, and verifying
-2
-The Administration Workstation (Console) is not part of the TOE, in that there is no code added to it in order to function as the
-Console it is required to access features and function of the TOE and is included for completeness.
-June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST
-NetIQ Corporation Page 9 of 36
-attestation reports. It includes the workflow engine that controls the routing of requests
-through the appropriate approval process. Designer aka Designer for Identity Manager helps
-you design, test, document, and deploy Identity Manager solutions in a network or test
-environment. Analyzer aka NetIQ Analyzer for Identity Manager is an identity management
-toolset that helps you ensure that internal data quality policies are adhered to by providing
-data analysis, data cleansing, data reconciliation, and data monitoring/reporting. Analyzer lets
-you analyze, enhance, and control all data stores throughout the enterprise.
-Identity Manager:
-The Identity Manager houses the Identity Manager Engine (and the Identity Vault which
-contains the Identity Applications data) and iManager. The Identity Manager Engine
-synchronizes identity data between applications. For example, data synchronized from a
-PeopleSoft system to Lotus Notes is first added to the Identity Vault and then sent to the Lotus
-Notes system. In addition, the Identity Vault stores information specific to Identity Manager,
-such as driver configurations, parameters, and policies.
-The following packages are used to provide cryptographic functions, and are not included in
-the TOE boundary. NetIQ eDirectory is used for the Identity Vault. eDirectory provides access
-to the OpenSSL Cryptographic functionality.
-They meet the cryptographic quality requirements as evidenced by the following certificates:
-Component CAVP Cert #
-AES Certs. #3090 and #3264
-HMAC Certs. #1937 and #2063
-RSA Certs. #1581 and #1664
-Table 3  CAVP Certificate Numbers
-Reporting Server:
-The reporting server houses the Identity Reporting Module. The Identity Reporting Module
-generates reports that show critical business information about various aspects of your
-Identity Manager configuration, including information collected from Identity Vaults and
-managed systems such as Active Directory or SAP. The reporting module provides a set of
-predefined report definitions you can use to generate reports. In addition, it gives you the
-option to import custom reports defined in a third-party tool. The user interface for the
-reporting module makes it easy to schedule reports to run at off-peak times to optimize
-performance.
-The IDM Tools are used to manage the Identity Manager solution. This includes functions to:
- Analyze, enhance, and control all data stores throughout the enterprise
- Design, deploy, and document the TOE
- Manage Identity Manager and receive real-time health and status information
-about the Identity Manager system
- Define and maintain which authorizations are associated with which business roles
-Log Manager:
-The Log Manager, also known as Sentinel Log Manager for Identity Governance and
-Administration (SLM for IGA), collects and acknowledges receipt of auditing data from all
-aspects of the product.
-OneSSO Provider:
-June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST
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-The OneSSO Provider, also known as OSP) is a single interface for access authentication. This
-provider can handle user name / password, Kerberos, and SAML tokens.
-Self Service Password Reset:
-Self Service Password Reset (SSPR) allows users to enroll, update, and reset their passwords
-without administrative intervention in the Identity Vault (IDV).
-Note: that the components above can be installed on one or multiple distributed systems. Also,
-the hardware, operating systems and third-party support software (e.g. DBMS) on each of the
-systems are excluded from the TOE boundary.
-TOE Delivery:
-The TOE software is provided to customers via secure download from the download portal
-(https://dl.netiq.com/index.jsp). The software is available as either a gnu zip (.gz), iso
-formatted optical disk (.iso). zip (.zip) or dmg (if mac) depending on your destination platform.
-Once downloaded, and extracted, the setup files can be executed to perform the installation.
-Figure 2  Sample Download List
-TOE Environment
-Virtual Machines
-The following TOE components can be installed in virtual machines (VM).
- Console / Administration Workstation (Identity Applications)
- Identity Manager
- Reporting Server
- Sentinel Log Manager
- One SSO Provider
- Self Service Password Reset (SSPR)
-The hardware and software requirements for the operational environment to support the VM
-are listed in the table below:
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-Category Console /
-Administration
-Workstation
-(Identity
-Applications3)
-Identity
-Manager
-(Identity
-Manager
-Engine)
-Reporting
-Server
-(Identity
-Reporting
-Module)
-Log
-Manager
-(SLM for
-Identity
-Gov &
-Adm)
-SSO
-Provider
-(OneSSO
-Provider)
-Self Service
-Password Reset
-(SSPR)
-Processor 2 CPU cores 2 CPU
-cores
-2 CPU
-cores
-4 to 8 CPU
-cores
-2 CPU
-cores
-2 CPU cores
-Memory 8 GB 8 GB 8 GB 8 to 16 GB 8 GB 8 GB
-Table 4  Virtual Machine Environment Requirements
-Hardware and Software Supplied by the IT Environment
-The TOE consists of a set of software applications run on one or multiple distributed systems.
-The TOE requires the following software components as part of the evaluated configuration:
-Component Requirements
-Administration Workstation Mozilla Firefox 65
-Identity Applications (RBPM)
-Designer / Analyzer)
-SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 SP4
-Identity Manager (Identity
-Manager Engine)
-SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 SP4
-Reporting Server (Identity
-Reporting Module)
-SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 SP4
-Log Manager (Sentinel Log
-Management for Identity
-Governance and
-Administration)
-SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 SP4
-SSO Provider (OneSSO
-Provider)
-SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 SP4
-Self Service Password Reset SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 SP4
-Table 5  IT Environment Component Requirements
-In addition to the platform requirements mentioned above, the following hardware resources
-are needed in order to install and configure Identity Manager on each platform:
- A minimum of 8 GB RAM
- 15 GB available disk space to install all the components.
- Additional disk space to configure and populate data. This might vary depending
-on your connected systems and number of objects in the Identity Vault.
-For server-based components, it is recommended that the platform have a minimum of 2 CPUs
-or cores
-Logical Boundary
-This section outlines the boundaries of the security functionality of the TOE; the logical
-boundary of the TOE includes the security functionality described in the following table:
-3
-The system requirements also apply to the following components that you use with the identity applications: PostgreSQL, Tomcat,
-NetIQ One SSO Provider (OSP), and NetIQ Self Service Password Reset.
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-TSF DESCRIPTION
-Security
-Management
-The TOE restricts the ability to enable, modify and disable security
-policy rules and user roles to an authorized Administrator. The TOE
-also provides the functions necessary for effective management of
-the TOE security functions. Administrators configure the TOE with
-the Management Console via Web-based connection.
-Security Audit The TOE supports the provision of log data from each system
-component, such as user login/logout and incident/ticket
-management actions. It also records security events such as failed
-login attempts, etc. Audit trails can be stored for later review and
-analysis.
-Cryptographic
-Support
-The TOE utilizes the OpenSSL cryptographic module to provide
-support for HTTPS / TLS communications with administrators and
-TOE components.
-Identification and
-Authentication
-The TOE enforces individual I&A. Operators must successfully
-authenticate using a unique identifier and password prior to
-performing any actions on the TOE.
-User Data
-Protection
-The TOE enforces discretionary access rules using an access control
-list with user attributes.
-Trusted Path /
-Channels
-The TOE utilizes HTTPS/TLS to provide trusted paths and inter-TSF
-trusted channels.
-Table 6  Logical Boundary Descriptions
-TOE Security Functional Policies
-The TOE supports the following Security Functional Policy:
-Discretionary Access Control SFP
-The TOE implements an access control SFP named Discretionary Access Control SFP. This SFP
-determines and enforces the privileges associated with operator roles. An authorized
-administrator can define specific services available to administrators and users via the
-Management Console.
-TOE Vendor Documentation / Guidance
-In addition to the documentation generated for the certification, the TOE includes the following
-product and guidance documentation generated by NetIQ:
- Quick Start Guide for Installing NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 February 2018
- NetIQ Identity Manager Setup Guide for Linux February 2018
- NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7, Operational User Guidance and Preparative Procedures
-Supplement (AGD-IGS), version 0.6, is supplied for those customers that need
-guidance on how to set the TOE in the evaluated configuration.
-Features / Functionality NOT Included in the TOE
-The following supported operating systems and software were not included in the evaluated
-configuration:
-Functions Requirements
-Administration Workstation (Console) Web Browsers
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-Functions Requirements
- Internet Explorer 11
- Google Chrome
-Identity Applications (Includes Designer /
-Analyzer)
-RHEL 7.5
-Windows Server 2016
-Identity Manager (Includes Identity Vault
-and, iManager)
-RHEL 7.5
-Windows Server 2016
-Reporting Server
-(includes Identity Reporting Module)
-RHEL 7.5
-Windows Server 2016
-Log Manager (includes Sentinel Log
-Management for Identity Governance and
-Administration)
-RHEL 7.5
-One SSO Provider (uname / pass, Kerberos,
-SAML)
-RHEL 7.5
-Windows Server 2016
-Self Service Password Reset (SSPR) RHEL 7.5
-Windows Server 2016
-Table 7  IT Environment Components - Not In TOE
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-2. Conformance Claims
-CC Conformance Claim
-The TOE is Common Criteria Version 3.1 Revision 5 (April 2017) Part 2 conformant and Part 3
-conformant.
-PP Claim
-The TOE does not claim conformance to any registered Protection Profile.
-Package Claim
-The TOE claims conformance to the EAL3 assurance package defined in Part 3 of the Common
-Criteria Version 3.1 Revision 5 (April 2017). The TOE does not claim conformance to any
-functional package. The TOE EAL3 assurance package is augmented with ALC_FLR.2
-Conformance Rationale
-No conformance rationale is necessary for this evaluation since this Security Target does not
-claim conformance to a Protection Profile.
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-3. Security Problem Definition
-In order to clarify the nature of the security problem that the TOE is intended to solve, this
-section describes the following:
- Any known or assumed threats to the assets against which specific protection within the TOE or
-its environment is required
- Any organizational security policy statements or rules with which the TOE must comply
- Any assumptions about the security aspects of the environment and/or of the manner in which
-the TOE is intended to be used.
-This chapter identifies assumptions as A.assumption, threats as T.threat and policies as P.policy.
-Threats
-The following are threats identified for the TOE and the IT System (or operating environment)
-the TOE monitors. The TOE itself has threats and the TOE is also responsible for addressing
-threats to the environment in which it resides. The assumed level of expertise of the attacker
-for all threats is unsophisticated.
-The TOE addresses the following threats:
-THREAT DESCRIPTION
-T.NO_AUTH An unauthorized user may gain access to the TOE and alter the
-TOE configuration.
-T.NO_PRIV An authorized user of the TOE exceeds his/her assigned
-security privileges resulting in unauthorized modification of the
-TOE configuration and/or data.
-T.USER_ACCESS_DENY An authorized user may be able to change user authentication data
-and or user access policies and deny their access to it later.
-T.PASSWD_COMPROMISE An unauthorized user may be able to obtain and use user
-passwords.
-T.PROT_TRANS An unauthorized user may be able to gather information from
-communications between components.
-Table 8  Threats Addressed by the TOE
-Organizational Security Policies
-The TOE meets the following organizational security policies:
-ASSUMPTION DESCRIPTION
-P.REMOTE_DATA Passwords and account information from network-attached systems
-shall be monitored and managed.
-Table 9  Organizational Security Policies
-Assumptions
-The TOE is assured to provide effective security measures in a co-operative non-hostile
-environment only if it is installed, managed, and used correctly. The following specific
-conditions are assumed to exist in an environment where the TOE is employed.
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-ASSUMPTION DESCRIPTION
-A.MANAGE Administrators of the TOE are assumed to be appropriately trained to
-undertake the installation, configuration and management of the TOE
-in a secure and trusted manner.
-A.NOEVIL Administrators of the TOE and users on the local area network are not
-careless, willfully negligent, nor hostile, and will follow and abide by the
-instructions provided by the TOE documentation
-A.LOCATE The processing platforms on which the TOE resides are assumed to be
-located within a facility that provides controlled access
-A.CONFIG The TOE is configured to receive all passwords and associated data
-from network-attached systems.
-A.TIMESOURCE The TOE has a trusted source for system time via NTP server
-Table 10  Assumptions
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-4. Security Objectives
-Security Objectives for the TOE
-The IT security objectives for the TOE are addressed below:
-OBJECTIVE DESCRIPTION
-O.MANAGE_DATA The TOE shall provide a means to manage secrets and data associated
-with remote IT systems.
-O.MANAGE_POLICY The TOE shall provide a workflow to manage authentication and access
-control policies.
-O.SEC_ACCESS The TOE shall ensure that only those authorized users and applications
-are granted access to security functions and associated data.
-O.PASSWD_PROT The TOE shall provide cryptographic mechanisms to protect passwords
-via cryptographic processes including the ability to generate and destroy
-keys.
-O.TRANS_PROT The TOE shall provide mechanisms to protect data that is in transit
-between elements within the TOE.
-Table 11  TOE Security Objectives
-Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
-The security objectives for the operational environment are addressed below:
-OBJECTIVE DESCRIPTION
-OE.TIME The TOE operating environment shall provide an accurate timestamp
-(via reliable NTP server).
-OE.ENV_PROTECT The TOE operating environment shall provide mechanisms to isolate the
-TOE Security Functions (TSF) and assure that TSF components cannot
-be tampered with or bypassed
-OE.PERSONNEL Authorized administrators are non-hostile and follow all administrator
-guidance and must ensure that the TOE is delivered, installed, managed,
-and operated in a manner that maintains the TOE security objectives.
-Any operator of the TOE must be trusted not to disclose their
-authentication credentials to any individual not authorized for access to
-the TOE.
-OE.PHYSEC The facility surrounding the processing platform in which the TOE
-resides must provide a controlled means of access into the facility
-Table 12  Operational Environment Security Objectives
-Security Objectives Rationale
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-This section provides the summary that all security objectives are traced back to aspects of the
-addressed assumptions, threats, and Organizational Security Policies.
-OBJECTIVES THREATS/
-ASSUMPTIONS/ POLICIES
-O.MANAGE_DATA
-O.MANAGE_POLICY
-O.SEC_ACCESS
-O.PASSWD_PROT
-O.TRANS_PROT
-OE.TIME
-OE.ENV_PROTECT
-OE.PERSONNEL
-OE.PHYSEC
-A.CONFIG   
-A.MANAGE 
-A.NOEVIL 
-A.LOCATE 
-A.TIMESOURCE 
-T.NO_AUTH 
-T.NO_PRIV 
-T.USER_ACCESS_DENY 
-T.PASSWD_COMPROMISE 
-T.PROT_TRANS 
-P. REMOTE_DATA 
-Table 13  Mapping of Assumptions, Threats, Policies and ORSP s to Security Objectives
-Mapping of Objectives
-ASSUMPTION /THREAT/
-POLICY
-RATIONALE
-A.CONFIG This assumption is addressed by
- OE.ENV_PROTECT, which ensures that TSF components
-cannot be tampered with or bypassed
- OE.PERSONNEL, which ensures that the TOE is managed
-and administered by in a secure manner by a competent
-and security aware personnel in accordance with the
-administrator documentation. This objective also ensures
-that those responsible for the TOE install, manage, and
-operate the TOE in a secure manner
- OE.PHYSEC, which ensures that the facility surrounding the
-processing platform in which the TOE resides provides a
-controlled means of access into the facility
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-ASSUMPTION /THREAT/
-POLICY
-RATIONALE
-A.MANAGE This assumption is addressed by
- OE.PERSONNEL, which ensures that the TOE is managed
-and administered by in a secure manner by a competent
-and security aware personnel in accordance with the
-administrator documentation. This objective also ensures
-that those responsible for the TOE install, manage, and
-operate the TOE in a secure manner
-A.NOEVIL This assumption is addressed by OE.PERSONNEL, which ensures
-that the TOE is managed and administered by in a secure manner
-by a competent and security aware personnel in accordance with
-the administrator documentation. This objective also ensures
-that those responsible for the TOE install, manage, and operate
-the TOE in a secure manner
-A.LOCATE This assumption is addressed by OE.PHYSEC which ensures that
-the facility surrounding the processing platform in which the
-TOE resides provides a controlled means of access into the
-facility
-A.TIMESOURCE This assumption is addressed by OE.TIME, which ensures the
-provision of an accurate time source.
-T.NO_AUTH This threat is countered by the following:
- O.SEC_ACCESS, which ensures that the TOE allows access to
-the security functions, configuration, and associated data
-only by authorized users and applications
-T.NO_PRIV This threat is countered by O.SEC_ACCESS, which ensures that
-the TOE allows access to the security functions, configuration,
-and associated data only by authorized users and applications.
-T.PASSWD_COMPROMISE This threat is countered by O.PASSWD_PROT, which ensures
-the passwords are not in the clear and cannot be exposed to un
-authorized users for use.
-T.PROT_TRANS This threat is countered by O.TRANS_PROT, which protects data
-that is in transit between elements within the TOE.
-P.REMOTE_DATA This organizational security policy is enforced by
- O.MANAGE_DATA, which ensures that the TOE provide a
-means to manage secrets and data associated with remote
-IT systems.
-T.USER_ACCESS_DENY This threat is countered by O.MANAGE_POLICY which ensures
-that the TOE provides a workflow to manage authentication and
-access control policies.
-Table 14  Mapping of Threats, Policies, and Assumptions to Objectives
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-5. Extended Components Definition
-This Security Target does include any extended components.
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-6. Security Requirements
-The security requirements that are levied on the TOE and the IT environment are specified in
-this section of the ST.
-Security Functional Requirements
-The functional security requirements for this Security Target consist of the following
-components from Part 2 of the CC, which are summarized in the following table:
-CLASS HEADING CLASS_FAMILY DESCRIPTION
-Security Audit
-FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation
-FAU_SAR.1 Audit Review
-Cryptographic Support FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation
-FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
-FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation
-User Data Protection
-FDP_ACC.1 Subset Access Control
-FDP_ACF.1 Security Attribute Based Access Control
-Identification and
-Authentication
-FIA_ATD.1 User Attribute Definition
-FIA_UID.2 User Identification before Any Action
-FIA_UAU.2 User Authentication before Any Action
-Security Management
-FMT_MSA.1 Management of Security Attributes
-FMT_MSA.2 Secure Security Attributes
-FMT_MSA.3 Static Attribute Initialization
-FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF Data
-FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
-FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles
-Protection of the TSF FPT_TDC.1 Inter-TSF basic TSF data consistency
-Trusted Path / Channels
-FTP_ITC.1 Trusted Channel
-FTP_TRP.1 Trusted Path
-Table 15  TOE Security Functional Requirements
-Security Audit (FAU)
-FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation
-FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following
-auditable events:
-a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
-b) All auditable events for the [not specified] level of audit; and
-c) [User login/logout and;
-d) Login failures;]
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-FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following
-information:
-a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if
-applicable), and the outcome (success or failure) of the event;
-and
-b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event
-definitions of the functional components included in the PP/ST,
-[no other audit relevant information].
-FAU_SAR.1 Audit Review
-FAU_SAR.1.1 The TSF shall provide [the Administrator] with the capability to read
-[all audit data generated within the TOE] from the audit records.
-FAU_SAR.1.2 The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the
-user to interpret the information.
-Cryptographic Support
-FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation
-FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
-specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [cryptographic key
-generation algorithm in Table 16] and specified cryptographic key
-sizes [cryptographic key sizes in Table 16] that meet the following: [list
-of standards in Table 16].
-Usage Key Generation Algorithm Key Size (bits), Elliptical Curves Standard
-RSA RSA Key Generation 2048 FIPS 186-4
-AES Deterministic Random Bit
-Generator (DRBG)
-128, 256 SP 800-90A
-Diffie-Hellman Diffie-Hellman Key
-Generation
-1024, 2048 FIPS 186-4
-Table 16  Cryptographic Standards
-FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
-FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a
-specified cryptographic key destruction method [zeroize] that meets
-the following: [FIPS 140-2].
-FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation (Encryption / Decryption)
-FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operations in Table 17] in
-accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic
-algorithm in Table 17] and cryptographic key sizes [cryptographic key
-sizes in Table 17] that meet the following: [list of standards in Table
-17].
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-Application Note: AES in CBC mode is used for encrypting/decrypting
-data in support of TLS.
-Operation Algorithm Key Size, Curve or
-Digest
-Standard
-Encryption and
-Decryption in support of
-TLS
-AES (Advanced
-Encryption
-Standard)
-128, 256 FIPS PUB
-197
-Key agreement in
-support TLS
-Key Agreement
-Schemes (KAS) and
-Key Confirmation
-P-256, P384, P521 SP800-
-56A
-Authentication algorithm
-in support of TLS
-ECDSA (Elliptic
-Curve Digital
-Signature
-Algorithm)
-P-256, P384, P521 FIPS 186-4
-Secure Hashing in
-support of TLS
-Secure Hash
-Algorithm (SHA)
-160 (SHA-1)
-256 (SHA-256)
-384 (SHA-384)
-FIPS PUB
-180-4
-Message Authentication
-in support of TLS
-Keyed-Hash
-Message
-Authentication Code
-(HMAC)
-160 (HMAC-SHA1) 256
-(HMAC-SHA2-256) 384
-(HMAC-SHA2-384)
-FIPS 198-1
-Asymmetric
-cryptography in support
-of TLS
-Rivest, Shamir,
-Adleman (RSA)
-2048 FIPS 186-4
-Table 17  Cryptographic Operations
-Information Flow Control (FDP)
-FDP_ACC.1 Subset Access Control
-FDP_ACC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Discretionary Access Control SFP] on [
-Subjects: All users
-Objects: System reports, component audit logs, TOE configuration,
-operator account attributes
-Operations: all user actions]
-FDP_ACF.1 Security Attribute Based Access Control
-FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Discretionary Access Control SFP]to objects
-based on the following: [
-Subjects: All users
-Objects: System reports, component audit logs, TOE configuration,
-operator account attributes
-Operations: all user actions]
-FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation
-among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: [if the
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-ACL identifies the user or a group of users that contains the user
-requesting access for the type of resource that the user is requesting,
-and the user (or group of users) has the specific rights required for the
-type of operation requested on the object then the user is granted
-access].
-FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based
-on the following additional rules: [password restrictions, login
-restrictions, time based access controls, ip access controls, intruder
-lockout].
-FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the
-following additional rules [ password restrictions, login restrictions,
-time based access controls, ip access controls, intruder lockout]
-Identification and Authentication (FIA)
-FIA_ATD.1  User Attribute Definition
-FIA_ATD.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes
-belonging to individual users: [User Identity, Authentication Status,
-and Privilege Level].
-FIA_UAU.2 User Authentication before Any Action
-FIA_UAU.2.1 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated
-before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
-FIA_UID.2 User Identification before Any Action
-FIA_UID.2.1 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before
-allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
-Security Management (FMT)
-FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
-FMT_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Discretionary Access Control SFP] to
-restrict the ability to [query, modify, delete] the security attributes
-[Accounts, privileges, ACLs] to [Administrator].
-FMT_MSA.2 Secure Security Attributes
-FMT_MSA.2.1 The TSF shall ensure that only secure values are accepted for
-[security attributes listed with Discretionary Access Control SFP].
-FMT_MSA.3 Static Attribute Initialization
-FMT_MSA.3.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Discretionary Access Control SFP] to
-provide [restrictive] default values for security attributes that are
-used to enforce the SFP.
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-FMT_MSA.3.2 The TSF shall allow the [Administrator] to specify alternative initial
-values to override the default values when an object or information
-is created.
-FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF Data
-FMT_MTD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to [control] the [data described in the
-table below] to [Administrator]:
-DATA CHANGE QUERY MODIFY DELETE CLEAR
-Discretionary
-Access Control SFP
-    
-User Account
-Attributes
- 
-Audit Logs 
-Date/Time 
-Table 18  Management of TSF data
-FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
-FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management
-functions: [
-a) Create accounts
-b) Modify accounts
-c) Define privilege levels Change Default,
-Query, Modify, Delete, Clear the attributes
-associated with the Discretionary Access
-Control SFP
-d) Modify the behavior of the Discretionary
-Access Control SFP
-e) Manage ACLs].
-FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles
-FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles [Administrator, User].
-FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
-Protection of the TSF (FPT)
-FPT_TDC.1 Inter-TSF Basic TSF Data Consistency
-FPT_TDC.1.1 The TSF shall provide the capability to consistently interpret [secrets
-(passwords)] when shared between the TSF and another trusted IT
-product.
-FPT_TDC.1.2 The TSF shall use [the secret with the newest associated timestamp]
-when interpreting the TSF data from another trusted IT product.
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-Trusted Path / Channel (FTP)
-FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
-FTP_ITC.1.1 The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and
-[another trusted IT product] that is logically distinct from other
-communication channels and provides assured identification of its end
-points and protection of the channel data from [modification or
-disclosure].
-FTP_ITC.1.2 The TSF shall permit [the TSF] to initiate communication via the
-trusted channel.
-FTP_ITC.1.3 The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for
-[HTTPS/TLS connections
- for communications labeled 1  12 in Figure 1]
-Application Note: The TOE supports TLS v1.1 and 1.2 as configured by
-the Administrator.
-Application Note: Crypto as claimed in FCS_COP_1 is used to support
-TLS.
-FTP_TRP.1 Trusted Path
-FTP_TRP.1.1 The TSF shall provide a communication path between itself and [local]
-users that is logically distinct from other communication paths and
-provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the
-communicated data from [disclosure].
-FTP_TRP.1.2 The TSF shall permit [the TSF] to initiate communication via the
-trusted path.
-FTP_TRP.1.3 The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for [key requests, and
-encryption operations
- for communications labeled A, B, and C in Figure 1]
-Security Assurance Requirements
-The Security Assurance Requirements for this evaluation are listed in Section 6.3.4  Security
-Assurance Requirements.
-Security Requirements Rationale
-Security Functional Requirements
-The following table provides the correspondence mapping between security objectives and the
-requirements that satisfy them.
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-OBJECTIVE
-SFR
-O.MANAGE_DATA
-O.MANAGE_POLICY
-O.SEC_ACCESS
-O.PASSWD_PROT
-O.TRANS_PROT
-FAU_GEN.1 
-FAU_SAR.1 
-FCS_CKM.1 
-FCS_CKM.4 
-FCS_COP.1 
-FDP_ACC.1 
-FDP_ACF.1 
-FIA_ATD.1 
-FIA_UID.2 
-FIA_UAU.2 
-FMT_MSA.1 
-FMT_MSA.2 
-FMT_MSA.3 
-FMT_MTD.1 
-FMT_SMF.1 
-FMT_SMR.1 
-FPT_TDC.1 
-FTP_ITC.1 
-FTP_TRP.1 
-Table 19  Mapping of TOE Security Functional Requirements and Objectives
-Dependency Rationale
-This ST satisfies all the security functional requirement dependencies of the Common Criteria.
-The table below lists each SFR to which the TOE claims conformance with a dependency and
-indicates whether the dependent requirement was included. As the table indicates, all
-dependencies have been met.
-SFR CLAIM DEPENDENCIES DEPENDENCY MET RATIONALE
-FAU_GEN.1 FPT_STM.1 YES
-Satisfied by the Operational
-Environment (OE.TIME)
-FAU_SAR.1
-FAU_GEN.1
-FPT_STM.1
-YES
-FPT_STM.1 satisfied by the
-Operational Environment
-(OE.TIME)
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-SFR CLAIM DEPENDENCIES DEPENDENCY MET RATIONALE
-FCS_CKM.1
-FCS_CKM.1 or
-FCS_COP.1 and
-FCS_CKM.4
-YES
-Satisfied by FCS_COP.1 and
-FCS_CKM.4
-FCS_CKM.4 FTP_ITC.1 or
-FTP_ITC.2 or
-FCS_CKM.1
-YES Satisfied by FCS_CKM.1 for AES
-FCS_COP.1 FTP_ITC.1 or
-FTP_ITC.2 or
-FCS_CKM.1 and
-FCS_CKM.4
-YES Satisfied by FCS_CKM.1 and
-FCS_CKM.4
-FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACF.1 YES
-FDP_ACF.1
-FDP_ACC.1
-FMT_MSA.3
-YES
-FIA_ATD.1 N/A N/A
-FIA_UID.2 N/A N/A
-FMT_MSA.1
-FDP_ACC.1
-FMT_SMF.1
-FMT_SMR.1
-YES
-FMT_MSA.2
-FDP_ACC.1
-FMT_MSA.1
-FMT_SMR.1
-YES
-FMT_MSA.3
-FMT_MSA.1
-FMT_SMR.1
-YES
-FMT_MTD.1
-FMT_SMF.1
-FMT_SMR.1
-YES
-FMT_SMF.1 N/A N/A
-FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1 YES
-Although FIA_UID.1 is not
-included, FIA_UID.2, which is
-hierarchical to FIA_UID.1 is
-included. This satisfies this
-dependency.
-FPT_TDC.1 N/A N/A
-FTP_ITC.1 N/A N/A
-FTP_TRP.1 N/A N/A
-Table 20  Mapping of SFR to Dependencies and Rationales
-Sufficiency of Security Requirements
-The following table presents a mapping of the rationale of TOE Security Requirements to
-Objectives.
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-OBJECTIVE RATIONALE
-O.MANAGE_DATA The objective to ensure that the TOE will collect events from security
-products and non-security products deployed within a network and
-applies analytical processes to derive conclusions about the events is
-met by the following security requirements:
- FPT_TDC.1 ensures that the TOE provides consistency between
-passwords used on remote IT systems and those
-stored/managed within the TOE.
-O.MANAGE_POLICY The objective to ensure that the TOE provides a workflow to manage
-authentication and access control policies is met by the following
-security requirements:
- FAU_GEN.1 and FAU_SAR.1 define the auditing capability for
-incidents and administrative access control and requires that
-authorized users will have the capability to read and interpret
-data stored in the audit logs
- FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1 support the security functions
-relevant to the TOE and ensure the definition of an authorized
-administrator role
-O.SEC_ACCESS This objective ensures that the TOE allows access to the security
-functions, configuration, and associated data only by authorized users
-and applications.
- FDP_ACC.1 requires that all user actions resulting in the access
-to TOE security functions and configuration data are controlled
- FDP_ACF.1 supports FDP_ACC.1 by ensuring that access to TOE
-security functions, configuration data, audit logs, and account
-attributes is based on the user privilege level and their
-allowable actions
- FIA_UID.2 requires the TOE to enforce identification of all users
-prior to configuration of the TOE
- FIA_UAU.2 requires the TOE to enforce authentication of all
-users prior to configuration of the TOE
- FIA_ATD.1 specifies security attributes for users of the TOE
- FMT_MTD.1 restricts the ability to query, add or modify TSF
-data to authorized users.
- FMT_MSA.1 specifies that only privileged administrators can
-access the TOE security functions and related configuration
-data.
- FMT_MSA.2 specifies that only secure values are accepted for
-security attributes listed with access control policies.
- FMT_MSA.3 ensures that the default values of security
-attributes are restrictive in nature as to enforce the access
-control policy for the TOE
- FTP_ITC.1 specifies that the trusted channel exists for components
-HTTPS/TLS.
- FTP_TRP.1 specifies that the trusted path exists for components
-HTTPS/TLS.
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-OBJECTIVE RATIONALE
-O.PASSWD_PROT This objective ensures that the TOE provides cryptographic
-mechanisms to generate and destroy keys. This objective is met by:
-FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM. 4, and FCS_COP.1 which provide the
-cryptographic support functions for secure communications within the
-TOE and with external IT entities.
-O.TRANS_PROT This objective ensures that the TOE protects data in transit between
-elements within the TOE. This objective is met by FTP_ITC (which
-specifies that the trusted channel exists for components) and FTP_TRP
-(which ensures that the trusted path exists for components).
-Table 21  Rationale for TOE SFRs to Objectives
-Security Assurance Requirements
-The assurance security requirements for this Security Target are taken from Part 3 of the CC.
-These assurance requirements compose an Evaluation Assurance Level 3 (EAL3). The assurance
-components are summarized in the following table:
-CLASS HEADING CLASS_FAMILY DESCRIPTION
-ADV: Development
-ADV_ARC.1 Security Architecture Description
-ADV_FSP.3
-Functional Specification with Complete
-Summary
-ADV_TDS.2 Architectural Design
-AGD: Guidance
-Documents
-AGD_OPE.1 Operational User Guidance
-AGD_PRE.1 Preparative Procedures
-ALC: Lifecycle Support
-ALC_CMC.3 Authorization Controls
-ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
-ALC_DEL.1 Delivery Procedures
-ALC_DVS.1 Identification of Security Measures
-ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
-ALC_FLR.2 Flaw Reporting Procedures
-ATE: Tests
-ATE_COV.2 Analysis of Coverage
-ATE_DPT.1 Testing: Basic Design
-ATE_FUN.1 Functional Testing
-ATE_IND.2 Independent Testing - Sample
-AVA: Vulnerability
-Assessment
-AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability Analysis
-Table 22  Security Assurance Requirements at EAL3
-Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
-The ST specifies Evaluation Assurance Level 3. EAL3 was chosen because it is based upon good
-commercial development practices with thorough functional testing. EAL3 provides the
-developers and users a moderate level of independently assured security in conventional
-commercial TOEs. The threat of malicious attacks is not greater than low, the security
-environment provides physical protection, and the TOE itself offers a very limited interface,
-June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST
-NetIQ Corporation Page 31 of 36
-offering essentially no opportunity for an attacker to subvert the security policies without
-physical access. The product was augmented to comply with ALC_FLR.2 in order to document
-and address requirements for remediation and reporting of faults that may be discovered in the
-product after release.
-Security Assurance Requirements Evidence
-This section identifies the measures applied to satisfy CC assurance requirements.
-SECURITY ASSURANCE
-REQUIREMENT
-EVIDENCE TITLE
-ADV_ARC.1 Security Architecture
-Description
-NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7
-Security Architecture (ADV_ARC)
-ADV_FSP.3 Functional Specification
-with Complete Summary
-NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7
-Functional Specification (ADV_FSP)
-ADV_TDS.2 Architectural Design
-NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7
-Architectural Design (IDM TDS)
-AGD_OPE.1 Operational User
-Guidance4
-NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7
-Operational User Guidance and Preparative
-Procedures Supplement (AGD-IGS)
-AGD_PRE.1Preparative Procedures
-NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7
-Operational User Guidance and Preparative
-Procedures Supplement (AGD-IGS)
-ALC_CMC.3 Authorization Controls
-NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7
-Configuration Management Processes and
-Procedures (ALC_CM)
-ALC_CMS.3 Implementation
-representation CM coverage
-NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7
-Configuration Management Processes and
-Procedures (ALC_CM)
-ALC_DEL.1 Delivery Procedures
-NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7
-Secure Delivery Processes and Procedures
-(ALC_DEL)
-ALC_DVS.1 Identification of Security
-Measures
-NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7
-Development Security Measures (ALC_DVS)
-ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-
-cycle model
-NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7
-Life Cycle Development Process (ALC_LCD)
-ALC_FLR.2: Flaw Remediation
-Procedures
-NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7
-Flaw reporting Procedures (ALC_FLR)
-ATE_COV.2 Analysis of Coverage
-NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7
-Test Plan and Coverage Analysis (ATE)
-ATE_DPT.1 Testing: Basic Design
-NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7
-Test Plan and Coverage Analysis (ATE)
-4
-Additional documents can be found in Appendix A
-June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST
-NetIQ Corporation Page 32 of 36
-SECURITY ASSURANCE
-REQUIREMENT
-EVIDENCE TITLE
-ATE_FUN.1Functional Testing
-NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7
-Test Plan and Coverage Analysis (ATE)
-Table 23  Security Assurance Rationale and Measures
-June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST
-NetIQ Corporation Page 33 of 36
-7. TOE Summary Specification
-This section presents the Security Functions implemented by the TOE.
-TOE Security Functions
-The security functions performed by the TOE are as follows:
- Security Management
- Security Audit
- Identification and Authentication
- User Data Protection
- Trusted Path / Channels
- Cryptographic Support
-Security Audit
-The TOE generates the following audit data:
- Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions (instantiated by startup of the TOE)
- User login/logout
- Login failures
-The TOE provides the Administrator with the capability to read all audit data generated within
-the TOE via the console. The GUI provides a suitable means for an Administrator to interpret the
-information from the audit log.
-The A.TIMESOURCE is added to the assumptions on operational environment, and OE.TIME is
-added to the operational environment security objectives. The time and date provided by the
-operational environment are used to form the timestamps. The TOE ensures that the audit trail
-data is stamped when recorded with a dependable date and time received from the OE
-(operating system). In this manner, accurate time and date is maintained on the TOE.
-The Security Audit function is designed to satisfy the following security functional requirements:
- FAU_GEN.1
- FAU_SAR.1
-Identification and Authentication
-The IDM console application provides user interfaces that administrators may use to manage
-TOE functions. The operating system and the database in the TOE Environment are queried to
-individually authenticate administrators or users. The TOE maintains authorization information
-that determines which TOE functions an authenticated administrators or users (of a given role)
-may perform.
-The TOE maintains the following list of security attributes belonging to individual users:
- User Identity (i.e., user name)
- Authentication Status (whether the IT Environment validated the username/password)
- Privilege Level (Administrator or User)
-The Identification and Authentication function is designed to satisfy the following security
-functional requirements:
- FIA_ATD.1
- FIA_UAU.2
- FIA_UID.2
-User Data Protection
-June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST
-NetIQ Corporation Page 34 of 36
-The TOE implements a discretionary access control policy to define what roles can access
-particular functions of the TOE. All access and actions for system reports, component audit logs,
-TOE configuration, operator account attributes (defined in FIA_ATD.1) are protected via access
-control list. When a user requests to perform an action on an object, the TOE verifies the role
-associated with the user name. Access is granted if the user (or group of users) has the specific
-rights required for the type of operation requested on the object.
-Identity Manager can enforce password policies on incoming passwords from connected
-systems and on passwords set or changed through the User Application password self-service.
-If the new password does not comply, you can specify that Identity Manager not accept the
-password. This also means that passwords that don't comply with your policies are not
-distributed to other connected systems.
-In addition, can enforce password policies on connected systems. If the password being
-published to the Identity Vault does not comply with rules in a policy, you can specify that
-Identity Manager not only does not accept the password for distribution, but actually resets the
-noncompliant password on the connected system by using the current Distribution password in
-the Identity Vault.
-The User Data Protection function is designed to satisfy the following security functional
-requirements:
- FDP_ACC.1
- FDP_ACF.1
- FPT_TDC.1
-Security Management
-The TOE maintains the operator roles described in the following table. The individual roles are
-categorized into two main roles: the Administrator and the User.
-ROLE MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS
-Administrator A user who has rights to configure and manage all aspects of the TOE
-User The user's capabilities can be configured to:
-View hierarchical relationships between User objects
-View and edit user information (with appropriate rights).
-Search for users or resources using advanced search criteria
-(which can be saved for later reuse).
-Recover forgotten passwords.
-Table 24  Roles and Functions
-Only an Administrator can determine the behavior of, disable, enable, and modify the behavior
-of the functions that implement the Discretionary Access Control SFP. The TPE ensures only
-secure values are accepted for the security attributes listed with Discretionary Access Control
-SFP.
-The Security Management function is designed to satisfy the following security functional
-requirements:
- FMT_MTD.1
- FMT_MSA.1
- FMT_MSA.2
- FMT_MSA.3
- FMT_SMF.1
- FMT_SMR.1
-June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST
-NetIQ Corporation Page 35 of 36
-Trusted Path / Channels
-The Trusted Path/Channels function is designed to satisfy the following security functional
-requirements:
- FTP_ITC.1  the TOE supports establishment of trusted channels for communicating
-TOE entities using HTTPS.
- FTP_TRP.1  the TOE provides a trusted path for TOE Users, using HTTPS
-Trusted Channel
-The TOE provides a trusted channel between the TOE and external web servers.
-Trusted channels are implemented using HTTPS. The TOE supports TLS v1.1 and TLS v1.2. The
-TOE supports the following TLS cipher suites, as defined in RFC 2246, RFC 4346 and RFC 5246:
- TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
- TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
- TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
- TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
- TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_ CBC_SHA
- TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
-Trusted Path:
-The TOE provides a trusted path for TOE administrators and TOE users to communicate with
-the TOE. The trusted path is implemented using HTTPS. The TOE's implementation of TLS is
-described in the previous section (Trusted Channel).
-Cryptographic Support
-Cryptographic protection of data in transit between the TOE and remote users, and between
-the TOE and external web servers is provided by the OpenSSL FIPS Object Module software
-version 2.0.10 (Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) certificate number 1747)
-libraries.
-The following table identifies the CAVP algorithm certificates.
-Operation Algorithm CAVP Certificate
-Encryption and Decryption in
-support of TLS
-AES (Advanced Encryption
-Standard)
-AES 3264
-Key Generation in support of
-TLS
-DRBG (Deterministic
-Random Bit Generation)
-DRBG 723
-Key agreement in support of
-TLS
-Key Agreement Schemes
-(KAS) and Key Confirmation
-CVL 472
-Keyed-Hash Message
-Authentication in support of
-TLS
-HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA2-
-256, HMAC-SHA2-384
-HMAC 2063
-Secure Hash in support of TLS SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384 SHS 2702
-June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST
-NetIQ Corporation Page 36 of 36
-Asymmetric cryptography in
-support of TLS
-RSA RSA 1664
-Authentication algorithm in
-support of TLS
-ECDSA ECDSA 620
-Table 25  CAVP
-The Cryptographic Support function is designed to satisfy the following security functional
-requirements:
- FCS_CKM.1
- FCS_CKM.4
- FCS_COP.1
-
-\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/test/data/test_cc_oop/toy_dataset.json b/test/data/test_cc_oop/toy_dataset.json
deleted file mode 100644
index 9c15beb7..00000000
--- a/test/data/test_cc_oop/toy_dataset.json
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,127 +0,0 @@
-{
-    "_type": "CCDataset",
-    "state": {
-        "_type": "DatasetInternalState",
-        "meta_sources_parsed": true,
-        "pdfs_downloaded": false,
-        "pdfs_converted": false,
-        "txt_data_extracted": false,
-        "certs_analyzed": false
-    },
-    "timestamp": "2020-11-16 17:04:14.770153",
-    "sha256_digest": "not implemented",
-    "name": "toy dataset",
-    "description": "toy dataset description",
-    "n_certs": 2,
-    "certs": [
-        {
-            "_type": "CommonCriteriaCert",
-            "dgst": "869415cc4b91282e",
-            "status": "active",
-            "category": "Access Control Devices and Systems",
-            "name": "NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7",
-            "manufacturer": "NetIQ Corporation",
-            "scheme": "SE",
-            "security_level": [
-                "ALC_FLR.2",
-                "EAL3+"
-            ],
-            "not_valid_before": "2020-06-15",
-            "not_valid_after": "2025-06-15",
-            "report_link": "http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/epfiles/Certification%20Report%20-%20NetIQÂŽ%20Identity%20Manager%204.7.pdf",
-            "st_link": "http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/epfiles/ST%20-%20NetIQ%20Identity%20Manager%204.7.pdf",
-            "src": "csv + html",
-            "cert_link": "http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/epfiles/Certifikat%20CCRA%20-%20NetIQ%20Identity%20Manager%204.7_signed.pdf",
-            "manufacturer_web": "https://www.netiq.com/",
-            "protection_profiles": [],
-            "maintainance_updates": [],
-            "state": {
-                "_type": "InternalState",
-                "st_link_ok": true,
-                "report_link_ok": true,
-                "st_convert_ok": true,
-                "report_convert_ok": true,
-                "st_extract_ok": true,
-                "report_extract_ok": true,
-                "errors": []
-            },
-            "pdf_data": {
-                "_type": "PdfData",
-                "report_metadata": null,
-                "st_metadata": null,
-                "report_frontpage": null,
-                "st_frontpage": null,
-                "report_keywords": null,
-                "st_keywords": null
-            },
-            "heuristics": {
-                "_type": "Heuristics",
-                "extracted_versions": null,
-                "cpe_matches": null,
-                "labeled": false,
-                "verified_cpe_matches": null,
-                "related_cves": null,
-<<<<<<< HEAD
-                "cert_lab": null,
-                "cert_id": null
-=======
-                "labeled": false
->>>>>>> dev
-            }
-        },
-        {
-            "_type": "CommonCriteriaCert",
-            "dgst": "2d010ecfb604747a",
-            "status": "active",
-            "category": "Access Control Devices and Systems",
-            "name": "Magic SSO V4.0",
-            "manufacturer": "Dreamsecurity Co., Ltd.",
-            "scheme": "KR",
-            "security_level": [],
-            "not_valid_before": "2019-11-15",
-            "not_valid_after": "2024-11-15",
-            "report_link": "http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/epfiles/KECS-CR-19-70%20Magic%20SSO%20V4.0(eng)%20V1.0.pdf",
-            "st_link": "http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/epfiles/Magic_SSO_V4.0-ST-v1.4_EN.pdf",
-            "src": "csv + html",
-            "cert_link": null,
-            "manufacturer_web": "https://www.dreamsecurity.com/",
-            "protection_profiles": [
-                {
-                    "_type": "ProtectionProfile",
-                    "pp_name": "Korean National Protection Profile for Single Sign On V1.0",
-                    "pp_link": "http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/ppfiles/KECS-PP-0822-2017%20Korean%20National%20PP%20for%20Single%20Sign%20On%20V1.0(eng).pdf"
-                }
-            ],
-            "maintainance_updates": [],
-            "state": {
-                "_type": "InternalState",
-                "st_link_ok": true,
-                "report_link_ok": true,
-                "st_convert_ok": true,
-                "report_convert_ok": true,
-                "st_extract_ok": true,
-                "report_extract_ok": true,
-                "errors": []
-            },
-            "pdf_data": {
-                "_type": "PdfData",
-                "report_metadata": null,
-                "st_metadata": null,
-                "report_frontpage": null,
-                "st_frontpage": null,
-                "report_keywords": null,
-                "st_keywords": null
-            },
-            "heuristics": {
-                "_type": "Heuristics",
-                "extracted_versions": null,
-                "cpe_matches": null,
-                "labeled": false,
-                "verified_cpe_matches": null,
-                "related_cves": null,
-                "cert_lab": null,
-                "cert_id": null
-            }
-        }
-    ]
-}
-\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/test/data/test_cpe_cve/auxillary_datasets/cpe_dataset.json b/test/data/test_cpe_cve/auxillary_datasets/cpe_dataset.json
deleted file mode 100644
index 7bb22f1c..00000000
--- a/test/data/test_cpe_cve/auxillary_datasets/cpe_dataset.json
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
-{
-    "cpe:2.3:a:ibm:security_access_manager_for_enterprise_single_sign-on:8.2.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*": "IBM Security Access Manager For Enterprise Single Sign-On 8.2.2",
-    "cpe:2.3:a:ibm:security_key_lifecycle_manager:2.6.0.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*": "IBM Security Key Lifecycle Manager 2.6.0.1",
-    "cpe:2.3:a:semperplugins:all_in_one_seo_pack:1.3.6.4:*:*:*:*:wordpress:*:*": "Semper Plugins All in One SEO Pack 1.3.6.4 for WordPress",
-    "cpe:2.3:a:tracker-software:pdf-xchange_lite_printer:6.0.320.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*": "Tracker Software PDF-XChange Lite Printer 6.0.320.0"
-}
-\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/test/data/test_cpe_cve/auxillary_datasets/cve_dataset.json b/test/data/test_cpe_cve/auxillary_datasets/cve_dataset.json
deleted file mode 100644
index 0572310b..00000000
--- a/test/data/test_cpe_cve/auxillary_datasets/cve_dataset.json
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-{
-    "_type": "CVEDataset",
-    "cves": {
-        "CVE-2017-1732": {
-            "_type": "CVE",
-            "cve_id": "CVE-2017-1732",
-            "vulnerable_cpes": [
-                "cpe:2.3:a:ibm:security_access_manager_for_enterprise_single_sign-on:8.2.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
-            ],
-            "impact": {
-                "_type": "Impact",
-                "base_score": 5.3,
-                "severity": "MEDIUM",
-                "explotability_score": 3.9,
-                "impact_score": 1.4
-            }
-        },
-        "CVE-2019-4513": {
-            "_type": "CVE",
-            "cve_id": "CVE-2019-4513",
-            "vulnerable_cpes": [
-                "cpe:2.3:a:ibm:security_access_manager_for_enterprise_single_sign-on:8.2.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
-            ],
-            "impact": {
-                "_type": "Impact",
-                "base_score": 8.2,
-                "severity": "HIGH",
-                "explotability_score": 3.9,
-                "impact_score": 4.2
-            }
-        }
-    }
-}
-\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/test/data/test_cpe_cve/vulnerable_dataset.json b/test/data/test_cpe_cve/vulnerable_dataset.json
deleted file mode 100644
index 30a62017..00000000
--- a/test/data/test_cpe_cve/vulnerable_dataset.json
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,68 +0,0 @@
-{
-    "_type": "CCDataset",
-    "state": {
-        "_type": "DatasetInternalState",
-        "meta_sources_parsed": true,
-        "pdfs_downloaded": false,
-        "pdfs_converted": false,
-        "txt_data_extracted": false,
-        "certs_analyzed": false
-    },
-    "timestamp": "2021-04-16 15:05:18.386794",
-    "sha256_digest": "not implemented",
-    "name": "cc_full_dataset",
-    "description": "sample dataset description",
-    "n_certs": 1,
-    "certs": [
-        {
-            "_type": "CommonCriteriaCert",
-            "dgst": "c01e5375331b25dc",
-            "status": "active",
-            "category": "Access Control Devices and Systems",
-            "name": "IBM Security Access Manager for Enterprise Single Sign-On Version 8.2",
-            "manufacturer": "IBM Corporation",
-            "scheme": "DE",
-            "security_level": [
-                "ALC_FLR.1",
-                "EAL3+"
-            ],
-            "not_valid_before": "2014-12-05",
-            "not_valid_after": null,
-            "report_link": "http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/epfiles/0683a_pdf.pdf",
-            "st_link": "http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/epfiles/0683b_pdf.pdf",
-            "src": "csv + html",
-            "cert_link": null,
-            "manufacturer_web": "http://www.ibm.com",
-            "protection_profiles": [],
-            "maintainance_updates": [],
-            "state": {
-                "_type": "InternalState",
-                "st_link_ok": true,
-                "report_link_ok": true,
-                "st_convert_ok": true,
-                "report_convert_ok": true,
-                "st_extract_ok": true,
-                "report_extract_ok": true,
-                "errors": []
-            },
-            "pdf_data": {
-                "_type": "PdfData",
-                "report_metadata": null,
-                "st_metadata": null,
-                "report_frontpage": null,
-                "st_frontpage": null,
-                "report_keywords": null,
-                "st_keywords": null
-            },
-            "heuristics": {
-                "_type": "Heuristics",
-                "extracted_versions": [
-                    "8.2"
-                ],
-                "cpe_matches": null,
-                "verified_cpe_matches": null,
-                "related_cves": null
-            }
-        }
-    ]
-}
-\ No newline at end of file
author	Adam Janovsky	2021-05-10 18:42:00 +0200
committer	Adam Janovsky	2021-05-10 18:42:00 +0200
commit	4c927448a4ff1d1e889e735a50465616e34e4682 (patch)
tree	e5ea6db542280756688ad4315bf58b272781fec8 /test/data
parent	f684f704dd970fb3101e273d6d634f413db15067 (diff)
download	sec-certs-4c927448a4ff1d1e889e735a50465616e34e4682.tar.gz sec-certs-4c927448a4ff1d1e889e735a50465616e34e4682.tar.zst sec-certs-4c927448a4ff1d1e889e735a50465616e34e4682.zip