added test for CC pdf conversion

4 files changed, 1992 insertions, 1 deletions

diff --git a/.travis.yml b/.travis.yml
index 21416ba2..e67232e0 100644
--- a/.travis.yml
+++ b/.travis.yml
@@ -3,6 +3,9 @@ language: python
 dist: xenial
 python: "3.8"
 
+before_install:
+  - sudo apt-get -y install poppler-utils
+
 install:
   - pip install ".[dev,test]"
 
diff --git a/test/data/test_cc_oop/report_869415cc4b91282e.txt b/test/data/test_cc_oop/report_869415cc4b91282e.txt
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..0f421a31
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/data/test_cc_oop/report_869415cc4b91282e.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,481 @@
+Ärendetyp: 6 Diarienummer: 18FMV7705-43:1
+HEMLIG/
+enligt Offentlighets- och sekretesslagen
+(2009:400)
+2020-06-15
+Country of origin: Sweden
+Försvarets materielverk
+Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
+Certification Report NetIQ® Identity Manager 4.7
+Issue: 1.0, 2020-Jun-15
+Authorisation: Helén Svensson, Lead Certifier , CSEC
+Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
+Certification Report NetIQ® Identity Manager 4.7
+18FMV7705-43:1 1.0 2020-06-15
+2 (18)
+Table of Contents
+1 Executive Summary 3
+2 Identification 5
+3 Security Policy 6
+3.1 Security Management 6
+3.2 Security Audit 6
+3.3 Identification and Authentication 6
+3.4 User Data Protection 7
+3.5 Trusted Path / Channel 7
+3.6 Cryptographic Support 7
+4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 8
+4.1 Usage Assumptions 8
+4.2 Environmental Assumptions 8
+4.3 Clarification of Scope 8
+5 Architectural Information 9
+6 Documentation 11
+7 IT Product Testing 12
+7.1 Developer Testing 12
+7.2 Evaluator Testing 12
+7.3 Penetration Testing 12
+8 Evaluated Configuration 13
+9 Results of the Evaluation 14
+10 Evaluator Comments and Recommendations 15
+11 Glossary 16
+12 Bibliography 17
+Appendix A Scheme Versions 18
+A.1 Scheme/Quality Management System 18
+A.2 Scheme Notes 18
+Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
+Certification Report NetIQ® Identity Manager 4.7
+18FMV7705-43:1 1.0 2020-06-15
+3 (18)
+1 Executive Summary
+The TOE is NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7.
+It is a software TOE consisting of the components listed below that can be setup on
+separate hardware platforms, see the [ST], or as a virtual appliances.
+TOE Components:
+ Identity Applications (RBPM) 4.7.3.0.1109
+ Identity Manager Engine 4.7.3.0.AE
+ Identity Reporting Module 6.5.0. F14508F
+ Sentinel Log Management for Identity Governance and Administration
+8.2.2.0_5415
+ One SSO Provider (OSP) 6.3.3.0
+ Self Service Password Reset (SSPR) 4.4.0.2 B366 r39762
+The TOE is delivered as software with documentation and can be installed in a physi-
+cal or virtual environment.
+It is important to verify the integrity of the TOE for secure acceptance of the TOE in
+accordance with the preparative procedures of the guidance, i.e. verify the TLS con-
+nection, the CA certificate and the file hash. It is also important to update the TOE (in-
+cluding 3rd party software) and the operational environment of the TOE in accordance
+with the preparative procedures of the guidance to mitigate known vulnerabilities.
+No conformance claims to any PP are made for the TOE.
+The evaluation has been performed by Combitech AB in Växjö, Sweden and by
+EWA-Canada in Ottawa, Canada. Site Visit and parts of the testing was performed at
+the developer's site in Bangalore, India.
+The evaluation was completed on 2020-06-02. The evaluation was conducted in ac-
+cordance with the requirements of Common Criteria, version 3.1 R5.
+Combitech AB is a licensed evaluation facility for Common Criteria under the Swe-
+dish Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme. Combitech AB is also
+accredited by the Swedish accreditation body SWEDAC according to ISO/IEC 17025
+for Common Criteria evaluation. EWA-Canada Ltd. operates as a Foreign location for
+Combitech AB within scope of the Swedish Common Criteria Evaluation and Certifi-
+cation Scheme.
+The certifier monitored the activities of the evaluator by reviewing all successive ver-
+sions of the evaluation reports, and by observing site-visit and testing. The certifier
+determined that the evaluation results confirm the security claims in the Security
+Target (ST) and the Common Methodology for evaluation assurance level EAL3
+augmented by ALC_FLR.2
+The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
+certificate, and on the condition that all the stipulations in the Security Target are
+met.
+This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by CSEC or any other or-
+ganisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the
+IT product by CSEC or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
+certificate is either expressed or implied.
+Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
+Certification Report NetIQ® Identity Manager 4.7
+18FMV7705-43:1 1.0 2020-06-15
+4 (18)
+As specified in the security target of this evaluation, the invocation of cryptographic
+primitives has been included in the TOE, while the implementation of these primi-
+tives has been located in TOE environment. Therefore the invocation of crypto-
+graphic primitives has been in the scope of this evaluation, while correctness of im-
+plementation of cryptographic primitives been excluded from the TOE. Correctness
+of implementation is done through third party certification Cryptographic Module
+Validation Program (CMVP) certificate number 1747 referred to in the Security
+Target.
+Users of this product are advised to consider their acceptance of this third party af-
+firmation regarding the correctness of implementation of the cryptographic primi-
+tives.
+Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
+Certification Report NetIQ® Identity Manager 4.7
+18FMV7705-43:1 1.0 2020-06-15
+5 (18)
+2 Identification
+Certification Identification
+Certification ID CSEC2018013
+Name and version of the cer-
+tified IT product
+NetIQ® Identity Manager 4.7
+TOE components:
+ Identity Applications (RBPM) 4.7.3.0.1109
+ Identity Manager Engine 4.7.3.0.AE
+ Identity Reporting Module 6.5.0. F14508F
+ Sentinel Log Management for Identity Govern-
+ance and Administration 8.2.2.0_5415
+ One SSO Provider (OSP) 6.3.3.0
+ Self Service Password Reset (SSPR) 4.4.0.2
+B366 r39762
+Security Target Identification NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 Security Target (ST),
+NetIQ Corporation , 2020-06-01, document version
+2.6
+EAL EAL3 + ALC_FLR.2
+Sponsor NetIQ Corporation
+Developer NetIQ Corporation
+ITSEF Combitech AB and EWA-Canada
+Common Criteria version 3.1 release 5
+CEM version 3.1 release 5
+QMS version 1.23.2
+Scheme Notes Release 15.0
+Recognition Scope CCRA, SOGIS and EA/MLA
+Certification date 2020-06-15
+Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
+Certification Report NetIQ® Identity Manager 4.7
+18FMV7705-43:1 1.0 2020-06-15
+6 (18)
+3 Security Policy
+The security features performed by the TOE are as follows:
+ Security Management
+ Security Audit
+ Identification and Authentication
+ User Data Protection
+ Trusted Path / Channels
+ Cryptographic Support
+3.1 Security Management
+The TOE maintains operator roles. The individual roles are categorized into two main
+roles: the Administrator and the User.
+Administrator - A user who has rights to configure and manage all aspects of the TOE
+User - The user's capabilities can be configured to:
+ View hierarchical relationships between User objects
+ View and edit user information (with appropriate rights).
+ Search for users or resources using advanced search criteria (which can be saved
+for later reuse).
+ Recover forgotten passwords.
+Only an Administrator can determine the behavior of, disable, enable, and modify the
+behavior of the functions that implement the Discretionary Access Control SFP. The
+TPE ensures only secure values are accepted for the security attributes listed with Dis-
+cretionary Access Control SFP.
+3.2 Security Audit
+The TOE generates the following audit data:
+ Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions (instantiated by startup of the TOE)
+ User login/logout
+ Login failures
+The TOE provides the Administrator with the capability to read all audit data gener-
+ated within the TOE via the console. The GUI provides a suitable means for an Ad-
+ministrator to interpret the information from the audit log.
+The A.TIMESOURCE is added to the assumptions on operational environment, and
+OE.TIME is added to the operational environment security objectives. The time and
+date provided by the operational environment are used to form the timestamps. The
+TOE ensures that the audit trail data is stamped when recorded with a dependable date
+and time received from the OE (operating system). In this manner, accurate time and
+date is maintained on the TOE.
+3.3 Identification and Authentication
+The IDM console application provides user interfaces that administrators may use to
+manage TOE functions. The operating system and the database in the TOE Environ-
+ment are queried to individually authenticate administrators or users. The TOE main-
+tains authorization information that determines which TOE functions an authenticated
+administrators or users (of a given role) may perform.
+Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
+Certification Report NetIQ® Identity Manager 4.7
+18FMV7705-43:1 1.0 2020-06-15
+7 (18)
+The TOE maintains the following list of security attributes belonging to individual us-
+ers:
+ User Identity (i.e., user name)
+ Authentication Status (whether the IT Environment validated the username/pass-
+word)
+ Privilege Level (Administrator or User)
+3.4 User Data Protection
+The TOE implements a discretionary access control policy to define what roles can
+access particular functions of the TOE. All access and actions for system reports, com-
+ponent audit logs, TOE configuration, operator account attributes (defined in
+FIA_ATD.1) are protected via access control list. When a user requests to perform an
+action on an object, the TOE verifies the role associated with the user name. Access is
+granted if the user (or group of users) has the specific rights required for the type of
+operation requested on the object.
+Identity Manager can enforce password policies on incoming passwords from con-
+nected systems and on passwords set or changed through the User Application pass-
+word self-service. If the new password does not comply, you can specify that Identity
+Manager not accept the password. This also means that passwords that don't comply
+with your policies are not distributed to other connected systems.
+In addition, can enforce password policies on connected systems. If the password be-
+ing published to the Identity Vault does not comply with rules in a policy, you can
+specify that Identity Manager not only does not accept the password for distribution,
+but actually resets the noncompliant password on the connected system by using the
+current Distribution password in the Identity Vault.
+3.5 Trusted Path / Channel
+The TOE provides a trusted channel between the TOE and external web servers.
+The TOE provides a trusted path for TOE administrators and TOE users to communi-
+cate with the TOE. The trusted path is implemented using HTTPS. The TOE's imple-
+mentation of TLS is described in the previous section (Trusted Channel).
+3.6 Cryptographic Support
+Cryptographic protection of data in transit between the TOE and remote users, and be-
+tween the TOE and external web servers is provided by the OpenSSL FIPS Object
+Module software version 2.0.10 (Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP)
+certificate number 1747) libraries.
+Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
+Certification Report NetIQ® Identity Manager 4.7
+18FMV7705-43:1 1.0 2020-06-15
+8 (18)
+4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
+4.1 Usage Assumptions
+The Security Target [ST] makes two assumptions on the usage of the TOE.
+A.MANAGE - Administrators of the TOE are assumed to be appropriately trained to
+undertake the installation, configuration and management of the TOE in a secure and
+trusted manner.
+A.NOEVIL - Administrators of the TOE and users on the local area network are not
+careless, willfully negligent, nor hostile, and will follow and abide by the instructions
+provided by the TOE documentation
+4.2 Environmental Assumptions
+The Security Target [ST] makes three assumptions on the operational environment of
+the TOE.
+A.LOCATE - The processing platforms on which the TOE resides are assumed to be
+located within a facility that provides controlled access
+A.CONFIG - The TOE is configured to receive all passwords and associated data from
+network-attached systems.
+A.TIMESOURCE - The TOE has a trusted source for system time via NTP server
+4.3 Clarification of Scope
+The Security Target contains five threats, which have been considered during the eval-
+uation.
+T.NO_AUTH - An unauthorized user may gain access to the TOE and alter the TOE
+configuration.
+T.NO_PRIV - An authorized user of the TOE exceeds his/her assigned security privi-
+leges resulting in unauthorized modification of the TOE configuration and/or data.
+T.USER_ACCESS_DENY - An authorized user may be able to change user authenti-
+cation data and or user access policies and deny their access to it later.
+T.PASSWD_COMPROMISE - An unauthorized user may be able to obtain and use
+user passwords.
+T.PROT_TRANS - An unauthorized user may be able to gather information from
+communications between components.
+The Security Target contains one Organisational Security Policies (OSPs), which have
+been considered during the evaluation.
+P.REMOTE_DATA - Passwords and account information from network-attached sys-
+tems shall be monitored and managed.
+Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
+Certification Report NetIQ® Identity Manager 4.7
+18FMV7705-43:1 1.0 2020-06-15
+9 (18)
+5 Architectural Information
+The TOE consists of the following components:
+ Administration Workstation (Console)2
+ Identity Applications (RBPM)
+ Designer aka Identity Manager Designer
+ Analyzer aka Identity Manager Analyzer
+ Identity Manager
+ Identity Manager Engine
+ Identity Vault
+ iManager
+ Reporting Server
+ Identity Reporting Module
+ Log Manager
+ Sentinel Log Management for Identity Governance and Administration
+ SSO Provider
+ One SSO Provider (OSP)
+ Self Service Password Reset
+ Self Service Password Reset (SSPR)
+Figure 1, TOE Deployment with subsystems
+The TOE provides the following functions: data synchronization, role management,
+auditing/reporting, and management.
+Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
+Certification Report NetIQ® Identity Manager 4.7
+18FMV7705-43:1 1.0 2020-06-15
+10 (18)
+ Data synchronization, including password synchronization, is provided by the
+base components of the Identity Manager solution: the Identity Vault, Identity
+Manager engine, drivers, Remote Loader, and connected applications
+ Role management is provided by the User Application
+ Auditing and reporting are provided by the Identity Reporting Module
+Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
+Certification Report NetIQ® Identity Manager 4.7
+18FMV7705-43:1 1.0 2020-06-15
+11 (18)
+6 Documentation
+The TOE includes the following guidance documentation:
+ Quick Start Guide for Installing NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 February 2018
+[QSIM]
+ NetIQ Identity Manager Setup Guide for Linux February 2018 [SUL]
+ NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7, Operational User Guidance and Preparative Proce-
+dures Supplement (AGD-IGS), version 0.6, is supplied for those customers that
+need guidance on how to set the TOE in the evaluated configuration. [AGD]
+Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
+Certification Report NetIQ® Identity Manager 4.7
+18FMV7705-43:1 1.0 2020-06-15
+12 (18)
+7 IT Product Testing
+7.1 Developer Testing
+There are 30 test cases covering all SFRs with at least one test per SFR. All tests were
+successful with a pass verdict.
+7.2 Evaluator Testing
+Since all SFRs and security function requirements were tested by the developer the
+evaluator focused on repetition of the developer's test cases and penetration testing.
+7.3 Penetration Testing
+Port and vulnerability scan were performed on Identity manager engine, Identity appli-
+cations (RBPM), and Identity reporting module.
+No unforeseen ports or vulnerabilities were found.
+Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
+Certification Report NetIQ® Identity Manager 4.7
+18FMV7705-43:1 1.0 2020-06-15
+13 (18)
+8 Evaluated Configuration
+The TOE consists of a set of software applications run on one or multiple distributed
+systems. The TOE requires the following software components as part of the evalu-
+ated configuration:
+Component Requirements
+Administration Workstation Mozilla Firefox 65
+Identity Applications (RBPM)
+Designer / Analyzer)
+SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 SP4
+Identity Manager (Identity Man-
+ager Engine)
+SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 SP4
+Reporting Server (Identity Re-
+porting Module)
+SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 SP4
+Log Manager (Sentinel Log Man-
+agement for Identity Governance
+and Administration)
+SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 SP4
+SSO Provider (OneSSO Provider) SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 SP4
+Self Service Password Reset SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 SP4
+In addition to the platform requirements mentioned above, the following hardware re-
+sources are needed in order to install and configure Identity Manager on each plat-
+form:
+ A minimum of 8 GB RAM
+ 15 GB available disk space to install all the components.
+ Additional disk space to configure and populate data. This might vary depending
+on your connected systems and number of objects in the Identity Vault.
+For server-based components, it is recommended that the platform have a minimum of
+2 CPUs or cores.
+Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
+Certification Report NetIQ® Identity Manager 4.7
+18FMV7705-43:1 1.0 2020-06-15
+14 (18)
+9 Results of the Evaluation
+The evaluators applied each work unit of the Common Methodology [CEM] within
+the scope of the evaluation, and concluded that the TOE meets the security objectives
+stated in the Security Target [ST] for an attack potential of Basic.
+The certifier reviewed the work of the evaluators and determined that the evaluation
+was conducted in accordance with the Common Criteria [CC].
+The evaluators' overall verdict is PASS.
+The verdicts for the respective assurance classes and components are summarised in
+the following table:
+Assurance Class/Family Short name Verdict
+Development ADV: PASS
+Security architecture description ADV_ARC.1 PASS
+Functional specification with complete summary ADV_FSP.3 PASS
+Architectural design ADV_TDS.2 PASS
+Guidance documents AGD: PASS
+Operational user guidance AGD_OPE.1 PASS
+Preparative procedures AGD_PRE.1 PASS
+Life-cycle support ALC: PASS
+Authorisation controls ALC_CMC.3 PASS
+Implementation representation CM coverage ALC_CMS.3 PASS
+Delivery procedures ALC_DEL.1 PASS
+Identification of security measures ALC_DVS.1 PASS
+Developer defined life-cycle model ALC_LCD.1 PASS
+Flaw reporting procedures ALC_FLR.2 PASS
+Security Target evaluation ASE: PASS
+Conformance claims ASE_CCL.1 PASS
+Extended components definition ASE_ECD.1 PASS
+ST introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
+Security objectives ASE_OBJ.2 PASS
+Derived security requirements ASE_REQ.2 PASS
+Security problem definition ASE_SPD.1 PASS
+TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
+Tests ATE: PASS
+Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.2 PASS
+Testing: basic design ATE_DPT.1 PASS
+Functional testing ATE_FUN.1 PASS
+Independent testing - sample ATE_IND.2 PASS
+Vulnerability assessment AVA: PASS
+Vulnerability analysis AVA_VAN.2 PASS
+Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
+Certification Report NetIQ® Identity Manager 4.7
+18FMV7705-43:1 1.0 2020-06-15
+15 (18)
+10 Evaluator Comments and Recommendations
+None.
+Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
+Certification Report NetIQ® Identity Manager 4.7
+18FMV7705-43:1 1.0 2020-06-15
+16 (18)
+11 Glossary
+CC Common Criteria version 3.1
+EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
+FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
+IDM Identity Manager
+ITSEF
+IT Security Evaluation Facility, test labora-
+tory licensed to operate within a evaluation
+and certification scheme
+NTP Network Time Protocol
+OSP Organizational Security Policy
+OSP One SSO Provider
+SSO Single Sign On
+SFP Security Function Policy
+SFR Security Functional Requirement
+SSPR Self Service Password Reset
+ST Security Target
+TOE Target of Evaluation
+Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
+Certification Report NetIQ® Identity Manager 4.7
+18FMV7705-43:1 1.0 2020-06-15
+17 (18)
+12 Bibliography
+ST NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 Security Target (ST), NetIQ
+Corporation, 2020-06-01, document version 2.6
+QSIM Quick Start Guide for Installing NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7
+February 2018
+SUL NetIQ Identity Manager Setup Guide for Linux February 2018
+AGD NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7, Operational User Guidance and
+Preparative Procedures Supplement (AGD-IGS), version 0.6
+CCpart1 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
+Part 1, version 3.1 revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001
+CCpart2 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
+Part 2, version 3.1 revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-002
+CCpart3 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
+Evaluation,Part 3, version 3.1 revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-003
+CC CCpart1 + CCpart2 + CCpart3
+CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
+Evaluation, version 3.1 revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-004
+SP-002 SP-002 Evaluation and Certification, CSEC, 2019-09-24, document
+version 31.0
+Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
+Certification Report NetIQ® Identity Manager 4.7
+18FMV7705-43:1 1.0 2020-06-15
+18 (18)
+Appendix A Scheme Versions
+During the certification the following versions of the Swedish Common Criteria Eval-
+uation and Certification scheme have been used.
+A.1 Scheme/Quality Management System
+During the certification project, the following versions of the quality management sys-
+tem (QMS) have been applicable since the certification application was received:
+QMS 1.21.5 valid from 2018-11-19
+QMS 1.22 valid from 2019-02-01
+QMS 1.22.1 valid from 2019-03-08
+QMS 1.22.2 valid from 2019-05-02
+QMS 1.22.3 valid from 2019-05-20
+QMS 1.23 valid from 2019-10-14
+QMS 1.23.1 valid from 2020-03-06
+QMS 1.23.2 valid from 2020-05-11
+In order to ensure consistency in the outcome of the certification, the certifier has ex-
+amined the changes introduced in each update of the quality management system.
+The changes between consecutive versions are outlined in "Ändringslista CSEC QMS
+1.23.1". The certifier concluded that, from QMS 1.21.5 to the current QMS 1.23.2,
+there are no changes with impact on the result of the certification.
+Note that the SP-188 Scheme Crypto Policy version 9.0 was introduced in QMS 1.23.
+The certification application was submitted before the SP-188 Scheme Crypto Policy
+version 9.0 was introduced and therefore version 8.0 was used.
+A.2 Scheme Notes
+The following Scheme interpretations have been considered during the certification.
+ Scheme Note 15 - Demonstration of test Coverage
+ Scheme Note 18 - Highlighted Requirements on the Security Target
+ Scheme Note 22 - Vulnerability assessment
+ Scheme Note 28 - Updated procedures for application, evaluation and certification
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/test/data/test_cc_oop/target_869415cc4b91282e.txt b/test/data/test_cc_oop/target_869415cc4b91282e.txt
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..9435c203
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/data/test_cc_oop/target_869415cc4b91282e.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,1497 @@
+NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7
+Security Target (ST)
+Date: June 1, 2020
+Version: 2.6
+Prepared By: NetIQ Corporation
+Prepared For: NetIQ Corporation
+515 Post Oak Blvd
+Suite 1200
+Houston, Texas 77027
+Abstract
+This document provides the basis for an evaluation of a specific Target of Evaluation (TOE), Identity
+Manager 4.7. This Security Target (ST) defines a set of assumptions about the aspects of the environment,
+a list of threats that the product intends to counter, a set of security objectives, a set of security requirements
+and the IT security functions provided by the TOE which meet the set of requirements.
+June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST
+NetIQ Corporation Page 2 of 36
+Table of Contents
+Table of Contents...................................................................................................................................2
+List of Tables.........................................................................................................................................3
+List of Figures........................................................................................................................................4
+1. Introduction ...........................................................................................................................................5
+Security Target Reference:............................................................................................................5
+TOE Reference..............................................................................................................................5
+Document Organization................................................................................................................5
+Document Conventions.................................................................................................................6
+Document Terminology................................................................................................................6
+TOE Overview..............................................................................................................................7
+TOE Description...........................................................................................................................8
+Administration Workstation (Console):........................................................................................8
+Identity Applications (RBPM)......................................................................................................8
+Identity Manager:..........................................................................................................................9
+Reporting Server:..........................................................................................................................9
+Log Manager:................................................................................................................................9
+OneSSO Provider:.........................................................................................................................9
+Self Service Password Reset:......................................................................................................10
+TOE Delivery:.............................................................................................................................10
+TOE Environment.......................................................................................................................10
+Virtual Machines.........................................................................................................................10
+Hardware and Software Supplied by the IT Environment..........................................................11
+Logical Boundary........................................................................................................................11
+TOE Security Functional Policies...............................................................................................12
+Discretionary Access Control SFP..............................................................................................12
+TOE Vendor Documentation / Guidance....................................................................................12
+Features / Functionality NOT Included in the TOE....................................................................12
+2. Conformance Claims ...........................................................................................................................14
+CC Conformance Claim..............................................................................................................14
+PP Claim .....................................................................................................................................14
+Package Claim ............................................................................................................................14
+Conformance Rationale...............................................................................................................14
+3. Security Problem Definition................................................................................................................15
+Threats.........................................................................................................................................15
+Organizational Security Policies.................................................................................................15
+Assumptions................................................................................................................................15
+4. Security Objectives..............................................................................................................................17
+Security Objectives for the TOE.................................................................................................17
+Security Objectives for the Operational Environment................................................................17
+Security Objectives Rationale.....................................................................................................17
+Mapping of Objectives................................................................................................................18
+5. Extended Components Definition........................................................................................................20
+6. Security Requirements.........................................................................................................................21
+Security Functional Requirements..............................................................................................21
+Security Audit (FAU) .................................................................................................................21
+FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation..........................................................................................21
+FAU_SAR.1 Audit Review.........................................................................................................22
+June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST
+NetIQ Corporation Page 3 of 36
+Cryptographic Support................................................................................................................22
+FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation...............................................................................22
+FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction..............................................................................22
+FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation (Encryption / Decryption) ..............................................22
+Information Flow Control (FDP) ................................................................................................23
+FDP_ACC.1 Subset Access Control...........................................................................................23
+FDP_ACF.1 Security Attribute Based Access Control...............................................................23
+Identification and Authentication (FIA) .....................................................................................24
+FIA_ATD.1 ­ User Attribute Definition.....................................................................................24
+FIA_UAU.2 User Authentication before Any Action ................................................................24
+FIA_UID.2 User Identification before Any Action....................................................................24
+Security Management (FMT)......................................................................................................24
+FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes .......................................................................24
+FMT_MSA.2 Secure Security Attributes....................................................................................24
+FMT_MSA.3 Static Attribute Initialization................................................................................24
+FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF Data....................................................................................25
+FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions ..............................................................25
+FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles.......................................................................................................25
+Protection of the TSF (FPT)........................................................................................................25
+FPT_TDC.1 Inter-TSF Basic TSF Data Consistency .................................................................25
+Trusted Path / Channel (FTP) .....................................................................................................26
+FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel ........................................................................................26
+FTP_TRP.1 Trusted Path............................................................................................................26
+Security Assurance Requirements ..............................................................................................26
+Security Requirements Rationale................................................................................................26
+Security Functional Requirements..............................................................................................26
+Dependency Rationale ................................................................................................................27
+Sufficiency of Security Requirements ........................................................................................28
+Security Assurance Requirements ..............................................................................................30
+Security Assurance Requirements Rationale ..............................................................................30
+Security Assurance Requirements Evidence...............................................................................31
+7. TOE Summary Specification...............................................................................................................33
+TOE Security Functions..............................................................................................................33
+Security Audit.............................................................................................................................33
+Identification and Authentication................................................................................................33
+User Data Protection...................................................................................................................33
+Security Management .................................................................................................................34
+Trusted Path / Channels ..............................................................................................................35
+Trusted Channel..........................................................................................................................35
+Trusted Path:...............................................................................................................................35
+Cryptographic Support................................................................................................................35
+List of Tables
+Table 1 ­ ST Organization and Section Descriptions...................................................................................6
+Table 2 ­ Acronyms Used in Security Target...............................................................................................7
+Table 3 ­ CAVP Certificate Numbers ..........................................................................................................9
+Table 4 ­ Virtual Machine Environment Requirements .............................................................................11
+Table 5 ­ IT Environment Component Requirements................................................................................11
+Table 6 ­ Logical Boundary Descriptions ..................................................................................................12
+Table 7 ­ IT Environment Components - Not In TOE ...............................................................................13
+June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST
+NetIQ Corporation Page 4 of 36
+Table 8 ­ Threats Addressed by the TOE...................................................................................................15
+Table 9 ­ Organizational Security Policies.................................................................................................15
+Table 10 ­ Assumptions..............................................................................................................................16
+Table 11 ­ TOE Security Objectives ..........................................................................................................17
+Table 12 ­ Operational Environment Security Objectives .........................................................................17
+Table 13 ­ Mapping of Assumptions, Threats, Policies and ORSP s to Security Objectives.....................18
+Table 14 ­ Mapping of Threats, Policies, and Assumptions to Objectives ................................................19
+Table 15 ­ TOE Security Functional Requirements ...................................................................................21
+Table 16 ­ Cryptographic Standards...........................................................................................................22
+Table 17 ­ Cryptographic Operations.........................................................................................................23
+Table 18 ­ Management of TSF data..........................................................................................................25
+Table 19 ­ Mapping of TOE Security Functional Requirements and Objectives.......................................27
+Table 20 ­ Mapping of SFR to Dependencies and Rationales....................................................................28
+Table 20 ­ Rationale for TOE SFRs to Objectives.....................................................................................30
+Table 22 ­ Security Assurance Requirements at EAL3..............................................................................30
+Table 23 ­ Security Assurance Rationale and Measures ............................................................................32
+Table 24 ­ Roles and Functions..................................................................................................................34
+Table 22 ­ CAVP........................................................................................................................................36
+List of Figures
+Figure 1 ­ TOE Deployment with Subsystems.............................................................................................7
+Figure 2 ­ Sample Download List ..............................................................................................................10
+June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST
+NetIQ Corporation Page 5 of 36
+1. Introduction
+This section identifies the Security Target (ST), Target of Evaluation (TOE), Security Target
+organization, document conventions, and terminology. It also includes an overview of the
+evaluated product.
+Security Target Reference:
+ST Title NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 Security Target:
+ST Revision 2.6
+ST Publication Date June 1, 2020
+ST Author Michael F. Angelo
+TOE Reference
+TOE Reference NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7
+TOE Developer NetIQ Corporation
+Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) EAL3+
+Note: The file download name is: Identity_Manager_4.7_Linux.iso .
+Note: The official name of the product is NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 Advanced Edition. The
+released product can be uniquely identified as: NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7.3. The product name
+may also be abbreviated as Identity Manager 4.7 AE, Identity Manager, IDM 4.7.3AE or IDM 4.7
+or simply IDM . Finally the TOE, if examined for the build number will be identified as NetIQ
+Identity Manager 4.7.3.0.317. For the purpose of this document all of the above references are
+equivalent, and the document may refer to the product simply as IDM or the TOE.
+Document Organization
+This Security Target follows the following format:
+SECTION TITLE DESCRIPTION
+1 Introduction Provides an overview of the TOE and defines the
+hardware and software that make up the TOE as well
+as the physical and logical boundaries of the TOE
+2 Conformance Claims Lists evaluation conformance to Common Criteria
+versions, Protection Profiles, or Packages where
+applicable
+3 Security Problem
+Definition
+Specifies the threats, assumptions and organizational
+security policies that affect the TOE
+4 Security Objectives Defines the security objectives for the
+TOE/operational environment and provides a
+rationale to demonstrate that the security objectives
+satisfy the threats
+5 Extended
+Components
+Definition
+Describes extended components of the evaluation (if
+any)
+6 Security
+Requirements
+Contains the functional and assurance requirements
+for this TOE
+June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST
+NetIQ Corporation Page 6 of 36
+SECTION TITLE DESCRIPTION
+7 TOE Summary
+Specification
+Identifies the IT security functions provided by the
+TOE and also identifies the assurance measures
+targeted to meet the assurance requirements.
+Table 1 ­ ST Organization and Section Descriptions
+Document Conventions
+The notation, formatting, and conventions used in this Security Target are consistent with those
+used in Version 3.1 of the Common Criteria. Selected presentation choices are discussed here
+to aid the Security Target reader. The Common Criteria allows several operations to be
+performed on functional requirements: The allowable operations defined in Part 2 of the
+Common Criteria are refinement, selection, assignment and iteration.
+ The refinement operation is used to add detail to a requirement, and thus further
+restricts a requirement. Refinement of security requirements is denoted by bold text.
+Any text removed is indicated with a strikethrough format (Example: TSF).
+ The selection operation is picking one or more items from a list in order to narrow the
+scope of a component element. Selections are denoted by italicized text.
+ The assignment operation is used to assign a specific value to an unspecified parameter,
+such as the length of a password. An assignment operation is indicated by showing the
+value in square brackets, i.e. [assignment_value(s)].
+ Iterated functional and assurance requirements are given unique identifiers by
+appending to the base requirement identifier from the Common Criteria an iteration
+number inside parenthesis, for example, FMT_MTD.1.1 (1) and FMT_MTD.1.1 (2) refer
+to separate instances of the FMT_MTD.1 security functional requirement component.
+When not embedded in a Security Functional Requirement, italicized text is used for both
+official document titles and text meant to be emphasized more than plain text.
+Document Terminology
+The following table describes the acronyms used in this document:
+TERM DEFINITION
+CC Common Criteria version 3.1
+EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
+IDM Identity Manager
+IDV Identity Vault
+IGA Identity Governance and Administration
+NMAS NetIQ Modular Authentication Service
+NTP Network Time Protocol
+ORSP Organizational Security Policy
+OSP One SSO Provider
+SSO Single Sign On
+SFP Security Function Policy
+SFR Security Functional Requirement
+SLM Sentinel Log Manager
+June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST
+NetIQ Corporation Page 7 of 36
+TERM DEFINITION
+SSPR Self Service Password Reset
+ST Security Target
+TOE Target of Evaluation
+TSF TOE Security Function
+Table 2 ­ Acronyms Used in Security Target
+TOE Overview
+The TOE is NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7. NetIQ Identity Manager provides data sharing and
+synchronization services which enable applications, directories, and databases to share
+information. It links scattered information and enables you to establish policies that govern
+automatic updates to designated systems when identity changes occur.
+Identity Manager provides the foundation for account provisioning, security, single sign-on,
+user self-service, authentication, authorization, automated workflow, and Web services. It
+allows you to integrate, manage, and control your distributed identity information so you can
+securely deliver the right resources to the right people.
+The following diagram shows a typical TOE deployment:
+Identity Reporting Module
+Operating System
+General Purpose Computing
+Platform
+Reporting Server
+Sentinel Log Management
+for Identity Governance
+and Administration
+Operating System
+General Purpose Computing
+Platform
+Log Manager
+Identity Manager Engine
+Identity Vault
+Operating System
+General Purpose Computing
+Platform
+Identity Applications
+(RBPM)
+Web Browser
+Operating System
+General Purpose Computing
+(GPC) Platform
+Identity Application
+4
+1
+2
+8
+10
+= TOE Component
+= IT Environment Component
+One SSO Provider
+(uname / pass, Kerberos,
+SAML)
+Operating System
+General Purpose Computing
+Platform
+3
+5
+SSO Provider
+Self Service Password
+Reset
+Web Browser
+Operating System
+General Purpose Computing
+Platform
+Self Service Password Reset
+11
+9
+12
+7a
+Identity Manager
+6
+B
+Administration
+Workstation
+(Console) 7b
+Separate communication paths to Sentinel Log Manager
+7a ­ Identity Vault to Sentinel Log Manager
+7b ­ iManager to Sentinel Log Manager
+C
+A
+iManager
+Designer / Analyzer
+= TOE Sub Component
+OpenSSL
+Figure 1 ­ TOE Deployment with Subsystems1
+The TOE provides the following functions: data synchronization, role management,
+auditing/reporting, and management.
+11
+Note the Administration Workstation Console is not included in the evaluation as there is no code that is added to it to make it
+explicitly a workstation console. It is included in the document as a component required for access.to the TOE.
+June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST
+NetIQ Corporation Page 8 of 36
+ Data synchronization, including password synchronization, is provided by the base
+components of the Identity Manager solution: the Identity Vault, Identity Manager
+engine, drivers, Remote Loader, and connected applications
+ Role management is provided by the User Application
+ Auditing and reporting are provided by the Identity Reporting Module
+TOE Description
+NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 is a comprehensive identity management suite. It provides an
+intelligent identity framework that leverages your existing IT assets and new computing
+models like Software as a Service (SaaS) by reducing cost and ensuring compliance across
+physical, virtual, and cloud environments. With the NetIQ Identity Manager solution, you can
+make sure that your business has the most current user identity information. You can retain
+control at the enterprise level by managing, provisioning, and de-provisioning identities within
+the firewall and extending to the cloud. Through streamlined user administration and
+processes, Identity Manager helps organizations reduce management costs, increase
+productivity and security, and comply with government regulations.
+The TOE is a software TOE and includes the following functions.
+Each function contains the components as follows:
+1. Administration Workstation (Console)2
+2. Identity Applications (RBPM) 4.7.3.0.1109
+ Designer aka Identity Manager Designer 4.7.3.0.20190614
+ Analyzer aka Identity Manager Analyzer
+3. Identity Manager
+ Identity Manager Engine 4.7.3.0.AE
+o Identity Vault 9.1.4
+o iManager 3.1.4
+4. Reporting Server
+ Identity Reporting Module 6.5.0. F14508F
+5. Log Manager
+ Sentinel Log Management for Identity Governance and Administration 8.2.2.0_5415
+6. SSO Provider
+ One SSO Provider (OSP) 6.3.3.0
+7. Self Service Password Reset
+ Self Service Password Reset (SSPR) 4.4.0.2 B366 r39762
+Administration Workstation (Console):
+The Administration Workstation (Console) is used to access the Identity Applications (RBPM),
+Identity Manager, and the Reporting Server. Each of these functions is described below.
+Identity Applications (RBPM)
+The Identity Applications (RBPM) houses the Designer / Analyzer functions. The Identity
+Application is a Web application (browser-based) that gives users and business administrators
+the ability to perform a variety of identity self-service and roles provisioning tasks, including
+managing passwords and identity data, initiating and monitoring provisioning and role
+assignment requests, managing the approval process for provisioning requests, and verifying
+2
+The Administration Workstation (Console) is not part of the TOE, in that there is no code added to it in order to function as the
+Console it is required to access features and function of the TOE and is included for completeness.
+June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST
+NetIQ Corporation Page 9 of 36
+attestation reports. It includes the workflow engine that controls the routing of requests
+through the appropriate approval process. Designer aka Designer for Identity Manager helps
+you design, test, document, and deploy Identity Manager solutions in a network or test
+environment. Analyzer aka NetIQ Analyzer for Identity Manager is an identity management
+toolset that helps you ensure that internal data quality policies are adhered to by providing
+data analysis, data cleansing, data reconciliation, and data monitoring/reporting. Analyzer lets
+you analyze, enhance, and control all data stores throughout the enterprise.
+Identity Manager:
+The Identity Manager houses the Identity Manager Engine (and the Identity Vault which
+contains the Identity Applications data) and iManager. The Identity Manager Engine
+synchronizes identity data between applications. For example, data synchronized from a
+PeopleSoft system to Lotus Notes is first added to the Identity Vault and then sent to the Lotus
+Notes system. In addition, the Identity Vault stores information specific to Identity Manager,
+such as driver configurations, parameters, and policies.
+The following packages are used to provide cryptographic functions, and are not included in
+the TOE boundary. NetIQ eDirectory is used for the Identity Vault. eDirectory provides access
+to the OpenSSL Cryptographic functionality.
+They meet the cryptographic quality requirements as evidenced by the following certificates:
+Component CAVP Cert #
+AES Certs. #3090 and #3264
+HMAC Certs. #1937 and #2063
+RSA Certs. #1581 and #1664
+Table 3 ­ CAVP Certificate Numbers
+Reporting Server:
+The reporting server houses the Identity Reporting Module. The Identity Reporting Module
+generates reports that show critical business information about various aspects of your
+Identity Manager configuration, including information collected from Identity Vaults and
+managed systems such as Active Directory or SAP. The reporting module provides a set of
+predefined report definitions you can use to generate reports. In addition, it gives you the
+option to import custom reports defined in a third-party tool. The user interface for the
+reporting module makes it easy to schedule reports to run at off-peak times to optimize
+performance.
+The IDM Tools are used to manage the Identity Manager solution. This includes functions to:
+ Analyze, enhance, and control all data stores throughout the enterprise
+ Design, deploy, and document the TOE
+ Manage Identity Manager and receive real-time health and status information
+about the Identity Manager system
+ Define and maintain which authorizations are associated with which business roles
+Log Manager:
+The Log Manager, also known as Sentinel Log Manager for Identity Governance and
+Administration (SLM for IGA), collects and acknowledges receipt of auditing data from all
+aspects of the product.
+OneSSO Provider:
+June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST
+NetIQ Corporation Page 10 of 36
+The OneSSO Provider, also known as OSP) is a single interface for access authentication. This
+provider can handle user name / password, Kerberos, and SAML tokens.
+Self Service Password Reset:
+Self Service Password Reset (SSPR) allows users to enroll, update, and reset their passwords
+without administrative intervention in the Identity Vault (IDV).
+Note: that the components above can be installed on one or multiple distributed systems. Also,
+the hardware, operating systems and third-party support software (e.g. DBMS) on each of the
+systems are excluded from the TOE boundary.
+TOE Delivery:
+The TOE software is provided to customers via secure download from the download portal
+(https://dl.netiq.com/index.jsp). The software is available as either a gnu zip (.gz), iso
+formatted optical disk (.iso). zip (.zip) or dmg (if mac) depending on your destination platform.
+Once downloaded, and extracted, the setup files can be executed to perform the installation.
+Figure 2 ­ Sample Download List
+TOE Environment
+Virtual Machines
+The following TOE components can be installed in virtual machines (VM).
+ Console / Administration Workstation (Identity Applications)
+ Identity Manager
+ Reporting Server
+ Sentinel Log Manager
+ One SSO Provider
+ Self Service Password Reset (SSPR)
+The hardware and software requirements for the operational environment to support the VM
+are listed in the table below:
+June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST
+NetIQ Corporation Page 11 of 36
+Category Console /
+Administration
+Workstation
+(Identity
+Applications3)
+Identity
+Manager
+(Identity
+Manager
+Engine)
+Reporting
+Server
+(Identity
+Reporting
+Module)
+Log
+Manager
+(SLM for
+Identity
+Gov &
+Adm)
+SSO
+Provider
+(OneSSO
+Provider)
+Self Service
+Password Reset
+(SSPR)
+Processor 2 CPU cores 2 CPU
+cores
+2 CPU
+cores
+4 to 8 CPU
+cores
+2 CPU
+cores
+2 CPU cores
+Memory 8 GB 8 GB 8 GB 8 to 16 GB 8 GB 8 GB
+Table 4 ­ Virtual Machine Environment Requirements
+Hardware and Software Supplied by the IT Environment
+The TOE consists of a set of software applications run on one or multiple distributed systems.
+The TOE requires the following software components as part of the evaluated configuration:
+Component Requirements
+Administration Workstation Mozilla Firefox 65
+Identity Applications (RBPM)
+Designer / Analyzer)
+SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 SP4
+Identity Manager (Identity
+Manager Engine)
+SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 SP4
+Reporting Server (Identity
+Reporting Module)
+SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 SP4
+Log Manager (Sentinel Log
+Management for Identity
+Governance and
+Administration)
+SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 SP4
+SSO Provider (OneSSO
+Provider)
+SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 SP4
+Self Service Password Reset SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 SP4
+Table 5 ­ IT Environment Component Requirements
+In addition to the platform requirements mentioned above, the following hardware resources
+are needed in order to install and configure Identity Manager on each platform:
+ A minimum of 8 GB RAM
+ 15 GB available disk space to install all the components.
+ Additional disk space to configure and populate data. This might vary depending
+on your connected systems and number of objects in the Identity Vault.
+For server-based components, it is recommended that the platform have a minimum of 2 CPUs
+or cores
+Logical Boundary
+This section outlines the boundaries of the security functionality of the TOE; the logical
+boundary of the TOE includes the security functionality described in the following table:
+3
+The system requirements also apply to the following components that you use with the identity applications: PostgreSQL, Tomcat,
+NetIQ One SSO Provider (OSP), and NetIQ Self Service Password Reset.
+June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST
+NetIQ Corporation Page 12 of 36
+TSF DESCRIPTION
+Security
+Management
+The TOE restricts the ability to enable, modify and disable security
+policy rules and user roles to an authorized Administrator. The TOE
+also provides the functions necessary for effective management of
+the TOE security functions. Administrators configure the TOE with
+the Management Console via Web-based connection.
+Security Audit The TOE supports the provision of log data from each system
+component, such as user login/logout and incident/ticket
+management actions. It also records security events such as failed
+login attempts, etc. Audit trails can be stored for later review and
+analysis.
+Cryptographic
+Support
+The TOE utilizes the OpenSSL cryptographic module to provide
+support for HTTPS / TLS communications with administrators and
+TOE components.
+Identification and
+Authentication
+The TOE enforces individual I&A. Operators must successfully
+authenticate using a unique identifier and password prior to
+performing any actions on the TOE.
+User Data
+Protection
+The TOE enforces discretionary access rules using an access control
+list with user attributes.
+Trusted Path /
+Channels
+The TOE utilizes HTTPS/TLS to provide trusted paths and inter-TSF
+trusted channels.
+Table 6 ­ Logical Boundary Descriptions
+TOE Security Functional Policies
+The TOE supports the following Security Functional Policy:
+Discretionary Access Control SFP
+The TOE implements an access control SFP named Discretionary Access Control SFP. This SFP
+determines and enforces the privileges associated with operator roles. An authorized
+administrator can define specific services available to administrators and users via the
+Management Console.
+TOE Vendor Documentation / Guidance
+In addition to the documentation generated for the certification, the TOE includes the following
+product and guidance documentation generated by NetIQ:
+ Quick Start Guide for Installing NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 February 2018
+ NetIQ Identity Manager Setup Guide for Linux February 2018
+ NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7, Operational User Guidance and Preparative Procedures
+Supplement (AGD-IGS), version 0.6, is supplied for those customers that need
+guidance on how to set the TOE in the evaluated configuration.
+Features / Functionality NOT Included in the TOE
+The following supported operating systems and software were not included in the evaluated
+configuration:
+Functions Requirements
+Administration Workstation (Console) Web Browsers
+June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST
+NetIQ Corporation Page 13 of 36
+Functions Requirements
+ Internet Explorer 11
+ Google Chrome
+Identity Applications (Includes Designer /
+Analyzer)
+RHEL 7.5
+Windows Server 2016
+Identity Manager (Includes Identity Vault
+and, iManager)
+RHEL 7.5
+Windows Server 2016
+Reporting Server
+(includes Identity Reporting Module)
+RHEL 7.5
+Windows Server 2016
+Log Manager (includes Sentinel Log
+Management for Identity Governance and
+Administration)
+RHEL 7.5
+One SSO Provider (uname / pass, Kerberos,
+SAML)
+RHEL 7.5
+Windows Server 2016
+Self Service Password Reset (SSPR) RHEL 7.5
+Windows Server 2016
+Table 7 ­ IT Environment Components - Not In TOE
+June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST
+NetIQ Corporation Page 14 of 36
+2. Conformance Claims
+CC Conformance Claim
+The TOE is Common Criteria Version 3.1 Revision 5 (April 2017) Part 2 conformant and Part 3
+conformant.
+PP Claim
+The TOE does not claim conformance to any registered Protection Profile.
+Package Claim
+The TOE claims conformance to the EAL3 assurance package defined in Part 3 of the Common
+Criteria Version 3.1 Revision 5 (April 2017). The TOE does not claim conformance to any
+functional package. The TOE EAL3 assurance package is augmented with ALC_FLR.2
+Conformance Rationale
+No conformance rationale is necessary for this evaluation since this Security Target does not
+claim conformance to a Protection Profile.
+June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST
+NetIQ Corporation Page 15 of 36
+3. Security Problem Definition
+In order to clarify the nature of the security problem that the TOE is intended to solve, this
+section describes the following:
+ Any known or assumed threats to the assets against which specific protection within the TOE or
+its environment is required
+ Any organizational security policy statements or rules with which the TOE must comply
+ Any assumptions about the security aspects of the environment and/or of the manner in which
+the TOE is intended to be used.
+This chapter identifies assumptions as A.assumption, threats as T.threat and policies as P.policy.
+Threats
+The following are threats identified for the TOE and the IT System (or operating environment)
+the TOE monitors. The TOE itself has threats and the TOE is also responsible for addressing
+threats to the environment in which it resides. The assumed level of expertise of the attacker
+for all threats is unsophisticated.
+The TOE addresses the following threats:
+THREAT DESCRIPTION
+T.NO_AUTH An unauthorized user may gain access to the TOE and alter the
+TOE configuration.
+T.NO_PRIV An authorized user of the TOE exceeds his/her assigned
+security privileges resulting in unauthorized modification of the
+TOE configuration and/or data.
+T.USER_ACCESS_DENY An authorized user may be able to change user authentication data
+and or user access policies and deny their access to it later.
+T.PASSWD_COMPROMISE An unauthorized user may be able to obtain and use user
+passwords.
+T.PROT_TRANS An unauthorized user may be able to gather information from
+communications between components.
+Table 8 ­ Threats Addressed by the TOE
+Organizational Security Policies
+The TOE meets the following organizational security policies:
+ASSUMPTION DESCRIPTION
+P.REMOTE_DATA Passwords and account information from network-attached systems
+shall be monitored and managed.
+Table 9 ­ Organizational Security Policies
+Assumptions
+The TOE is assured to provide effective security measures in a co-operative non-hostile
+environment only if it is installed, managed, and used correctly. The following specific
+conditions are assumed to exist in an environment where the TOE is employed.
+June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST
+NetIQ Corporation Page 16 of 36
+ASSUMPTION DESCRIPTION
+A.MANAGE Administrators of the TOE are assumed to be appropriately trained to
+undertake the installation, configuration and management of the TOE
+in a secure and trusted manner.
+A.NOEVIL Administrators of the TOE and users on the local area network are not
+careless, willfully negligent, nor hostile, and will follow and abide by the
+instructions provided by the TOE documentation
+A.LOCATE The processing platforms on which the TOE resides are assumed to be
+located within a facility that provides controlled access
+A.CONFIG The TOE is configured to receive all passwords and associated data
+from network-attached systems.
+A.TIMESOURCE The TOE has a trusted source for system time via NTP server
+Table 10 ­ Assumptions
+June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST
+NetIQ Corporation Page 17 of 36
+4. Security Objectives
+Security Objectives for the TOE
+The IT security objectives for the TOE are addressed below:
+OBJECTIVE DESCRIPTION
+O.MANAGE_DATA The TOE shall provide a means to manage secrets and data associated
+with remote IT systems.
+O.MANAGE_POLICY The TOE shall provide a workflow to manage authentication and access
+control policies.
+O.SEC_ACCESS The TOE shall ensure that only those authorized users and applications
+are granted access to security functions and associated data.
+O.PASSWD_PROT The TOE shall provide cryptographic mechanisms to protect passwords
+via cryptographic processes including the ability to generate and destroy
+keys.
+O.TRANS_PROT The TOE shall provide mechanisms to protect data that is in transit
+between elements within the TOE.
+Table 11 ­ TOE Security Objectives
+Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
+The security objectives for the operational environment are addressed below:
+OBJECTIVE DESCRIPTION
+OE.TIME The TOE operating environment shall provide an accurate timestamp
+(via reliable NTP server).
+OE.ENV_PROTECT The TOE operating environment shall provide mechanisms to isolate the
+TOE Security Functions (TSF) and assure that TSF components cannot
+be tampered with or bypassed
+OE.PERSONNEL Authorized administrators are non-hostile and follow all administrator
+guidance and must ensure that the TOE is delivered, installed, managed,
+and operated in a manner that maintains the TOE security objectives.
+Any operator of the TOE must be trusted not to disclose their
+authentication credentials to any individual not authorized for access to
+the TOE.
+OE.PHYSEC The facility surrounding the processing platform in which the TOE
+resides must provide a controlled means of access into the facility
+Table 12 ­ Operational Environment Security Objectives
+Security Objectives Rationale
+June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST
+NetIQ Corporation Page 18 of 36
+This section provides the summary that all security objectives are traced back to aspects of the
+addressed assumptions, threats, and Organizational Security Policies.
+OBJECTIVES THREATS/
+ASSUMPTIONS/ POLICIES
+O.MANAGE_DATA
+O.MANAGE_POLICY
+O.SEC_ACCESS
+O.PASSWD_PROT
+O.TRANS_PROT
+OE.TIME
+OE.ENV_PROTECT
+OE.PERSONNEL
+OE.PHYSEC
+A.CONFIG   
+A.MANAGE 
+A.NOEVIL 
+A.LOCATE 
+A.TIMESOURCE 
+T.NO_AUTH 
+T.NO_PRIV 
+T.USER_ACCESS_DENY 
+T.PASSWD_COMPROMISE 
+T.PROT_TRANS 
+P. REMOTE_DATA 
+Table 13 ­ Mapping of Assumptions, Threats, Policies and ORSP s to Security Objectives
+Mapping of Objectives
+ASSUMPTION /THREAT/
+POLICY
+RATIONALE
+A.CONFIG This assumption is addressed by
+ OE.ENV_PROTECT, which ensures that TSF components
+cannot be tampered with or bypassed
+ OE.PERSONNEL, which ensures that the TOE is managed
+and administered by in a secure manner by a competent
+and security aware personnel in accordance with the
+administrator documentation. This objective also ensures
+that those responsible for the TOE install, manage, and
+operate the TOE in a secure manner
+ OE.PHYSEC, which ensures that the facility surrounding the
+processing platform in which the TOE resides provides a
+controlled means of access into the facility
+June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST
+NetIQ Corporation Page 19 of 36
+ASSUMPTION /THREAT/
+POLICY
+RATIONALE
+A.MANAGE This assumption is addressed by
+ OE.PERSONNEL, which ensures that the TOE is managed
+and administered by in a secure manner by a competent
+and security aware personnel in accordance with the
+administrator documentation. This objective also ensures
+that those responsible for the TOE install, manage, and
+operate the TOE in a secure manner
+A.NOEVIL This assumption is addressed by OE.PERSONNEL, which ensures
+that the TOE is managed and administered by in a secure manner
+by a competent and security aware personnel in accordance with
+the administrator documentation. This objective also ensures
+that those responsible for the TOE install, manage, and operate
+the TOE in a secure manner
+A.LOCATE This assumption is addressed by OE.PHYSEC which ensures that
+the facility surrounding the processing platform in which the
+TOE resides provides a controlled means of access into the
+facility
+A.TIMESOURCE This assumption is addressed by OE.TIME, which ensures the
+provision of an accurate time source.
+T.NO_AUTH This threat is countered by the following:
+ O.SEC_ACCESS, which ensures that the TOE allows access to
+the security functions, configuration, and associated data
+only by authorized users and applications
+T.NO_PRIV This threat is countered by O.SEC_ACCESS, which ensures that
+the TOE allows access to the security functions, configuration,
+and associated data only by authorized users and applications.
+T.PASSWD_COMPROMISE This threat is countered by O.PASSWD_PROT, which ensures
+the passwords are not in the clear and cannot be exposed to un
+authorized users for use.
+T.PROT_TRANS This threat is countered by O.TRANS_PROT, which protects data
+that is in transit between elements within the TOE.
+P.REMOTE_DATA This organizational security policy is enforced by
+ O.MANAGE_DATA, which ensures that the TOE provide a
+means to manage secrets and data associated with remote
+IT systems.
+T.USER_ACCESS_DENY This threat is countered by O.MANAGE_POLICY which ensures
+that the TOE provides a workflow to manage authentication and
+access control policies.
+Table 14 ­ Mapping of Threats, Policies, and Assumptions to Objectives
+June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST
+NetIQ Corporation Page 20 of 36
+5. Extended Components Definition
+This Security Target does include any extended components.
+June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST
+NetIQ Corporation Page 21 of 36
+6. Security Requirements
+The security requirements that are levied on the TOE and the IT environment are specified in
+this section of the ST.
+Security Functional Requirements
+The functional security requirements for this Security Target consist of the following
+components from Part 2 of the CC, which are summarized in the following table:
+CLASS HEADING CLASS_FAMILY DESCRIPTION
+Security Audit
+FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation
+FAU_SAR.1 Audit Review
+Cryptographic Support FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation
+FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
+FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation
+User Data Protection
+FDP_ACC.1 Subset Access Control
+FDP_ACF.1 Security Attribute Based Access Control
+Identification and
+Authentication
+FIA_ATD.1 User Attribute Definition
+FIA_UID.2 User Identification before Any Action
+FIA_UAU.2 User Authentication before Any Action
+Security Management
+FMT_MSA.1 Management of Security Attributes
+FMT_MSA.2 Secure Security Attributes
+FMT_MSA.3 Static Attribute Initialization
+FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF Data
+FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
+FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles
+Protection of the TSF FPT_TDC.1 Inter-TSF basic TSF data consistency
+Trusted Path / Channels
+FTP_ITC.1 Trusted Channel
+FTP_TRP.1 Trusted Path
+Table 15 ­ TOE Security Functional Requirements
+Security Audit (FAU)
+FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation
+FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following
+auditable events:
+a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
+b) All auditable events for the [not specified] level of audit; and
+c) [User login/logout and;
+d) Login failures;]
+June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST
+NetIQ Corporation Page 22 of 36
+FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following
+information:
+a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if
+applicable), and the outcome (success or failure) of the event;
+and
+b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event
+definitions of the functional components included in the PP/ST,
+[no other audit relevant information].
+FAU_SAR.1 Audit Review
+FAU_SAR.1.1 The TSF shall provide [the Administrator] with the capability to read
+[all audit data generated within the TOE] from the audit records.
+FAU_SAR.1.2 The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the
+user to interpret the information.
+Cryptographic Support
+FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation
+FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
+specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [cryptographic key
+generation algorithm in Table 16] and specified cryptographic key
+sizes [cryptographic key sizes in Table 16] that meet the following: [list
+of standards in Table 16].
+Usage Key Generation Algorithm Key Size (bits), Elliptical Curves Standard
+RSA RSA Key Generation 2048 FIPS 186-4
+AES Deterministic Random Bit
+Generator (DRBG)
+128, 256 SP 800-90A
+Diffie-Hellman Diffie-Hellman Key
+Generation
+1024, 2048 FIPS 186-4
+Table 16 ­ Cryptographic Standards
+FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
+FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a
+specified cryptographic key destruction method [zeroize] that meets
+the following: [FIPS 140-2].
+FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation (Encryption / Decryption)
+FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operations in Table 17] in
+accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic
+algorithm in Table 17] and cryptographic key sizes [cryptographic key
+sizes in Table 17] that meet the following: [list of standards in Table
+17].
+June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST
+NetIQ Corporation Page 23 of 36
+Application Note: AES in CBC mode is used for encrypting/decrypting
+data in support of TLS.
+Operation Algorithm Key Size, Curve or
+Digest
+Standard
+Encryption and
+Decryption in support of
+TLS
+AES (Advanced
+Encryption
+Standard)
+128, 256 FIPS PUB
+197
+Key agreement in
+support TLS
+Key Agreement
+Schemes (KAS) and
+Key Confirmation
+P-256, P384, P521 SP800-
+56A
+Authentication algorithm
+in support of TLS
+ECDSA (Elliptic
+Curve Digital
+Signature
+Algorithm)
+P-256, P384, P521 FIPS 186-4
+Secure Hashing in
+support of TLS
+Secure Hash
+Algorithm (SHA)
+160 (SHA-1)
+256 (SHA-256)
+384 (SHA-384)
+FIPS PUB
+180-4
+Message Authentication
+in support of TLS
+Keyed-Hash
+Message
+Authentication Code
+(HMAC)
+160 (HMAC-SHA1) 256
+(HMAC-SHA2-256) 384
+(HMAC-SHA2-384)
+FIPS 198-1
+Asymmetric
+cryptography in support
+of TLS
+Rivest, Shamir,
+Adleman (RSA)
+2048 FIPS 186-4
+Table 17 ­ Cryptographic Operations
+Information Flow Control (FDP)
+FDP_ACC.1 Subset Access Control
+FDP_ACC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Discretionary Access Control SFP] on [
+Subjects: All users
+Objects: System reports, component audit logs, TOE configuration,
+operator account attributes
+Operations: all user actions]
+FDP_ACF.1 Security Attribute Based Access Control
+FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Discretionary Access Control SFP]to objects
+based on the following: [
+Subjects: All users
+Objects: System reports, component audit logs, TOE configuration,
+operator account attributes
+Operations: all user actions]
+FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation
+among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: [if the
+June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST
+NetIQ Corporation Page 24 of 36
+ACL identifies the user or a group of users that contains the user
+requesting access for the type of resource that the user is requesting,
+and the user (or group of users) has the specific rights required for the
+type of operation requested on the object then the user is granted
+access].
+FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based
+on the following additional rules: [password restrictions, login
+restrictions, time based access controls, ip access controls, intruder
+lockout].
+FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the
+following additional rules [ password restrictions, login restrictions,
+time based access controls, ip access controls, intruder lockout]
+Identification and Authentication (FIA)
+FIA_ATD.1 ­ User Attribute Definition
+FIA_ATD.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes
+belonging to individual users: [User Identity, Authentication Status,
+and Privilege Level].
+FIA_UAU.2 User Authentication before Any Action
+FIA_UAU.2.1 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated
+before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
+FIA_UID.2 User Identification before Any Action
+FIA_UID.2.1 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before
+allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
+Security Management (FMT)
+FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
+FMT_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Discretionary Access Control SFP] to
+restrict the ability to [query, modify, delete] the security attributes
+[Accounts, privileges, ACLs] to [Administrator].
+FMT_MSA.2 Secure Security Attributes
+FMT_MSA.2.1 The TSF shall ensure that only secure values are accepted for
+[security attributes listed with Discretionary Access Control SFP].
+FMT_MSA.3 Static Attribute Initialization
+FMT_MSA.3.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Discretionary Access Control SFP] to
+provide [restrictive] default values for security attributes that are
+used to enforce the SFP.
+June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST
+NetIQ Corporation Page 25 of 36
+FMT_MSA.3.2 The TSF shall allow the [Administrator] to specify alternative initial
+values to override the default values when an object or information
+is created.
+FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF Data
+FMT_MTD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to [control] the [data described in the
+table below] to [Administrator]:
+DATA CHANGE QUERY MODIFY DELETE CLEAR
+Discretionary
+Access Control SFP
+    
+User Account
+Attributes
+ 
+Audit Logs 
+Date/Time 
+Table 18 ­ Management of TSF data
+FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
+FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management
+functions: [
+a) Create accounts
+b) Modify accounts
+c) Define privilege levels Change Default,
+Query, Modify, Delete, Clear the attributes
+associated with the Discretionary Access
+Control SFP
+d) Modify the behavior of the Discretionary
+Access Control SFP
+e) Manage ACLs].
+FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles
+FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles [Administrator, User].
+FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
+Protection of the TSF (FPT)
+FPT_TDC.1 Inter-TSF Basic TSF Data Consistency
+FPT_TDC.1.1 The TSF shall provide the capability to consistently interpret [secrets
+(passwords)] when shared between the TSF and another trusted IT
+product.
+FPT_TDC.1.2 The TSF shall use [the secret with the newest associated timestamp]
+when interpreting the TSF data from another trusted IT product.
+June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST
+NetIQ Corporation Page 26 of 36
+Trusted Path / Channel (FTP)
+FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
+FTP_ITC.1.1 The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and
+[another trusted IT product] that is logically distinct from other
+communication channels and provides assured identification of its end
+points and protection of the channel data from [modification or
+disclosure].
+FTP_ITC.1.2 The TSF shall permit [the TSF] to initiate communication via the
+trusted channel.
+FTP_ITC.1.3 The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for
+[HTTPS/TLS connections
+ for communications labeled 1 ­ 12 in Figure 1]
+Application Note: The TOE supports TLS v1.1 and 1.2 as configured by
+the Administrator.
+Application Note: Crypto as claimed in FCS_COP_1 is used to support
+TLS.
+FTP_TRP.1 Trusted Path
+FTP_TRP.1.1 The TSF shall provide a communication path between itself and [local]
+users that is logically distinct from other communication paths and
+provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the
+communicated data from [disclosure].
+FTP_TRP.1.2 The TSF shall permit [the TSF] to initiate communication via the
+trusted path.
+FTP_TRP.1.3 The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for [key requests, and
+encryption operations
+ for communications labeled A, B, and C in Figure 1]
+Security Assurance Requirements
+The Security Assurance Requirements for this evaluation are listed in Section 6.3.4 ­ Security
+Assurance Requirements.
+Security Requirements Rationale
+Security Functional Requirements
+The following table provides the correspondence mapping between security objectives and the
+requirements that satisfy them.
+June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST
+NetIQ Corporation Page 27 of 36
+OBJECTIVE
+SFR
+O.MANAGE_DATA
+O.MANAGE_POLICY
+O.SEC_ACCESS
+O.PASSWD_PROT
+O.TRANS_PROT
+FAU_GEN.1 
+FAU_SAR.1 
+FCS_CKM.1 
+FCS_CKM.4 
+FCS_COP.1 
+FDP_ACC.1 
+FDP_ACF.1 
+FIA_ATD.1 
+FIA_UID.2 
+FIA_UAU.2 
+FMT_MSA.1 
+FMT_MSA.2 
+FMT_MSA.3 
+FMT_MTD.1 
+FMT_SMF.1 
+FMT_SMR.1 
+FPT_TDC.1 
+FTP_ITC.1 
+FTP_TRP.1 
+Table 19 ­ Mapping of TOE Security Functional Requirements and Objectives
+Dependency Rationale
+This ST satisfies all the security functional requirement dependencies of the Common Criteria.
+The table below lists each SFR to which the TOE claims conformance with a dependency and
+indicates whether the dependent requirement was included. As the table indicates, all
+dependencies have been met.
+SFR CLAIM DEPENDENCIES DEPENDENCY MET RATIONALE
+FAU_GEN.1 FPT_STM.1 YES
+Satisfied by the Operational
+Environment (OE.TIME)
+FAU_SAR.1
+FAU_GEN.1
+FPT_STM.1
+YES
+FPT_STM.1 satisfied by the
+Operational Environment
+(OE.TIME)
+June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST
+NetIQ Corporation Page 28 of 36
+SFR CLAIM DEPENDENCIES DEPENDENCY MET RATIONALE
+FCS_CKM.1
+FCS_CKM.1 or
+FCS_COP.1 and
+FCS_CKM.4
+YES
+Satisfied by FCS_COP.1 and
+FCS_CKM.4
+FCS_CKM.4 FTP_ITC.1 or
+FTP_ITC.2 or
+FCS_CKM.1
+YES Satisfied by FCS_CKM.1 for AES
+FCS_COP.1 FTP_ITC.1 or
+FTP_ITC.2 or
+FCS_CKM.1 and
+FCS_CKM.4
+YES Satisfied by FCS_CKM.1 and
+FCS_CKM.4
+FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACF.1 YES
+FDP_ACF.1
+FDP_ACC.1
+FMT_MSA.3
+YES
+FIA_ATD.1 N/A N/A
+FIA_UID.2 N/A N/A
+FMT_MSA.1
+FDP_ACC.1
+FMT_SMF.1
+FMT_SMR.1
+YES
+FMT_MSA.2
+FDP_ACC.1
+FMT_MSA.1
+FMT_SMR.1
+YES
+FMT_MSA.3
+FMT_MSA.1
+FMT_SMR.1
+YES
+FMT_MTD.1
+FMT_SMF.1
+FMT_SMR.1
+YES
+FMT_SMF.1 N/A N/A
+FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1 YES
+Although FIA_UID.1 is not
+included, FIA_UID.2, which is
+hierarchical to FIA_UID.1 is
+included. This satisfies this
+dependency.
+FPT_TDC.1 N/A N/A
+FTP_ITC.1 N/A N/A
+FTP_TRP.1 N/A N/A
+Table 20 ­ Mapping of SFR to Dependencies and Rationales
+Sufficiency of Security Requirements
+The following table presents a mapping of the rationale of TOE Security Requirements to
+Objectives.
+June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST
+NetIQ Corporation Page 29 of 36
+OBJECTIVE RATIONALE
+O.MANAGE_DATA The objective to ensure that the TOE will collect events from security
+products and non-security products deployed within a network and
+applies analytical processes to derive conclusions about the events is
+met by the following security requirements:
+ FPT_TDC.1 ensures that the TOE provides consistency between
+passwords used on remote IT systems and those
+stored/managed within the TOE.
+O.MANAGE_POLICY The objective to ensure that the TOE provides a workflow to manage
+authentication and access control policies is met by the following
+security requirements:
+ FAU_GEN.1 and FAU_SAR.1 define the auditing capability for
+incidents and administrative access control and requires that
+authorized users will have the capability to read and interpret
+data stored in the audit logs
+ FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1 support the security functions
+relevant to the TOE and ensure the definition of an authorized
+administrator role
+O.SEC_ACCESS This objective ensures that the TOE allows access to the security
+functions, configuration, and associated data only by authorized users
+and applications.
+ FDP_ACC.1 requires that all user actions resulting in the access
+to TOE security functions and configuration data are controlled
+ FDP_ACF.1 supports FDP_ACC.1 by ensuring that access to TOE
+security functions, configuration data, audit logs, and account
+attributes is based on the user privilege level and their
+allowable actions
+ FIA_UID.2 requires the TOE to enforce identification of all users
+prior to configuration of the TOE
+ FIA_UAU.2 requires the TOE to enforce authentication of all
+users prior to configuration of the TOE
+ FIA_ATD.1 specifies security attributes for users of the TOE
+ FMT_MTD.1 restricts the ability to query, add or modify TSF
+data to authorized users.
+ FMT_MSA.1 specifies that only privileged administrators can
+access the TOE security functions and related configuration
+data.
+ FMT_MSA.2 specifies that only secure values are accepted for
+security attributes listed with access control policies.
+ FMT_MSA.3 ensures that the default values of security
+attributes are restrictive in nature as to enforce the access
+control policy for the TOE
+ FTP_ITC.1 specifies that the trusted channel exists for components
+HTTPS/TLS.
+ FTP_TRP.1 specifies that the trusted path exists for components
+HTTPS/TLS.
+June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST
+NetIQ Corporation Page 30 of 36
+OBJECTIVE RATIONALE
+O.PASSWD_PROT This objective ensures that the TOE provides cryptographic
+mechanisms to generate and destroy keys. This objective is met by:
+FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM. 4, and FCS_COP.1 which provide the
+cryptographic support functions for secure communications within the
+TOE and with external IT entities.
+O.TRANS_PROT This objective ensures that the TOE protects data in transit between
+elements within the TOE. This objective is met by FTP_ITC (which
+specifies that the trusted channel exists for components) and FTP_TRP
+(which ensures that the trusted path exists for components).
+Table 21 ­ Rationale for TOE SFRs to Objectives
+Security Assurance Requirements
+The assurance security requirements for this Security Target are taken from Part 3 of the CC.
+These assurance requirements compose an Evaluation Assurance Level 3 (EAL3). The assurance
+components are summarized in the following table:
+CLASS HEADING CLASS_FAMILY DESCRIPTION
+ADV: Development
+ADV_ARC.1 Security Architecture Description
+ADV_FSP.3
+Functional Specification with Complete
+Summary
+ADV_TDS.2 Architectural Design
+AGD: Guidance
+Documents
+AGD_OPE.1 Operational User Guidance
+AGD_PRE.1 Preparative Procedures
+ALC: Lifecycle Support
+ALC_CMC.3 Authorization Controls
+ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
+ALC_DEL.1 Delivery Procedures
+ALC_DVS.1 Identification of Security Measures
+ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
+ALC_FLR.2 Flaw Reporting Procedures
+ATE: Tests
+ATE_COV.2 Analysis of Coverage
+ATE_DPT.1 Testing: Basic Design
+ATE_FUN.1 Functional Testing
+ATE_IND.2 Independent Testing - Sample
+AVA: Vulnerability
+Assessment
+AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability Analysis
+Table 22 ­ Security Assurance Requirements at EAL3
+Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
+The ST specifies Evaluation Assurance Level 3. EAL3 was chosen because it is based upon good
+commercial development practices with thorough functional testing. EAL3 provides the
+developers and users a moderate level of independently assured security in conventional
+commercial TOEs. The threat of malicious attacks is not greater than low, the security
+environment provides physical protection, and the TOE itself offers a very limited interface,
+June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST
+NetIQ Corporation Page 31 of 36
+offering essentially no opportunity for an attacker to subvert the security policies without
+physical access. The product was augmented to comply with ALC_FLR.2 in order to document
+and address requirements for remediation and reporting of faults that may be discovered in the
+product after release.
+Security Assurance Requirements Evidence
+This section identifies the measures applied to satisfy CC assurance requirements.
+SECURITY ASSURANCE
+REQUIREMENT
+EVIDENCE TITLE
+ADV_ARC.1 Security Architecture
+Description
+NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7
+Security Architecture (ADV_ARC)
+ADV_FSP.3 Functional Specification
+with Complete Summary
+NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7
+Functional Specification (ADV_FSP)
+ADV_TDS.2 Architectural Design
+NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7
+Architectural Design (IDM TDS)
+AGD_OPE.1 Operational User
+Guidance4
+NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7
+Operational User Guidance and Preparative
+Procedures Supplement (AGD-IGS)
+AGD_PRE.1Preparative Procedures
+NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7
+Operational User Guidance and Preparative
+Procedures Supplement (AGD-IGS)
+ALC_CMC.3 Authorization Controls
+NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7
+Configuration Management Processes and
+Procedures (ALC_CM)
+ALC_CMS.3 Implementation
+representation CM coverage
+NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7
+Configuration Management Processes and
+Procedures (ALC_CM)
+ALC_DEL.1 Delivery Procedures
+NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7
+Secure Delivery Processes and Procedures
+(ALC_DEL)
+ALC_DVS.1 Identification of Security
+Measures
+NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7
+Development Security Measures (ALC_DVS)
+ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-
+cycle model
+NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7
+Life Cycle Development Process (ALC_LCD)
+ALC_FLR.2: Flaw Remediation
+Procedures
+NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7
+Flaw reporting Procedures (ALC_FLR)
+ATE_COV.2 Analysis of Coverage
+NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7
+Test Plan and Coverage Analysis (ATE)
+ATE_DPT.1 Testing: Basic Design
+NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7
+Test Plan and Coverage Analysis (ATE)
+4
+Additional documents can be found in Appendix A
+June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST
+NetIQ Corporation Page 32 of 36
+SECURITY ASSURANCE
+REQUIREMENT
+EVIDENCE TITLE
+ATE_FUN.1Functional Testing
+NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7
+Test Plan and Coverage Analysis (ATE)
+Table 23 ­ Security Assurance Rationale and Measures
+June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST
+NetIQ Corporation Page 33 of 36
+7. TOE Summary Specification
+This section presents the Security Functions implemented by the TOE.
+TOE Security Functions
+The security functions performed by the TOE are as follows:
+ Security Management
+ Security Audit
+ Identification and Authentication
+ User Data Protection
+ Trusted Path / Channels
+ Cryptographic Support
+Security Audit
+The TOE generates the following audit data:
+ Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions (instantiated by startup of the TOE)
+ User login/logout
+ Login failures
+The TOE provides the Administrator with the capability to read all audit data generated within
+the TOE via the console. The GUI provides a suitable means for an Administrator to interpret the
+information from the audit log.
+The A.TIMESOURCE is added to the assumptions on operational environment, and OE.TIME is
+added to the operational environment security objectives. The time and date provided by the
+operational environment are used to form the timestamps. The TOE ensures that the audit trail
+data is stamped when recorded with a dependable date and time received from the OE
+(operating system). In this manner, accurate time and date is maintained on the TOE.
+The Security Audit function is designed to satisfy the following security functional requirements:
+ FAU_GEN.1
+ FAU_SAR.1
+Identification and Authentication
+The IDM console application provides user interfaces that administrators may use to manage
+TOE functions. The operating system and the database in the TOE Environment are queried to
+individually authenticate administrators or users. The TOE maintains authorization information
+that determines which TOE functions an authenticated administrators or users (of a given role)
+may perform.
+The TOE maintains the following list of security attributes belonging to individual users:
+ User Identity (i.e., user name)
+ Authentication Status (whether the IT Environment validated the username/password)
+ Privilege Level (Administrator or User)
+The Identification and Authentication function is designed to satisfy the following security
+functional requirements:
+ FIA_ATD.1
+ FIA_UAU.2
+ FIA_UID.2
+User Data Protection
+June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST
+NetIQ Corporation Page 34 of 36
+The TOE implements a discretionary access control policy to define what roles can access
+particular functions of the TOE. All access and actions for system reports, component audit logs,
+TOE configuration, operator account attributes (defined in FIA_ATD.1) are protected via access
+control list. When a user requests to perform an action on an object, the TOE verifies the role
+associated with the user name. Access is granted if the user (or group of users) has the specific
+rights required for the type of operation requested on the object.
+Identity Manager can enforce password policies on incoming passwords from connected
+systems and on passwords set or changed through the User Application password self-service.
+If the new password does not comply, you can specify that Identity Manager not accept the
+password. This also means that passwords that don't comply with your policies are not
+distributed to other connected systems.
+In addition, can enforce password policies on connected systems. If the password being
+published to the Identity Vault does not comply with rules in a policy, you can specify that
+Identity Manager not only does not accept the password for distribution, but actually resets the
+noncompliant password on the connected system by using the current Distribution password in
+the Identity Vault.
+The User Data Protection function is designed to satisfy the following security functional
+requirements:
+ FDP_ACC.1
+ FDP_ACF.1
+ FPT_TDC.1
+Security Management
+The TOE maintains the operator roles described in the following table. The individual roles are
+categorized into two main roles: the Administrator and the User.
+ROLE MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS
+Administrator A user who has rights to configure and manage all aspects of the TOE
+User The user's capabilities can be configured to:
+View hierarchical relationships between User objects
+View and edit user information (with appropriate rights).
+Search for users or resources using advanced search criteria
+(which can be saved for later reuse).
+Recover forgotten passwords.
+Table 24 ­ Roles and Functions
+Only an Administrator can determine the behavior of, disable, enable, and modify the behavior
+of the functions that implement the Discretionary Access Control SFP. The TPE ensures only
+secure values are accepted for the security attributes listed with Discretionary Access Control
+SFP.
+The Security Management function is designed to satisfy the following security functional
+requirements:
+ FMT_MTD.1
+ FMT_MSA.1
+ FMT_MSA.2
+ FMT_MSA.3
+ FMT_SMF.1
+ FMT_SMR.1
+June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST
+NetIQ Corporation Page 35 of 36
+Trusted Path / Channels
+The Trusted Path/Channels function is designed to satisfy the following security functional
+requirements:
+ FTP_ITC.1 ­ the TOE supports establishment of trusted channels for communicating
+TOE entities using HTTPS.
+ FTP_TRP.1 ­ the TOE provides a trusted path for TOE Users, using HTTPS
+Trusted Channel
+The TOE provides a trusted channel between the TOE and external web servers.
+Trusted channels are implemented using HTTPS. The TOE supports TLS v1.1 and TLS v1.2. The
+TOE supports the following TLS cipher suites, as defined in RFC 2246, RFC 4346 and RFC 5246:
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
+ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
+ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
+ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
+ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_ CBC_SHA
+ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
+Trusted Path:
+The TOE provides a trusted path for TOE administrators and TOE users to communicate with
+the TOE. The trusted path is implemented using HTTPS. The TOE's implementation of TLS is
+described in the previous section (Trusted Channel).
+Cryptographic Support
+Cryptographic protection of data in transit between the TOE and remote users, and between
+the TOE and external web servers is provided by the OpenSSL FIPS Object Module software
+version 2.0.10 (Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) certificate number 1747)
+libraries.
+The following table identifies the CAVP algorithm certificates.
+Operation Algorithm CAVP Certificate
+Encryption and Decryption in
+support of TLS
+AES (Advanced Encryption
+Standard)
+AES 3264
+Key Generation in support of
+TLS
+DRBG (Deterministic
+Random Bit Generation)
+DRBG 723
+Key agreement in support of
+TLS
+Key Agreement Schemes
+(KAS) and Key Confirmation
+CVL 472
+Keyed-Hash Message
+Authentication in support of
+TLS
+HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA2-
+256, HMAC-SHA2-384
+HMAC 2063
+Secure Hash in support of TLS SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384 SHS 2702
+June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST
+NetIQ Corporation Page 36 of 36
+Asymmetric cryptography in
+support of TLS
+RSA RSA 1664
+Authentication algorithm in
+support of TLS
+ECDSA ECDSA 620
+Table 25 ­ CAVP
+The Cryptographic Support function is designed to satisfy the following security functional
+requirements:
+ FCS_CKM.1
+ FCS_CKM.4
+ FCS_COP.1
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/test/test_cc_oop.py b/test/test_cc_oop.py
index f6471821..c643444b 100644
--- a/test/test_cc_oop.py
+++ b/test/test_cc_oop.py
@@ -72,6 +72,9 @@ class TestCommonCriteriaOOP(TestCase):
         self.template_target_pdf_hashes = {'869415cc4b91282e': 'b9a45995d9e40b2515506bbf5945e806ef021861820426c6d0a6a074090b47a9',
                                            '2d010ecfb604747a': '3c8614338899d956e9e56f1aa88d90e37df86f3310b875d9d14ec0f71e4759be'}
 
+        self.template_report_txt_path = self.test_data_dir / 'report_869415cc4b91282e.txt'
+        self.template_target_txt_path = self.test_data_dir / 'target_869415cc4b91282e.txt'
+
     def test_certificate_input_sanity(self):
         self.assertEqual(self.crt_one.report_link,
                          'http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/epfiles/Certification%20Report%20-%20NetIQ®%20Identity%20Manager%204.7.pdf',
@@ -94,7 +97,7 @@ class TestCommonCriteriaOOP(TestCase):
             new_obj = json.load(handle, cls=CustomJSONDecoder)
         return obj == new_obj
 
-    def test_download_pdfs(self):
+    def test_download_and_convert_pdfs(self):
         with open(self.test_data_dir / 'toy_dataset.json', 'r') as handle:
             dset = json.load(handle, cls=CustomJSONDecoder)
 
@@ -102,6 +105,7 @@ class TestCommonCriteriaOOP(TestCase):
             dset.root_dir = Path(td)
 
             dset.download_all_pdfs()
+            dset.convert_all_pdfs()
 
             actual_report_pdf_hashes = {key: helpers.get_sha256_filepath(val) for key, val in dset.report_pdf_paths.items()}
             actual_target_pdf_hashes = {key: helpers.get_sha256_filepath(val) for key, val in dset.target_pdf_paths.items()}
@@ -109,6 +113,12 @@ class TestCommonCriteriaOOP(TestCase):
             self.assertEqual(actual_report_pdf_hashes, self.template_report_pdf_hashes, 'Hashes of downloaded pdfs (certificate report) do not the template')
             self.assertEqual(actual_target_pdf_hashes, self.template_target_pdf_hashes, 'Hashes of downloaded pdfs (security target) do not match the template')
 
+            self.assertTrue(filecmp.cmp(dset.report_txt_paths['869415cc4b91282e'], self.template_report_txt_path),
+                            'The report of 869415cc4b91282e.pdf converted to txt does not match the template.')
+            self.assertTrue(filecmp.cmp(dset.target_txt_paths['869415cc4b91282e'], self.template_target_txt_path),
+                            'The target of 869415cc4b91282e.pdf converted to txt does not match the template.')
+
+
     def test_cert_to_json(self):
         self.assertTrue(self.equal_to_json(self.test_data_dir / 'fictional_cert.json', self.fictional_cert),
                         'The certificate serialized to json differs from a template.')