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| author | J08nY | 2026-03-03 18:49:50 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | J08nY | 2026-03-03 18:49:50 +0100 |
| commit | af120a40f0023b04c405e9663e36bf7fc2c1a3cb (patch) | |
| tree | a774b023f8b9cf5d4b18828059a5f1f16807d49f /docs | |
| parent | 4e0bb45421cabda5aa3c151c61ad0626b0d0f1e4 (diff) | |
| download | pyecsca-af120a40f0023b04c405e9663e36bf7fc2c1a3cb.tar.gz pyecsca-af120a40f0023b04c405e9663e36bf7fc2c1a3cb.tar.zst pyecsca-af120a40f0023b04c405e9663e36bf7fc2c1a3cb.zip | |
Update docs with RWC talk.
Diffstat (limited to 'docs')
| -rw-r--r-- | docs/papers.rst | 53 |
1 files changed, 50 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/docs/papers.rst b/docs/papers.rst index cb7be9a..32e11e6 100644 --- a/docs/papers.rst +++ b/docs/papers.rst @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ -============================ -:fas:`file-alt;fa-fw` Papers -============================ +====================================== +:fas:`file-alt;fa-fw` Papers and Talks +====================================== + + pyecsca: Reverse engineering black-box elliptic curve cryptography via side-channel analysis ============================================================================================ @@ -162,3 +164,48 @@ also the exact value of the random mask used. Using the techniques, we successfu reverse-engineered the countermeasures on 13 cryptographic smartcards from 5 major manufacturers – all but one we tested on. Finally, we discuss what mitigations can be applied to prevent such reverse engineering, and whether it is possible at all. + + + +Kerckhoff's Principle in Practice: Addressing Security by Obscurity in Secure Hardware +====================================================================================== + +Vojtech Suchanek, Jan Jancar, Jan Kvapil, Petr Svenda, Lukasz Chmielewski + +`RWC 2026, Taipei, Taiwan <https://rwc.iacr.org/2026/>`_ + +.. grid:: + :margin: 2 0 0 2 + :padding: 2 0 0 2 + + + .. grid-item:: + :columns: auto + + .. button-link:: _static/kerckhoff_rwc26_slides.pdf + :color: secondary + + :fas:`file-alt;fa-fw` Slides + +Abstract +-------- + +The Kerckhoff's principle, a cornerstone of cryptographic theory, states that a cryptosystem's +security should not rely on secrecy, but rather on the secrecy of the key. However, in the +secure hardware space, secrecy is widespread, with vendors revealing minimal information about +their implementations. This secrecy can lead to the delayed discovery of vulnerabilities, +leading to more impactful attacks. What can we do to address this gap between cryptographic +theory (Kerckhoff's) and the practice in the secure hardware space (security by obscurity)? + +In this talk, we make the case against security by obscurity by demonstrating automated +reverse-engineering of black-box elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) implementations on real-world +devices, thereby showing that obscurity provides only a limited defense. We showcase two +approaches to recovering key details of ECC implementations on JavaCards: using side-channels +and using out-of-spec parameters. + +Using our techniques, we were able to reverse-engineer scalar randomization countermeasures +in several real-world implementations of JavaCards from major vendors. We will demonstrate +how simple algebra and lying can be used to bypass the obscurity around these devices. Finally, +we will discuss how security certifications reward obscurity and how we believe that there is +a usable compromise that provides transparency and keeps the vendors' intellectual property +secret. We take first steps towards this in the sec-certs.org project. |
