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diff --git a/docs/papers.rst b/docs/papers.rst new file mode 100644 index 0000000..11782a4 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/papers.rst @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +============================ +:fas:`file-alt;fa-fw` Papers +============================ + +pyecsca: Reverse engineering black-box elliptic curve cryptography via side-channel analysis +============================================================================================ + +Jan Jancar, Vojtech Suchanek, Petr Svenda, Vladimir Sedlacek, Lukasz Chmielewski + +`CHES 2024, Halifax, Canada <https://ches.iacr.org/2024/>`_ + +.. grid:: + :margin: 2 0 0 2 + :padding: 2 0 0 2 + + .. grid-item:: + :columns: auto + + .. button-link:: _static/pyecsca_ches24.pdf + :color: primary + + :fas:`file-alt;fa-fw` Preprint + + .. grid-item:: + :columns: auto + + .. button-link:: https://github.com/J08nY/pyecsca-artifact + :color: primary + + :fas:`file-zipper;fa-fw` Artifact + +Abstract +-------- + +Side-channel attacks on elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) often assume a +white-box attacker who has detailed knowledge of the implementation choices taken +by the target implementation. Due to the complex and layered nature of ECC, there +are many choices that a developer makes to obtain a functional and interoperable +implementation. These include the curve model, coordinate system, addition formulas, +and the scalar multiplier, or lower-level details such as the finite-field multiplication +algorithm. This creates a gap between the attack requirements and a real-world +attacker that often only has black-box access to the target – i.e., has no access to +the source code nor knowledge of specific implementation choices made. Yet, when +the gap is closed, even real-world implementations of ECC succumb to side-channel +attacks, as evidenced by attacks such as TPM-Fail, Minerva, the Side Journey to +Titan, or TPMScan. + +We study this gap by first analyzing open-source ECC libraries for insight into real- +world implementation choices. We then examine the space of all ECC implementations +combinatorially. Finally, we present a set of novel methods for automated reverse +engineering of black-box ECC implementations and release a documented and usable +open-source toolkit for side-channel analysis of ECC called **pyecsca**. + +Our methods turn attacks around: instead of attempting to recover the private key, +they attempt to recover the implementation configuration given control over the +private and public inputs. We evaluate them on two simulation levels and study the +effect of noise on their performance. Our methods are able to 1) reverse-engineer +the scalar multiplication algorithm completely and 2) infer significant information +about the coordinate system and addition formulas used in a target implementation |