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diff --git a/docs/_static/ectester_ches25.pdf b/docs/_static/ectester_ches25.pdf Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..1c0fe0b --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/_static/ectester_ches25.pdf diff --git a/docs/papers.rst b/docs/papers.rst index e25330a..2e93c76 100644 --- a/docs/papers.rst +++ b/docs/papers.rst @@ -75,3 +75,74 @@ private and public inputs. We evaluate them on two simulation levels and study t effect of noise on their performance. Our methods are able to 1) reverse-engineer the scalar multiplication algorithm completely and 2) infer significant information about the coordinate system and addition formulas used in a target implementation + + + +ECTester: Reverse-engineering side-channel countermeasures of ECC implementations +================================================================================= + +Vojtech Suchanek, Jan Jancar, Jan Kvapil, Petr Svenda, Lukasz Chmielewski + +`CHES 2025, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia <https://ches.iacr.org/2025/>`_ + +.. grid:: + :margin: 2 0 0 2 + :padding: 2 0 0 2 + + .. grid-item:: + :columns: auto + + .. button-link:: _static/ectester_ches25.pdf + :color: secondary + + :fas:`file-alt;fa-fw` Preprint + + .. grid-item:: + :columns: auto + + .. button-link:: https://github.com/crocs-muni/ECTester + :color: secondary + + :fas:`file-zipper;fa-fw` Artifact + +.. dropdown:: BibTeX + :color: secondary + :name: pyecsca-bibtex + :class-container: bibtex-dropdown + + .. code-block:: Bibtex + + @InProceedings{2025-ches-jancar, + title = {ECTester: Reverse-engineering side-channel countermeasures of ECC implementations}, + author = {Vojtech Suchanek and Jan Jancar and Jan Kvapil and Petr Svenda and Lukasz Chmielewski}, + booktitle = {IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems}, + publisher = {Ruhr-University of Bochum}, + year = {2025} + } + +Abstract +-------- + +Developers implementing elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) face a wide +range of implementation choices created by decades of research into elliptic curves. +The literature on elliptic curves offers a plethora of curve models, scalar multipliers, +and addition formulas, but this comes with the price of enabling attacks to also +use the rich structure of these techniques. Navigating through this area is not +an easy task and developers often obscure their choices, especially in black-box +hardware implementations. Since side-channel attackers rely on the knowledge of the +implementation details, reverse engineering becomes a crucial part of attacks. + +This work presents **ECTester** – a tool for testing black-box ECC implementations. +Through various test suites, ECTester observes the behavior of the target implementation +against known attacks but also non-standard inputs and elliptic curve parameters. +We analyze popular ECC libraries and smartcards and show that some libraries and +most smartcards do not check the order of the input points and improperly handle +the infinity point. Based on these observations, we design new techniques for +reverse-engineering scalar randomization countermeasures that are able to distinguish +between group scalar randomization, additive, multiplicative or Euclidean splitting. +Our techniques do not require side-channel measurements; they only require the +ability to set custom domain parameters, and are able to extract not only the size but +also the exact value of the random mask used. Using the techniques, we successfully +reverse-engineered the countermeasures on 13 cryptographic smartcards from 5 major +manufacturers – all but one we tested on. Finally, we discuss what mitigations can +be applied to prevent such reverse engineering, and whether it is possible at all. |