From b0e4e9ed1a25f163dab45980cc5a32bcb0dacee9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: adamjanovsky Date: Mon, 4 Apr 2022 18:01:25 +0200 Subject: Refactor/pdftotext as library (#183) - Update Docker Ubuntu to 22.04 - Test pipeline now installs fresh Poppler - Poppler-utils package no longer needed - Paragraph on project dependencies added to CONTRIBUTING.md - Pdftotext is no longer called with subprocess call, but API is leveraged instead--- .github/workflows/lint.yml | 2 + .github/workflows/tests.yml | 14 +- CONTRIBUTING.md | 14 +- README.md | 31 +- docker/Dockerfile | 7 +- requirements.txt | 1 + sec_certs/helpers.py | 21 +- sec_certs/sample/common_criteria.py | 4 +- sec_certs/sample/fips.py | 2 +- tests/data/test_cc_oop/report_309ac2fd7f2dcf17.txt | 481 +++++++ tests/data/test_cc_oop/report_869415cc4b91282e.txt | 481 ------- tests/data/test_cc_oop/target_309ac2fd7f2dcf17.txt | 1497 ++++++++++++++++++++ tests/data/test_cc_oop/target_869415cc4b91282e.txt | 1497 -------------------- tests/test_cc_oop.py | 4 +- 14 files changed, 2041 insertions(+), 2015 deletions(-) create mode 100644 tests/data/test_cc_oop/report_309ac2fd7f2dcf17.txt delete mode 100644 tests/data/test_cc_oop/report_869415cc4b91282e.txt create mode 100644 tests/data/test_cc_oop/target_309ac2fd7f2dcf17.txt delete mode 100644 tests/data/test_cc_oop/target_869415cc4b91282e.txt diff --git a/.github/workflows/lint.yml b/.github/workflows/lint.yml index 0a625f68..d49b7224 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/lint.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/lint.yml @@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ jobs: uses: actions/setup-python@v2 with: python-version: '3.9' + - name: Install external dependencies + run: sudo apt-get install build-essential libpoppler-cpp-dev pkg-config python3-dev -y - name: Install python dependencies run: pip install -r requirements.txt - name: Install mypy and types diff --git a/.github/workflows/tests.yml b/.github/workflows/tests.yml index f8c7a328..84c8bc12 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/tests.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/tests.yml @@ -2,12 +2,22 @@ name: Tests on: push: workflow_dispatch: +env: + DEBIAN_FRONTEND: noninteractive + jobs: run-test: runs-on: ubuntu-latest steps: - - run: sudo apt-get install poppler-utils + - name: Install Poppler 21.06 + run: | + sudo apt-get update + sudo apt-get install -y software-properties-common + sudo apt-get update + sudo add-apt-repository ppa:hlprasu/poppler + sudo apt-get update + sudo apt-get install -y build-essential libpoppler-cpp-dev pkg-config python3-dev - uses: actions/checkout@v2 - name: Setup python uses: actions/setup-python@v2 @@ -21,4 +31,4 @@ jobs: pip install pytest-cov pip install ".[dev,test]" - name: Run tests - run: pytest --cov sec_certs + run: pytest --cov=sec_certs tests diff --git a/CONTRIBUTING.md b/CONTRIBUTING.md index 10094a99..9ce96222 100644 --- a/CONTRIBUTING.md +++ b/CONTRIBUTING.md @@ -4,10 +4,20 @@ You contribution is warmly welcomed. You can help by: 0. Spread the word about this project, look at generated processed webpages 1. Trying the tool and reporting issues and suggestions for improvement (open Github issue) - 2. Add new regular expressions to extract relevant information from certificates (update cert_rules.py) + 2. Add new regular expressions to extract relevant information from certificates (update cert_rules.py) 3. Perform additional analysis with extracted data (analyze_certificates.py) 3. Improve the code (TODO: Follow Github contribution guidelines, ideally contact us first about your plan) +## Dependencies + +Our [Dockerfile](https://github.com/crocs-muni/sec-certs/blob/main/docker/Dockerfile) presents all the required dependencies, elaborated below. + +- [Java](https://www.java.com/en) is needed to parse tables in FIPS pdf documents, must be available from `PATH`. +- Some imported libraries have non-trivial dependencies to resolve: + - [pdftotext](https://github.com/jalan/pdftotext) requires [Poppler](https://poppler.freedesktop.org/) to be installed. We've experienced issues with older versions of Poppler (`0.x`), make sure to install `20.x` version of these libraries. + - [graphviz](https://pypi.org/project/graphviz/) requires `graphviz` to be on the path +- + ## Branches and releases - `main` is the default branch against which all pull requests are to be made. This branch is not neccessarily stable, only the releases are. @@ -23,7 +33,7 @@ All commits shall pass the lint pipeline of the following tools: - isort (see [pyproject.toml](https://github.com/crocs-muni/sec-certs/blob/dev/pyproject.toml) for settings) - Flake8 (see [.flake8](https://github.com/crocs-muni/sec-certs/blob/dev/.flake8) for settings) -These tools can be installed via [dev_requirements.txt](https://github.com/crocs-muni/sec-certs/blob/dev/dev_requirements.txt) You can use [pre-commit](https://pre-commit.com/) tool register git hook that will evalute these checks prior to any commit and abort the commit for you. Note that the pre-commit is not meant to automatically fix the issues, just warn you. +These tools can be installed via [dev_requirements.txt](https://github.com/crocs-muni/sec-certs/blob/dev/dev_requirements.txt) You can use [pre-commit](https://pre-commit.com/) tool register git hook that will evalute these checks prior to any commit and abort the commit for you. Note that the pre-commit is not meant to automatically fix the issues, just warn you. It should thus suffice to: diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 53fff232..29da0021 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -13,24 +13,23 @@ This project is developed by the [Centre for Research On Cryptography and Securi ## Installation -The tool requires `Python >=3.8`. Alongside `Python`, [pdftotext](https://www.xpdfreader.com/pdftotext-man.html), [graphviz](https://graphviz.org/), -and [java](https://www.java.com/en) binaries must be accessible somewhere on `PATH`. +The tool can be pulled as a docker image with -The stable release is published on [GitHub](https://github.com/crocs-muni/sec-certs/releases), [PyPi](https://pypi.org/project/sec-certs/), and[DockerHub](https://hub.docker.com/repository/docker/seccerts/sec-certs), you can install it with: - -``` -pip install -U sec-certs +```bash +docker pull seccerts/sec-certs ``` -or +Alternatively, it can be installed from PyPi with -``` -docker pull seccerts/sec-certs +```bash +pip install -U sec-certs ``` -Alternatively, you can [download a release](https://github.com/crocs-muni/sec-certs/releases) and setup the tool for development in virtual environment: +Note, however, that `Python>=3.8` is required and there are some [additional dependencies](https://github.com/crocs-muni/sec-certs/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#dependencies). -``` +The stable release is also published on [GitHub](https://github.com/crocs-muni/sec-certs/releases) from where it can be setup for development with + +```bash python3 -m venv venv source venv/bin/activate pip install -e . @@ -43,7 +42,7 @@ There are two main steps in exploring the world of Common Criteria certificates: 1. Processing all the certificates 2. Data exploration -For the first step, we currently provide CLI and our already processed fresh snapshot. For the second step, we provide simple API that can be used directly inside our Jupyter notebook or locally, at your machine. +For the first step, we currently provide CLI and our already processed fresh snapshot. For the second step, we provide simple API that can be used directly inside our Jupyter notebook or locally, at your machine. ### Explore data with MyBinder Jupyter notebook @@ -97,7 +96,7 @@ Options: --help Show this message and exit. ``` -### Process CC data with Docker +### Process CC data with Docker 1. pull the image from the DockerHub repository : `docker pull seccerts/sec-certs` 2. run `docker run --volume ./processed_data:/home/user/sec-certs/examples/debug_dataset -it seccerts/sec-certs` @@ -105,7 +104,7 @@ Options: ## Usage (FIPS) -Currently, the main goal of the FIPS module is to find dependencies between the certified products. +Currently, the main goal of the FIPS module is to find dependencies between the certified products. ### MyBinder Jupyter Notebook @@ -209,14 +208,14 @@ The first time you are using the FIPS module, use the following command: ``` fips-certs new-run --output --name ``` -where `` is the name of the working directory of the FIPS module +where `` is the name of the working directory of the FIPS module (e.g. where all the metadata will be stored), and `` is the name of the resulting dataset. This will download a large amount of data (4-5 GB) and can take up to 4 hours to finish. #### Next runs -When a dataset is successfully created using `new-run`, you can use the command `all` to update the dataset +When a dataset is successfully created using `new-run`, you can use the command `all` to update the dataset (download latest files, redo scans for failed certificates, etc.). It is also **strongly advised** to use the `--higher-precision-results` switch on the **second run**. The following command should be used to update the dataset: ``` diff --git a/docker/Dockerfile b/docker/Dockerfile index 3efb0465..c691716c 100644 --- a/docker/Dockerfile +++ b/docker/Dockerfile @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -FROM ubuntu +FROM ubuntu:jammy ENV USER="user" ENV HOME /home/${USER} @@ -10,13 +10,11 @@ RUN apt-get install python3-pip -y RUN apt-get install python3-venv -y RUN apt-get install git -y RUN apt-get install curl -y -RUN apt-get install python3.8-venv -y # Install dependencies fo PyPDF2 and pdftotext RUN DEBIAN_FRONTEND="noninteractive" apt-get -y install tzdata -RUN apt-get install build-essential libpoppler-cpp-dev pkg-config python3-dev poppler-utils -y +RUN apt-get install build-essential libpoppler-cpp-dev pkg-config python3-dev -y RUN apt-get install libqpdf-dev -y -RUN apt-get install pkg-config -y RUN apt-get install default-jdk -y RUN apt-get install graphviz -y @@ -42,6 +40,7 @@ ENV PATH="${VENV_PATH}/bin:$PATH" # Install dependencies, notebook is because of mybinder.org RUN \ + pip3 install -U pip && \ pip3 install wheel && \ pip3 install -r requirements.txt && \ pip3 install --no-cache notebook diff --git a/requirements.txt b/requirements.txt index de26494c..4d66b8e7 100644 --- a/requirements.txt +++ b/requirements.txt @@ -40,3 +40,4 @@ threadpoolctl==3.0.0 tqdm==4.62.3 urllib3==1.26.7 webencodings==0.5.1 +pdftotext==2.2.2 diff --git a/sec_certs/helpers.py b/sec_certs/helpers.py index 0542e9bd..657ae83d 100644 --- a/sec_certs/helpers.py +++ b/sec_certs/helpers.py @@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ import html import logging import os import re -import subprocess import time from datetime import date, datetime from enum import Enum @@ -14,6 +13,7 @@ from typing import Any, Dict, Generator, Hashable, Iterator, List, Optional, Seq import matplotlib.pyplot as plt import numpy as np import pandas as pd +import pdftotext import pikepdf import requests from PyPDF2 import PdfFileReader @@ -198,15 +198,20 @@ def repair_pdf(file: Path) -> None: pdf.save(file) -def convert_pdf_file(pdf_path: Path, txt_path: Path, options) -> str: - response = subprocess.run( - ["pdftotext", *options, pdf_path, txt_path], stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, timeout=60 - ).returncode - if response == 0: - return constants.RETURNCODE_OK - else: +def convert_pdf_file(pdf_path: Path, txt_path: Path) -> str: + try: + with pdf_path.open("rb") as pdf_handle: + pdf = pdftotext.PDF(pdf_handle, "", True) # No password, Raw=True + txt = "".join(pdf) + except Exception as e: + logger.error(f"Error when converting pdf->txt: {e}") return constants.RETURNCODE_NOK + with txt_path.open("w", encoding="utf-8") as txt_handle: + txt_handle.write(txt) + + return constants.RETURNCODE_OK + def extract_pdf_metadata(filepath: Path) -> Tuple[str, Optional[Dict[str, Any]]]: def map_metadata_value(val, nope_out=False): diff --git a/sec_certs/sample/common_criteria.py b/sec_certs/sample/common_criteria.py index 046d7ba7..e3b1e442 100644 --- a/sec_certs/sample/common_criteria.py +++ b/sec_certs/sample/common_criteria.py @@ -581,7 +581,7 @@ class CommonCriteriaCert( @staticmethod def convert_report_pdf(cert: "CommonCriteriaCert") -> "CommonCriteriaCert": - exit_code = helpers.convert_pdf_file(cert.state.report_pdf_path, cert.state.report_txt_path, ["-raw"]) + exit_code = helpers.convert_pdf_file(cert.state.report_pdf_path, cert.state.report_txt_path) if exit_code != constants.RETURNCODE_OK: error_msg = "failed to convert report pdf->txt" logger.error(f"Cert dgst: {cert.dgst}" + error_msg) @@ -591,7 +591,7 @@ class CommonCriteriaCert( @staticmethod def convert_target_pdf(cert: "CommonCriteriaCert") -> "CommonCriteriaCert": - exit_code = helpers.convert_pdf_file(cert.state.st_pdf_path, cert.state.st_txt_path, ["-raw"]) + exit_code = helpers.convert_pdf_file(cert.state.st_pdf_path, cert.state.st_txt_path) if exit_code != constants.RETURNCODE_OK: error_msg = "failed to convert security target pdf->txt" logger.error(f"Cert dgst: {cert.dgst}" + error_msg) diff --git a/sec_certs/sample/fips.py b/sec_certs/sample/fips.py index 85668cc0..d446cd34 100644 --- a/sec_certs/sample/fips.py +++ b/sec_certs/sample/fips.py @@ -539,7 +539,7 @@ class FIPSCertificate(Certificate["FIPSCertificate", "FIPSCertificate.FIPSHeuris def convert_pdf_file(tup: Tuple["FIPSCertificate", Path, Path]) -> "FIPSCertificate": cert, pdf_path, txt_path = tup if not cert.state.txt_state: - exit_code = helpers.convert_pdf_file(pdf_path, txt_path, ["-raw"]) + exit_code = helpers.convert_pdf_file(pdf_path, txt_path) if exit_code != constants.RETURNCODE_OK: logger.error(f"Cert dgst: {cert.cert_id} failed to convert security policy pdf->txt") cert.state.txt_state = False diff --git a/tests/data/test_cc_oop/report_309ac2fd7f2dcf17.txt b/tests/data/test_cc_oop/report_309ac2fd7f2dcf17.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..46bff446 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/data/test_cc_oop/report_309ac2fd7f2dcf17.txt @@ -0,0 +1,481 @@ +Ärendetyp: 6 Diarienummer: 18FMV7705-43:1 +HEMLIG/ +enligt Offentlighets- och sekretesslagen +(2009:400) +2020-06-15 +Country of origin: Sweden +Försvarets materielverk +Swedish Certification Body for IT Security +Certification Report NetIQ® Identity Manager 4.7 +Issue: 1.0, 2020-Jun-15 +Authorisation: Helén Svensson, Lead Certifier , CSEC + Swedish Certification Body for IT Security +Certification Report NetIQ® Identity Manager 4.7 +18FMV7705-43:1 1.0 2020-06-15 +2 (18) +Table of Contents +1 Executive Summary 3 +2 Identification 5 +3 Security Policy 6 +3.1 Security Management 6 +3.2 Security Audit 6 +3.3 Identification and Authentication 6 +3.4 User Data Protection 7 +3.5 Trusted Path / Channel 7 +3.6 Cryptographic Support 7 +4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 8 +4.1 Usage Assumptions 8 +4.2 Environmental Assumptions 8 +4.3 Clarification of Scope 8 +5 Architectural Information 9 +6 Documentation 11 +7 IT Product Testing 12 +7.1 Developer Testing 12 +7.2 Evaluator Testing 12 +7.3 Penetration Testing 12 +8 Evaluated Configuration 13 +9 Results of the Evaluation 14 +10 Evaluator Comments and Recommendations 15 +11 Glossary 16 +12 Bibliography 17 +Appendix A Scheme Versions 18 +A.1 Scheme/Quality Management System 18 +A.2 Scheme Notes 18 + Swedish Certification Body for IT Security +Certification Report NetIQ® Identity Manager 4.7 +18FMV7705-43:1 1.0 2020-06-15 +3 (18) +1 Executive Summary +The TOE is NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7. +It is a software TOE consisting of the components listed below that can be setup on +separate hardware platforms, see the [ST], or as a virtual appliances. +TOE Components: + Identity Applications (RBPM) 4.7.3.0.1109 + Identity Manager Engine 4.7.3.0.AE + Identity Reporting Module 6.5.0. F14508F + Sentinel Log Management for Identity Governance and Administration +8.2.2.0_5415 + One SSO Provider (OSP) 6.3.3.0 + Self Service Password Reset (SSPR) 4.4.0.2 B366 r39762 +The TOE is delivered as software with documentation and can be installed in a physi- +cal or virtual environment. +It is important to verify the integrity of the TOE for secure acceptance of the TOE in +accordance with the preparative procedures of the guidance, i.e. verify the TLS con- +nection, the CA certificate and the file hash. It is also important to update the TOE (in- +cluding 3rd party software) and the operational environment of the TOE in accordance +with the preparative procedures of the guidance to mitigate known vulnerabilities. +No conformance claims to any PP are made for the TOE. +The evaluation has been performed by Combitech AB in Växjö, Sweden and by +EWA-Canada in Ottawa, Canada. Site Visit and parts of the testing was performed at +the developer’s site in Bangalore, India. +The evaluation was completed on 2020-06-02. The evaluation was conducted in ac- +cordance with the requirements of Common Criteria, version 3.1 R5. +Combitech AB is a licensed evaluation facility for Common Criteria under the Swe- +dish Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme. Combitech AB is also +accredited by the Swedish accreditation body SWEDAC according to ISO/IEC 17025 +for Common Criteria evaluation. EWA-Canada Ltd. operates as a Foreign location for +Combitech AB within scope of the Swedish Common Criteria Evaluation and Certifi- +cation Scheme. +The certifier monitored the activities of the evaluator by reviewing all successive ver- +sions of the evaluation reports, and by observing site-visit and testing. The certifier +determined that the evaluation results confirm the security claims in the Security +Target (ST) and the Common Methodology for evaluation assurance level EAL3 +augmented by ALC_FLR.2 +The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the +certificate, and on the condition that all the stipulations in the Security Target are +met. +This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by CSEC or any other or- +ganisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the +IT product by CSEC or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this +certificate is either expressed or implied. + Swedish Certification Body for IT Security +Certification Report NetIQ® Identity Manager 4.7 +18FMV7705-43:1 1.0 2020-06-15 +4 (18) +As specified in the security target of this evaluation, the invocation of cryptographic +primitives has been included in the TOE, while the implementation of these primi- +tives has been located in TOE environment. Therefore the invocation of crypto- +graphic primitives has been in the scope of this evaluation, while correctness of im- +plementation of cryptographic primitives been excluded from the TOE. Correctness +of implementation is done through third party certification Cryptographic Module +Validation Program (CMVP) certificate number 1747 referred to in the Security +Target. +Users of this product are advised to consider their acceptance of this third party af- +firmation regarding the correctness of implementation of the cryptographic primi- +tives. + Swedish Certification Body for IT Security +Certification Report NetIQ® Identity Manager 4.7 +18FMV7705-43:1 1.0 2020-06-15 +5 (18) +2 Identification +Certification Identification +Certification ID CSEC2018013 +Name and version of the cer- +tified IT product +NetIQ® Identity Manager 4.7 +TOE components: + Identity Applications (RBPM) 4.7.3.0.1109 + Identity Manager Engine 4.7.3.0.AE + Identity Reporting Module 6.5.0. F14508F + Sentinel Log Management for Identity Govern- +ance and Administration 8.2.2.0_5415 + One SSO Provider (OSP) 6.3.3.0 + Self Service Password Reset (SSPR) 4.4.0.2 +B366 r39762 +Security Target Identification NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 Security Target (ST), +NetIQ Corporation , 2020-06-01, document version +2.6 +EAL EAL3 + ALC_FLR.2 +Sponsor NetIQ Corporation +Developer NetIQ Corporation +ITSEF Combitech AB and EWA-Canada +Common Criteria version 3.1 release 5 +CEM version 3.1 release 5 +QMS version 1.23.2 +Scheme Notes Release 15.0 +Recognition Scope CCRA, SOGIS and EA/MLA +Certification date 2020-06-15 + Swedish Certification Body for IT Security +Certification Report NetIQ® Identity Manager 4.7 +18FMV7705-43:1 1.0 2020-06-15 +6 (18) +3 Security Policy +The security features performed by the TOE are as follows: + Security Management + Security Audit + Identification and Authentication + User Data Protection + Trusted Path / Channels + Cryptographic Support +3.1 Security Management +The TOE maintains operator roles. The individual roles are categorized into two main +roles: the Administrator and the User. +Administrator - A user who has rights to configure and manage all aspects of the TOE +User - The user’s capabilities can be configured to: + View hierarchical relationships between User objects + View and edit user information (with appropriate rights). + Search for users or resources using advanced search criteria (which can be saved +for later reuse). + Recover forgotten passwords. +Only an Administrator can determine the behavior of, disable, enable, and modify the +behavior of the functions that implement the Discretionary Access Control SFP. The +TPE ensures only secure values are accepted for the security attributes listed with Dis- +cretionary Access Control SFP. +3.2 Security Audit +The TOE generates the following audit data: + Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions (instantiated by startup of the TOE) + User login/logout + Login failures +The TOE provides the Administrator with the capability to read all audit data gener- +ated within the TOE via the console. The GUI provides a suitable means for an Ad- +ministrator to interpret the information from the audit log. +The A.TIMESOURCE is added to the assumptions on operational environment, and +OE.TIME is added to the operational environment security objectives. The time and +date provided by the operational environment are used to form the timestamps. The +TOE ensures that the audit trail data is stamped when recorded with a dependable date +and time received from the OE (operating system). In this manner, accurate time and +date is maintained on the TOE. +3.3 Identification and Authentication +The IDM console application provides user interfaces that administrators may use to +manage TOE functions. The operating system and the database in the TOE Environ- +ment are queried to individually authenticate administrators or users. The TOE main- +tains authorization information that determines which TOE functions an authenticated +administrators or users (of a given role) may perform. + Swedish Certification Body for IT Security +Certification Report NetIQ® Identity Manager 4.7 +18FMV7705-43:1 1.0 2020-06-15 +7 (18) +The TOE maintains the following list of security attributes belonging to individual us- +ers: + User Identity (i.e., user name) + Authentication Status (whether the IT Environment validated the username/pass- +word) + Privilege Level (Administrator or User) +3.4 User Data Protection +The TOE implements a discretionary access control policy to define what roles can +access particular functions of the TOE. All access and actions for system reports, com- +ponent audit logs, TOE configuration, operator account attributes (defined in +FIA_ATD.1) are protected via access control list. When a user requests to perform an +action on an object, the TOE verifies the role associated with the user name. Access is +granted if the user (or group of users) has the specific rights required for the type of +operation requested on the object. +Identity Manager can enforce password policies on incoming passwords from con- +nected systems and on passwords set or changed through the User Application pass- +word self-service. If the new password does not comply, you can specify that Identity +Manager not accept the password. This also means that passwords that don't comply +with your policies are not distributed to other connected systems. +In addition, can enforce password policies on connected systems. If the password be- +ing published to the Identity Vault does not comply with rules in a policy, you can +specify that Identity Manager not only does not accept the password for distribution, +but actually resets the noncompliant password on the connected system by using the +current Distribution password in the Identity Vault. +3.5 Trusted Path / Channel +The TOE provides a trusted channel between the TOE and external web servers. +The TOE provides a trusted path for TOE administrators and TOE users to communi- +cate with the TOE. The trusted path is implemented using HTTPS. The TOE’s imple- +mentation of TLS is described in the previous section (Trusted Channel). +3.6 Cryptographic Support +Cryptographic protection of data in transit between the TOE and remote users, and be- +tween the TOE and external web servers is provided by the OpenSSL FIPS Object +Module software version 2.0.10 (Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) +certificate number 1747) libraries. + Swedish Certification Body for IT Security +Certification Report NetIQ® Identity Manager 4.7 +18FMV7705-43:1 1.0 2020-06-15 +8 (18) +4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope +4.1 Usage Assumptions +The Security Target [ST] makes two assumptions on the usage of the TOE. +A.MANAGE - Administrators of the TOE are assumed to be appropriately trained to +undertake the installation, configuration and management of the TOE in a secure and +trusted manner. +A.NOEVIL - Administrators of the TOE and users on the local area network are not +careless, willfully negligent, nor hostile, and will follow and abide by the instructions +provided by the TOE documentation +4.2 Environmental Assumptions +The Security Target [ST] makes three assumptions on the operational environment of +the TOE. +A.LOCATE - The processing platforms on which the TOE resides are assumed to be +located within a facility that provides controlled access +A.CONFIG - The TOE is configured to receive all passwords and associated data from +network-attached systems. +A.TIMESOURCE - The TOE has a trusted source for system time via NTP server +4.3 Clarification of Scope +The Security Target contains five threats, which have been considered during the eval- +uation. +T.NO_AUTH - An unauthorized user may gain access to the TOE and alter the TOE +configuration. +T.NO_PRIV - An authorized user of the TOE exceeds his/her assigned security privi- +leges resulting in unauthorized modification of the TOE configuration and/or data. +T.USER_ACCESS_DENY - An authorized user may be able to change user authenti- +cation data and or user access policies and deny their access to it later. +T.PASSWD_COMPROMISE - An unauthorized user may be able to obtain and use +user passwords. +T.PROT_TRANS - An unauthorized user may be able to gather information from +communications between components. +The Security Target contains one Organisational Security Policies (OSPs), which have +been considered during the evaluation. +P.REMOTE_DATA - Passwords and account information from network-attached sys- +tems shall be monitored and managed. + Swedish Certification Body for IT Security +Certification Report NetIQ® Identity Manager 4.7 +18FMV7705-43:1 1.0 2020-06-15 +9 (18) +5 Architectural Information +The TOE consists of the following components: + Administration Workstation (Console)2 + Identity Applications (RBPM) + Designer aka Identity Manager Designer + Analyzer aka Identity Manager Analyzer + Identity Manager + Identity Manager Engine + Identity Vault + iManager + Reporting Server + Identity Reporting Module + Log Manager + Sentinel Log Management for Identity Governance and Administration + SSO Provider + One SSO Provider (OSP) + Self Service Password Reset + Self Service Password Reset (SSPR) +Figure 1, TOE Deployment with subsystems +The TOE provides the following functions: data synchronization, role management, +auditing/reporting, and management. + Swedish Certification Body for IT Security +Certification Report NetIQ® Identity Manager 4.7 +18FMV7705-43:1 1.0 2020-06-15 +10 (18) + Data synchronization, including password synchronization, is provided by the +base components of the Identity Manager solution: the Identity Vault, Identity +Manager engine, drivers, Remote Loader, and connected applications + Role management is provided by the User Application + Auditing and reporting are provided by the Identity Reporting Module + Swedish Certification Body for IT Security +Certification Report NetIQ® Identity Manager 4.7 +18FMV7705-43:1 1.0 2020-06-15 +11 (18) +6 Documentation +The TOE includes the following guidance documentation: + Quick Start Guide for Installing NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 February 2018 +[QSIM] + NetIQ Identity Manager Setup Guide for Linux February 2018 [SUL] + NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7, Operational User Guidance and Preparative Proce- +dures Supplement (AGD-IGS), version 0.6, is supplied for those customers that +need guidance on how to set the TOE in the evaluated configuration. [AGD] + Swedish Certification Body for IT Security +Certification Report NetIQ® Identity Manager 4.7 +18FMV7705-43:1 1.0 2020-06-15 +12 (18) +7 IT Product Testing +7.1 Developer Testing +There are 30 test cases covering all SFRs with at least one test per SFR. All tests were +successful with a pass verdict. +7.2 Evaluator Testing +Since all SFRs and security function requirements were tested by the developer the +evaluator focused on repetition of the developer’s test cases and penetration testing. +7.3 Penetration Testing +Port and vulnerability scan were performed on Identity manager engine, Identity appli- +cations (RBPM), and Identity reporting module. +No unforeseen ports or vulnerabilities were found. + Swedish Certification Body for IT Security +Certification Report NetIQ® Identity Manager 4.7 +18FMV7705-43:1 1.0 2020-06-15 +13 (18) +8 Evaluated Configuration +The TOE consists of a set of software applications run on one or multiple distributed +systems. The TOE requires the following software components as part of the evalu- +ated configuration: +Component Requirements +Administration Workstation Mozilla Firefox 65 +Identity Applications (RBPM) +Designer / Analyzer) +SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 SP4 +Identity Manager (Identity Man- +ager Engine) +SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 SP4 +Reporting Server (Identity Re- +porting Module) +SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 SP4 +Log Manager (Sentinel Log Man- +agement for Identity Governance +and Administration) +SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 SP4 +SSO Provider (OneSSO Provider) SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 SP4 +Self Service Password Reset SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 SP4 +In addition to the platform requirements mentioned above, the following hardware re- +sources are needed in order to install and configure Identity Manager on each plat- +form: + A minimum of 8 GB RAM + 15 GB available disk space to install all the components. + Additional disk space to configure and populate data. This might vary depending +on your connected systems and number of objects in the Identity Vault. +For server-based components, it is recommended that the platform have a minimum of +2 CPUs or cores. + Swedish Certification Body for IT Security +Certification Report NetIQ® Identity Manager 4.7 +18FMV7705-43:1 1.0 2020-06-15 +14 (18) +9 Results of the Evaluation +The evaluators applied each work unit of the Common Methodology [CEM] within +the scope of the evaluation, and concluded that the TOE meets the security objectives +stated in the Security Target [ST] for an attack potential of Basic. +The certifier reviewed the work of the evaluators and determined that the evaluation +was conducted in accordance with the Common Criteria [CC]. +The evaluators' overall verdict is PASS. +The verdicts for the respective assurance classes and components are summarised in +the following table: +Assurance Class/Family Short name Verdict +Development ADV: PASS +Security architecture description ADV_ARC.1 PASS +Functional specification with complete summary ADV_FSP.3 PASS +Architectural design ADV_TDS.2 PASS +Guidance documents AGD: PASS +Operational user guidance AGD_OPE.1 PASS +Preparative procedures AGD_PRE.1 PASS +Life-cycle support ALC: PASS +Authorisation controls ALC_CMC.3 PASS +Implementation representation CM coverage ALC_CMS.3 PASS +Delivery procedures ALC_DEL.1 PASS +Identification of security measures ALC_DVS.1 PASS +Developer defined life-cycle model ALC_LCD.1 PASS +Flaw reporting procedures ALC_FLR.2 PASS +Security Target evaluation ASE: PASS +Conformance claims ASE_CCL.1 PASS +Extended components definition ASE_ECD.1 PASS +ST introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS +Security objectives ASE_OBJ.2 PASS +Derived security requirements ASE_REQ.2 PASS +Security problem definition ASE_SPD.1 PASS +TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS +Tests ATE: PASS +Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.2 PASS +Testing: basic design ATE_DPT.1 PASS +Functional testing ATE_FUN.1 PASS +Independent testing - sample ATE_IND.2 PASS +Vulnerability assessment AVA: PASS +Vulnerability analysis AVA_VAN.2 PASS + Swedish Certification Body for IT Security +Certification Report NetIQ® Identity Manager 4.7 +18FMV7705-43:1 1.0 2020-06-15 +15 (18) +10 Evaluator Comments and Recommendations +None. + Swedish Certification Body for IT Security +Certification Report NetIQ® Identity Manager 4.7 +18FMV7705-43:1 1.0 2020-06-15 +16 (18) +11 Glossary +CC Common Criteria version 3.1 +EAL Evaluation Assurance Level +FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard +IDM Identity Manager +ITSEF +IT Security Evaluation Facility, test labora- +tory licensed to operate within a evaluation +and certification scheme +NTP Network Time Protocol +OSP Organizational Security Policy +OSP One SSO Provider +SSO Single Sign On +SFP Security Function Policy +SFR Security Functional Requirement +SSPR Self Service Password Reset +ST Security Target +TOE Target of Evaluation + Swedish Certification Body for IT Security +Certification Report NetIQ® Identity Manager 4.7 +18FMV7705-43:1 1.0 2020-06-15 +17 (18) +12 Bibliography +ST NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 Security Target (ST), NetIQ +Corporation, 2020-06-01, document version 2.6 +QSIM Quick Start Guide for Installing NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 +February 2018 +SUL NetIQ Identity Manager Setup Guide for Linux February 2018 +AGD NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7, Operational User Guidance and +Preparative Procedures Supplement (AGD-IGS), version 0.6 +CCpart1 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, +Part 1, version 3.1 revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001 +CCpart2 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, +Part 2, version 3.1 revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-002 +CCpart3 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security +Evaluation,Part 3, version 3.1 revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-003 +CC CCpart1 + CCpart2 + CCpart3 +CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security +Evaluation, version 3.1 revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-004 +SP-002 SP-002 Evaluation and Certification, CSEC, 2019-09-24, document +version 31.0 + Swedish Certification Body for IT Security +Certification Report NetIQ® Identity Manager 4.7 +18FMV7705-43:1 1.0 2020-06-15 +18 (18) +Appendix A Scheme Versions +During the certification the following versions of the Swedish Common Criteria Eval- +uation and Certification scheme have been used. +A.1 Scheme/Quality Management System +During the certification project, the following versions of the quality management sys- +tem (QMS) have been applicable since the certification application was received: +QMS 1.21.5 valid from 2018-11-19 +QMS 1.22 valid from 2019-02-01 +QMS 1.22.1 valid from 2019-03-08 +QMS 1.22.2 valid from 2019-05-02 +QMS 1.22.3 valid from 2019-05-20 +QMS 1.23 valid from 2019-10-14 +QMS 1.23.1 valid from 2020-03-06 +QMS 1.23.2 valid from 2020-05-11 +In order to ensure consistency in the outcome of the certification, the certifier has ex- +amined the changes introduced in each update of the quality management system. +The changes between consecutive versions are outlined in “Ändringslista CSEC QMS +1.23.1”. The certifier concluded that, from QMS 1.21.5 to the current QMS 1.23.2, +there are no changes with impact on the result of the certification. +Note that the SP-188 Scheme Crypto Policy version 9.0 was introduced in QMS 1.23. +The certification application was submitted before the SP-188 Scheme Crypto Policy +version 9.0 was introduced and therefore version 8.0 was used. +A.2 Scheme Notes +The following Scheme interpretations have been considered during the certification. + Scheme Note 15 - Demonstration of test Coverage + Scheme Note 18 - Highlighted Requirements on the Security Target + Scheme Note 22 - Vulnerability assessment + Scheme Note 28 - Updated procedures for application, evaluation and certification + \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/data/test_cc_oop/report_869415cc4b91282e.txt b/tests/data/test_cc_oop/report_869415cc4b91282e.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 0f421a31..00000000 --- a/tests/data/test_cc_oop/report_869415cc4b91282e.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,481 +0,0 @@ -rendetyp: 6 Diarienummer: 18FMV7705-43:1 -HEMLIG/ -enligt Offentlighets- och sekretesslagen -(2009:400) -2020-06-15 -Country of origin: Sweden -Frsvarets materielverk -Swedish Certification Body for IT Security -Certification Report NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 -Issue: 1.0, 2020-Jun-15 -Authorisation: Heln Svensson, Lead Certifier , CSEC - Swedish Certification Body for IT Security -Certification Report NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 -18FMV7705-43:1 1.0 2020-06-15 -2 (18) -Table of Contents -1 Executive Summary 3 -2 Identification 5 -3 Security Policy 6 -3.1 Security Management 6 -3.2 Security Audit 6 -3.3 Identification and Authentication 6 -3.4 User Data Protection 7 -3.5 Trusted Path / Channel 7 -3.6 Cryptographic Support 7 -4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 8 -4.1 Usage Assumptions 8 -4.2 Environmental Assumptions 8 -4.3 Clarification of Scope 8 -5 Architectural Information 9 -6 Documentation 11 -7 IT Product Testing 12 -7.1 Developer Testing 12 -7.2 Evaluator Testing 12 -7.3 Penetration Testing 12 -8 Evaluated Configuration 13 -9 Results of the Evaluation 14 -10 Evaluator Comments and Recommendations 15 -11 Glossary 16 -12 Bibliography 17 -Appendix A Scheme Versions 18 -A.1 Scheme/Quality Management System 18 -A.2 Scheme Notes 18 - Swedish Certification Body for IT Security -Certification Report NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 -18FMV7705-43:1 1.0 2020-06-15 -3 (18) -1 Executive Summary -The TOE is NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7. -It is a software TOE consisting of the components listed below that can be setup on -separate hardware platforms, see the [ST], or as a virtual appliances. -TOE Components: - Identity Applications (RBPM) 4.7.3.0.1109 - Identity Manager Engine 4.7.3.0.AE - Identity Reporting Module 6.5.0. F14508F - Sentinel Log Management for Identity Governance and Administration -8.2.2.0_5415 - One SSO Provider (OSP) 6.3.3.0 - Self Service Password Reset (SSPR) 4.4.0.2 B366 r39762 -The TOE is delivered as software with documentation and can be installed in a physi- -cal or virtual environment. -It is important to verify the integrity of the TOE for secure acceptance of the TOE in -accordance with the preparative procedures of the guidance, i.e. verify the TLS con- -nection, the CA certificate and the file hash. It is also important to update the TOE (in- -cluding 3rd party software) and the operational environment of the TOE in accordance -with the preparative procedures of the guidance to mitigate known vulnerabilities. -No conformance claims to any PP are made for the TOE. -The evaluation has been performed by Combitech AB in Vxj, Sweden and by -EWA-Canada in Ottawa, Canada. Site Visit and parts of the testing was performed at -the developer's site in Bangalore, India. -The evaluation was completed on 2020-06-02. The evaluation was conducted in ac- -cordance with the requirements of Common Criteria, version 3.1 R5. -Combitech AB is a licensed evaluation facility for Common Criteria under the Swe- -dish Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme. Combitech AB is also -accredited by the Swedish accreditation body SWEDAC according to ISO/IEC 17025 -for Common Criteria evaluation. EWA-Canada Ltd. operates as a Foreign location for -Combitech AB within scope of the Swedish Common Criteria Evaluation and Certifi- -cation Scheme. -The certifier monitored the activities of the evaluator by reviewing all successive ver- -sions of the evaluation reports, and by observing site-visit and testing. The certifier -determined that the evaluation results confirm the security claims in the Security -Target (ST) and the Common Methodology for evaluation assurance level EAL3 -augmented by ALC_FLR.2 -The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the -certificate, and on the condition that all the stipulations in the Security Target are -met. -This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by CSEC or any other or- -ganisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the -IT product by CSEC or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this -certificate is either expressed or implied. - Swedish Certification Body for IT Security -Certification Report NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 -18FMV7705-43:1 1.0 2020-06-15 -4 (18) -As specified in the security target of this evaluation, the invocation of cryptographic -primitives has been included in the TOE, while the implementation of these primi- -tives has been located in TOE environment. Therefore the invocation of crypto- -graphic primitives has been in the scope of this evaluation, while correctness of im- -plementation of cryptographic primitives been excluded from the TOE. Correctness -of implementation is done through third party certification Cryptographic Module -Validation Program (CMVP) certificate number 1747 referred to in the Security -Target. -Users of this product are advised to consider their acceptance of this third party af- -firmation regarding the correctness of implementation of the cryptographic primi- -tives. - Swedish Certification Body for IT Security -Certification Report NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 -18FMV7705-43:1 1.0 2020-06-15 -5 (18) -2 Identification -Certification Identification -Certification ID CSEC2018013 -Name and version of the cer- -tified IT product -NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 -TOE components: - Identity Applications (RBPM) 4.7.3.0.1109 - Identity Manager Engine 4.7.3.0.AE - Identity Reporting Module 6.5.0. F14508F - Sentinel Log Management for Identity Govern- -ance and Administration 8.2.2.0_5415 - One SSO Provider (OSP) 6.3.3.0 - Self Service Password Reset (SSPR) 4.4.0.2 -B366 r39762 -Security Target Identification NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 Security Target (ST), -NetIQ Corporation , 2020-06-01, document version -2.6 -EAL EAL3 + ALC_FLR.2 -Sponsor NetIQ Corporation -Developer NetIQ Corporation -ITSEF Combitech AB and EWA-Canada -Common Criteria version 3.1 release 5 -CEM version 3.1 release 5 -QMS version 1.23.2 -Scheme Notes Release 15.0 -Recognition Scope CCRA, SOGIS and EA/MLA -Certification date 2020-06-15 - Swedish Certification Body for IT Security -Certification Report NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 -18FMV7705-43:1 1.0 2020-06-15 -6 (18) -3 Security Policy -The security features performed by the TOE are as follows: - Security Management - Security Audit - Identification and Authentication - User Data Protection - Trusted Path / Channels - Cryptographic Support -3.1 Security Management -The TOE maintains operator roles. The individual roles are categorized into two main -roles: the Administrator and the User. -Administrator - A user who has rights to configure and manage all aspects of the TOE -User - The user's capabilities can be configured to: - View hierarchical relationships between User objects - View and edit user information (with appropriate rights). - Search for users or resources using advanced search criteria (which can be saved -for later reuse). - Recover forgotten passwords. -Only an Administrator can determine the behavior of, disable, enable, and modify the -behavior of the functions that implement the Discretionary Access Control SFP. The -TPE ensures only secure values are accepted for the security attributes listed with Dis- -cretionary Access Control SFP. -3.2 Security Audit -The TOE generates the following audit data: - Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions (instantiated by startup of the TOE) - User login/logout - Login failures -The TOE provides the Administrator with the capability to read all audit data gener- -ated within the TOE via the console. The GUI provides a suitable means for an Ad- -ministrator to interpret the information from the audit log. -The A.TIMESOURCE is added to the assumptions on operational environment, and -OE.TIME is added to the operational environment security objectives. The time and -date provided by the operational environment are used to form the timestamps. The -TOE ensures that the audit trail data is stamped when recorded with a dependable date -and time received from the OE (operating system). In this manner, accurate time and -date is maintained on the TOE. -3.3 Identification and Authentication -The IDM console application provides user interfaces that administrators may use to -manage TOE functions. The operating system and the database in the TOE Environ- -ment are queried to individually authenticate administrators or users. The TOE main- -tains authorization information that determines which TOE functions an authenticated -administrators or users (of a given role) may perform. - Swedish Certification Body for IT Security -Certification Report NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 -18FMV7705-43:1 1.0 2020-06-15 -7 (18) -The TOE maintains the following list of security attributes belonging to individual us- -ers: - User Identity (i.e., user name) - Authentication Status (whether the IT Environment validated the username/pass- -word) - Privilege Level (Administrator or User) -3.4 User Data Protection -The TOE implements a discretionary access control policy to define what roles can -access particular functions of the TOE. All access and actions for system reports, com- -ponent audit logs, TOE configuration, operator account attributes (defined in -FIA_ATD.1) are protected via access control list. When a user requests to perform an -action on an object, the TOE verifies the role associated with the user name. Access is -granted if the user (or group of users) has the specific rights required for the type of -operation requested on the object. -Identity Manager can enforce password policies on incoming passwords from con- -nected systems and on passwords set or changed through the User Application pass- -word self-service. If the new password does not comply, you can specify that Identity -Manager not accept the password. This also means that passwords that don't comply -with your policies are not distributed to other connected systems. -In addition, can enforce password policies on connected systems. If the password be- -ing published to the Identity Vault does not comply with rules in a policy, you can -specify that Identity Manager not only does not accept the password for distribution, -but actually resets the noncompliant password on the connected system by using the -current Distribution password in the Identity Vault. -3.5 Trusted Path / Channel -The TOE provides a trusted channel between the TOE and external web servers. -The TOE provides a trusted path for TOE administrators and TOE users to communi- -cate with the TOE. The trusted path is implemented using HTTPS. The TOE's imple- -mentation of TLS is described in the previous section (Trusted Channel). -3.6 Cryptographic Support -Cryptographic protection of data in transit between the TOE and remote users, and be- -tween the TOE and external web servers is provided by the OpenSSL FIPS Object -Module software version 2.0.10 (Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) -certificate number 1747) libraries. - Swedish Certification Body for IT Security -Certification Report NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 -18FMV7705-43:1 1.0 2020-06-15 -8 (18) -4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope -4.1 Usage Assumptions -The Security Target [ST] makes two assumptions on the usage of the TOE. -A.MANAGE - Administrators of the TOE are assumed to be appropriately trained to -undertake the installation, configuration and management of the TOE in a secure and -trusted manner. -A.NOEVIL - Administrators of the TOE and users on the local area network are not -careless, willfully negligent, nor hostile, and will follow and abide by the instructions -provided by the TOE documentation -4.2 Environmental Assumptions -The Security Target [ST] makes three assumptions on the operational environment of -the TOE. -A.LOCATE - The processing platforms on which the TOE resides are assumed to be -located within a facility that provides controlled access -A.CONFIG - The TOE is configured to receive all passwords and associated data from -network-attached systems. -A.TIMESOURCE - The TOE has a trusted source for system time via NTP server -4.3 Clarification of Scope -The Security Target contains five threats, which have been considered during the eval- -uation. -T.NO_AUTH - An unauthorized user may gain access to the TOE and alter the TOE -configuration. -T.NO_PRIV - An authorized user of the TOE exceeds his/her assigned security privi- -leges resulting in unauthorized modification of the TOE configuration and/or data. -T.USER_ACCESS_DENY - An authorized user may be able to change user authenti- -cation data and or user access policies and deny their access to it later. -T.PASSWD_COMPROMISE - An unauthorized user may be able to obtain and use -user passwords. -T.PROT_TRANS - An unauthorized user may be able to gather information from -communications between components. -The Security Target contains one Organisational Security Policies (OSPs), which have -been considered during the evaluation. -P.REMOTE_DATA - Passwords and account information from network-attached sys- -tems shall be monitored and managed. - Swedish Certification Body for IT Security -Certification Report NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 -18FMV7705-43:1 1.0 2020-06-15 -9 (18) -5 Architectural Information -The TOE consists of the following components: - Administration Workstation (Console)2 - Identity Applications (RBPM) - Designer aka Identity Manager Designer - Analyzer aka Identity Manager Analyzer - Identity Manager - Identity Manager Engine - Identity Vault - iManager - Reporting Server - Identity Reporting Module - Log Manager - Sentinel Log Management for Identity Governance and Administration - SSO Provider - One SSO Provider (OSP) - Self Service Password Reset - Self Service Password Reset (SSPR) -Figure 1, TOE Deployment with subsystems -The TOE provides the following functions: data synchronization, role management, -auditing/reporting, and management. - Swedish Certification Body for IT Security -Certification Report NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 -18FMV7705-43:1 1.0 2020-06-15 -10 (18) - Data synchronization, including password synchronization, is provided by the -base components of the Identity Manager solution: the Identity Vault, Identity -Manager engine, drivers, Remote Loader, and connected applications - Role management is provided by the User Application - Auditing and reporting are provided by the Identity Reporting Module - Swedish Certification Body for IT Security -Certification Report NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 -18FMV7705-43:1 1.0 2020-06-15 -11 (18) -6 Documentation -The TOE includes the following guidance documentation: - Quick Start Guide for Installing NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 February 2018 -[QSIM] - NetIQ Identity Manager Setup Guide for Linux February 2018 [SUL] - NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7, Operational User Guidance and Preparative Proce- -dures Supplement (AGD-IGS), version 0.6, is supplied for those customers that -need guidance on how to set the TOE in the evaluated configuration. [AGD] - Swedish Certification Body for IT Security -Certification Report NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 -18FMV7705-43:1 1.0 2020-06-15 -12 (18) -7 IT Product Testing -7.1 Developer Testing -There are 30 test cases covering all SFRs with at least one test per SFR. All tests were -successful with a pass verdict. -7.2 Evaluator Testing -Since all SFRs and security function requirements were tested by the developer the -evaluator focused on repetition of the developer's test cases and penetration testing. -7.3 Penetration Testing -Port and vulnerability scan were performed on Identity manager engine, Identity appli- -cations (RBPM), and Identity reporting module. -No unforeseen ports or vulnerabilities were found. - Swedish Certification Body for IT Security -Certification Report NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 -18FMV7705-43:1 1.0 2020-06-15 -13 (18) -8 Evaluated Configuration -The TOE consists of a set of software applications run on one or multiple distributed -systems. The TOE requires the following software components as part of the evalu- -ated configuration: -Component Requirements -Administration Workstation Mozilla Firefox 65 -Identity Applications (RBPM) -Designer / Analyzer) -SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 SP4 -Identity Manager (Identity Man- -ager Engine) -SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 SP4 -Reporting Server (Identity Re- -porting Module) -SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 SP4 -Log Manager (Sentinel Log Man- -agement for Identity Governance -and Administration) -SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 SP4 -SSO Provider (OneSSO Provider) SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 SP4 -Self Service Password Reset SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 SP4 -In addition to the platform requirements mentioned above, the following hardware re- -sources are needed in order to install and configure Identity Manager on each plat- -form: - A minimum of 8 GB RAM - 15 GB available disk space to install all the components. - Additional disk space to configure and populate data. This might vary depending -on your connected systems and number of objects in the Identity Vault. -For server-based components, it is recommended that the platform have a minimum of -2 CPUs or cores. - Swedish Certification Body for IT Security -Certification Report NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 -18FMV7705-43:1 1.0 2020-06-15 -14 (18) -9 Results of the Evaluation -The evaluators applied each work unit of the Common Methodology [CEM] within -the scope of the evaluation, and concluded that the TOE meets the security objectives -stated in the Security Target [ST] for an attack potential of Basic. -The certifier reviewed the work of the evaluators and determined that the evaluation -was conducted in accordance with the Common Criteria [CC]. -The evaluators' overall verdict is PASS. -The verdicts for the respective assurance classes and components are summarised in -the following table: -Assurance Class/Family Short name Verdict -Development ADV: PASS -Security architecture description ADV_ARC.1 PASS -Functional specification with complete summary ADV_FSP.3 PASS -Architectural design ADV_TDS.2 PASS -Guidance documents AGD: PASS -Operational user guidance AGD_OPE.1 PASS -Preparative procedures AGD_PRE.1 PASS -Life-cycle support ALC: PASS -Authorisation controls ALC_CMC.3 PASS -Implementation representation CM coverage ALC_CMS.3 PASS -Delivery procedures ALC_DEL.1 PASS -Identification of security measures ALC_DVS.1 PASS -Developer defined life-cycle model ALC_LCD.1 PASS -Flaw reporting procedures ALC_FLR.2 PASS -Security Target evaluation ASE: PASS -Conformance claims ASE_CCL.1 PASS -Extended components definition ASE_ECD.1 PASS -ST introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS -Security objectives ASE_OBJ.2 PASS -Derived security requirements ASE_REQ.2 PASS -Security problem definition ASE_SPD.1 PASS -TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS -Tests ATE: PASS -Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.2 PASS -Testing: basic design ATE_DPT.1 PASS -Functional testing ATE_FUN.1 PASS -Independent testing - sample ATE_IND.2 PASS -Vulnerability assessment AVA: PASS -Vulnerability analysis AVA_VAN.2 PASS - Swedish Certification Body for IT Security -Certification Report NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 -18FMV7705-43:1 1.0 2020-06-15 -15 (18) -10 Evaluator Comments and Recommendations -None. - Swedish Certification Body for IT Security -Certification Report NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 -18FMV7705-43:1 1.0 2020-06-15 -16 (18) -11 Glossary -CC Common Criteria version 3.1 -EAL Evaluation Assurance Level -FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard -IDM Identity Manager -ITSEF -IT Security Evaluation Facility, test labora- -tory licensed to operate within a evaluation -and certification scheme -NTP Network Time Protocol -OSP Organizational Security Policy -OSP One SSO Provider -SSO Single Sign On -SFP Security Function Policy -SFR Security Functional Requirement -SSPR Self Service Password Reset -ST Security Target -TOE Target of Evaluation - Swedish Certification Body for IT Security -Certification Report NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 -18FMV7705-43:1 1.0 2020-06-15 -17 (18) -12 Bibliography -ST NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 Security Target (ST), NetIQ -Corporation, 2020-06-01, document version 2.6 -QSIM Quick Start Guide for Installing NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 -February 2018 -SUL NetIQ Identity Manager Setup Guide for Linux February 2018 -AGD NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7, Operational User Guidance and -Preparative Procedures Supplement (AGD-IGS), version 0.6 -CCpart1 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, -Part 1, version 3.1 revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001 -CCpart2 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, -Part 2, version 3.1 revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-002 -CCpart3 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security -Evaluation,Part 3, version 3.1 revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-003 -CC CCpart1 + CCpart2 + CCpart3 -CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security -Evaluation, version 3.1 revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-004 -SP-002 SP-002 Evaluation and Certification, CSEC, 2019-09-24, document -version 31.0 - Swedish Certification Body for IT Security -Certification Report NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 -18FMV7705-43:1 1.0 2020-06-15 -18 (18) -Appendix A Scheme Versions -During the certification the following versions of the Swedish Common Criteria Eval- -uation and Certification scheme have been used. -A.1 Scheme/Quality Management System -During the certification project, the following versions of the quality management sys- -tem (QMS) have been applicable since the certification application was received: -QMS 1.21.5 valid from 2018-11-19 -QMS 1.22 valid from 2019-02-01 -QMS 1.22.1 valid from 2019-03-08 -QMS 1.22.2 valid from 2019-05-02 -QMS 1.22.3 valid from 2019-05-20 -QMS 1.23 valid from 2019-10-14 -QMS 1.23.1 valid from 2020-03-06 -QMS 1.23.2 valid from 2020-05-11 -In order to ensure consistency in the outcome of the certification, the certifier has ex- -amined the changes introduced in each update of the quality management system. -The changes between consecutive versions are outlined in "ndringslista CSEC QMS -1.23.1". The certifier concluded that, from QMS 1.21.5 to the current QMS 1.23.2, -there are no changes with impact on the result of the certification. -Note that the SP-188 Scheme Crypto Policy version 9.0 was introduced in QMS 1.23. -The certification application was submitted before the SP-188 Scheme Crypto Policy -version 9.0 was introduced and therefore version 8.0 was used. -A.2 Scheme Notes -The following Scheme interpretations have been considered during the certification. - Scheme Note 15 - Demonstration of test Coverage - Scheme Note 18 - Highlighted Requirements on the Security Target - Scheme Note 22 - Vulnerability assessment - Scheme Note 28 - Updated procedures for application, evaluation and certification - \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/data/test_cc_oop/target_309ac2fd7f2dcf17.txt b/tests/data/test_cc_oop/target_309ac2fd7f2dcf17.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6f86c7be --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/data/test_cc_oop/target_309ac2fd7f2dcf17.txt @@ -0,0 +1,1497 @@ +NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 +Security Target (ST) +Date: June 1, 2020 +Version: 2.6 +Prepared By: NetIQ Corporation +Prepared For: NetIQ Corporation +515 Post Oak Blvd +Suite 1200 +Houston, Texas 77027 +Abstract +This document provides the basis for an evaluation of a specific Target of Evaluation (TOE), Identity +Manager 4.7. This Security Target (ST) defines a set of assumptions about the aspects of the environment, +a list of threats that the product intends to counter, a set of security objectives, a set of security requirements +and the IT security functions provided by the TOE which meet the set of requirements. + June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST +NetIQ Corporation Page 2 of 36 +Table of Contents +Table of Contents...................................................................................................................................2 +List of Tables.........................................................................................................................................3 +List of Figures........................................................................................................................................4 +1. Introduction ...........................................................................................................................................5 +Security Target Reference:............................................................................................................5 +TOE Reference..............................................................................................................................5 +Document Organization................................................................................................................5 +Document Conventions.................................................................................................................6 +Document Terminology................................................................................................................6 +TOE Overview..............................................................................................................................7 +TOE Description...........................................................................................................................8 +Administration Workstation (Console):........................................................................................8 +Identity Applications (RBPM)......................................................................................................8 +Identity Manager:..........................................................................................................................9 +Reporting Server:..........................................................................................................................9 +Log Manager:................................................................................................................................9 +OneSSO Provider:.........................................................................................................................9 +Self Service Password Reset:......................................................................................................10 +TOE Delivery:.............................................................................................................................10 +TOE Environment.......................................................................................................................10 +Virtual Machines.........................................................................................................................10 +Hardware and Software Supplied by the IT Environment..........................................................11 +Logical Boundary........................................................................................................................11 +TOE Security Functional Policies...............................................................................................12 +Discretionary Access Control SFP..............................................................................................12 +TOE Vendor Documentation / Guidance....................................................................................12 +Features / Functionality NOT Included in the TOE....................................................................12 +2. Conformance Claims ...........................................................................................................................14 +CC Conformance Claim..............................................................................................................14 +PP Claim .....................................................................................................................................14 +Package Claim ............................................................................................................................14 +Conformance Rationale...............................................................................................................14 +3. Security Problem Definition................................................................................................................15 +Threats.........................................................................................................................................15 +Organizational Security Policies.................................................................................................15 +Assumptions................................................................................................................................15 +4. Security Objectives..............................................................................................................................17 +Security Objectives for the TOE.................................................................................................17 +Security Objectives for the Operational Environment................................................................17 +Security Objectives Rationale.....................................................................................................17 +Mapping of Objectives................................................................................................................18 +5. Extended Components Definition........................................................................................................20 +6. Security Requirements.........................................................................................................................21 +Security Functional Requirements..............................................................................................21 +Security Audit (FAU) .................................................................................................................21 +FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation..........................................................................................21 +FAU_SAR.1 Audit Review.........................................................................................................22 + June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST +NetIQ Corporation Page 3 of 36 +Cryptographic Support................................................................................................................22 +FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation...............................................................................22 +FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction..............................................................................22 +FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation (Encryption / Decryption) ..............................................22 +Information Flow Control (FDP) ................................................................................................23 +FDP_ACC.1 Subset Access Control...........................................................................................23 +FDP_ACF.1 Security Attribute Based Access Control...............................................................23 +Identification and Authentication (FIA) .....................................................................................24 +FIA_ATD.1 – User Attribute Definition.....................................................................................24 +FIA_UAU.2 User Authentication before Any Action ................................................................24 +FIA_UID.2 User Identification before Any Action....................................................................24 +Security Management (FMT)......................................................................................................24 +FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes .......................................................................24 +FMT_MSA.2 Secure Security Attributes....................................................................................24 +FMT_MSA.3 Static Attribute Initialization................................................................................24 +FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF Data....................................................................................25 +FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions ..............................................................25 +FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles.......................................................................................................25 +Protection of the TSF (FPT)........................................................................................................25 +FPT_TDC.1 Inter-TSF Basic TSF Data Consistency .................................................................25 +Trusted Path / Channel (FTP) .....................................................................................................26 +FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel ........................................................................................26 +FTP_TRP.1 Trusted Path............................................................................................................26 +Security Assurance Requirements ..............................................................................................26 +Security Requirements Rationale................................................................................................26 +Security Functional Requirements..............................................................................................26 +Dependency Rationale ................................................................................................................27 +Sufficiency of Security Requirements ........................................................................................28 +Security Assurance Requirements ..............................................................................................30 +Security Assurance Requirements Rationale ..............................................................................30 +Security Assurance Requirements Evidence...............................................................................31 +7. TOE Summary Specification...............................................................................................................33 +TOE Security Functions..............................................................................................................33 +Security Audit.............................................................................................................................33 +Identification and Authentication................................................................................................33 +User Data Protection...................................................................................................................33 +Security Management .................................................................................................................34 +Trusted Path / Channels ..............................................................................................................35 +Trusted Channel..........................................................................................................................35 +Trusted Path:...............................................................................................................................35 +Cryptographic Support................................................................................................................35 +List of Tables +Table 1 – ST Organization and Section Descriptions...................................................................................6 +Table 2 – Acronyms Used in Security Target...............................................................................................7 +Table 3 – CAVP Certificate Numbers ..........................................................................................................9 +Table 4 – Virtual Machine Environment Requirements .............................................................................11 +Table 5 – IT Environment Component Requirements................................................................................11 +Table 6 – Logical Boundary Descriptions ..................................................................................................12 +Table 7 – IT Environment Components - Not In TOE ...............................................................................13 + June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST +NetIQ Corporation Page 4 of 36 +Table 8 – Threats Addressed by the TOE...................................................................................................15 +Table 9 – Organizational Security Policies.................................................................................................15 +Table 10 – Assumptions..............................................................................................................................16 +Table 11 – TOE Security Objectives ..........................................................................................................17 +Table 12 – Operational Environment Security Objectives .........................................................................17 +Table 13 – Mapping of Assumptions, Threats, Policies and ORSP s to Security Objectives.....................18 +Table 14 – Mapping of Threats, Policies, and Assumptions to Objectives ................................................19 +Table 15 – TOE Security Functional Requirements ...................................................................................21 +Table 16 – Cryptographic Standards...........................................................................................................22 +Table 17 – Cryptographic Operations.........................................................................................................23 +Table 18 – Management of TSF data..........................................................................................................25 +Table 19 – Mapping of TOE Security Functional Requirements and Objectives.......................................27 +Table 20 – Mapping of SFR to Dependencies and Rationales....................................................................28 +Table 20 – Rationale for TOE SFRs to Objectives.....................................................................................30 +Table 22 – Security Assurance Requirements at EAL3..............................................................................30 +Table 23 – Security Assurance Rationale and Measures ............................................................................32 +Table 24 – Roles and Functions..................................................................................................................34 +Table 22 – CAVP........................................................................................................................................36 +List of Figures +Figure 1 – TOE Deployment with Subsystems.............................................................................................7 +Figure 2 – Sample Download List ..............................................................................................................10 + June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST +NetIQ Corporation Page 5 of 36 +1. Introduction +This section identifies the Security Target (ST), Target of Evaluation (TOE), Security Target +organization, document conventions, and terminology. It also includes an overview of the +evaluated product. +Security Target Reference: +ST Title NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 Security Target: +ST Revision 2.6 +ST Publication Date June 1, 2020 +ST Author Michael F. Angelo +TOE Reference +TOE Reference NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 +TOE Developer NetIQ Corporation +Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) EAL3+ +Note: The file download name is: Identity_Manager_4.7_Linux.iso . +Note: The official name of the product is NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 Advanced Edition. The +released product can be uniquely identified as: NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7.3. The product name +may also be abbreviated as Identity Manager 4.7 AE, Identity Manager, IDM 4.7.3AE or IDM 4.7 +or simply IDM . Finally the TOE, if examined for the build number will be identified as NetIQ +Identity Manager 4.7.3.0.317. For the purpose of this document all of the above references are +equivalent, and the document may refer to the product simply as IDM or the TOE. +Document Organization +This Security Target follows the following format: +SECTION TITLE DESCRIPTION +1 Introduction Provides an overview of the TOE and defines the +hardware and software that make up the TOE as well +as the physical and logical boundaries of the TOE +2 Conformance Claims Lists evaluation conformance to Common Criteria +versions, Protection Profiles, or Packages where +applicable +3 Security Problem +Definition +Specifies the threats, assumptions and organizational +security policies that affect the TOE +4 Security Objectives Defines the security objectives for the +TOE/operational environment and provides a +rationale to demonstrate that the security objectives +satisfy the threats +5 Extended +Components +Definition +Describes extended components of the evaluation (if +any) +6 Security +Requirements +Contains the functional and assurance requirements +for this TOE + June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST +NetIQ Corporation Page 6 of 36 +SECTION TITLE DESCRIPTION +7 TOE Summary +Specification +Identifies the IT security functions provided by the +TOE and also identifies the assurance measures +targeted to meet the assurance requirements. +Table 1 – ST Organization and Section Descriptions +Document Conventions +The notation, formatting, and conventions used in this Security Target are consistent with those +used in Version 3.1 of the Common Criteria. Selected presentation choices are discussed here +to aid the Security Target reader. The Common Criteria allows several operations to be +performed on functional requirements: The allowable operations defined in Part 2 of the +Common Criteria are refinement, selection, assignment and iteration. + The refinement operation is used to add detail to a requirement, and thus further +restricts a requirement. Refinement of security requirements is denoted by bold text. +Any text removed is indicated with a strikethrough format (Example: TSF). + The selection operation is picking one or more items from a list in order to narrow the +scope of a component element. Selections are denoted by italicized text. + The assignment operation is used to assign a specific value to an unspecified parameter, +such as the length of a password. An assignment operation is indicated by showing the +value in square brackets, i.e. [assignment_value(s)]. + Iterated functional and assurance requirements are given unique identifiers by +appending to the base requirement identifier from the Common Criteria an iteration +number inside parenthesis, for example, FMT_MTD.1.1 (1) and FMT_MTD.1.1 (2) refer +to separate instances of the FMT_MTD.1 security functional requirement component. +When not embedded in a Security Functional Requirement, italicized text is used for both +official document titles and text meant to be emphasized more than plain text. +Document Terminology +The following table describes the acronyms used in this document: +TERM DEFINITION +CC Common Criteria version 3.1 +EAL Evaluation Assurance Level +IDM Identity Manager +IDV Identity Vault +IGA Identity Governance and Administration +NMAS NetIQ Modular Authentication Service +NTP Network Time Protocol +ORSP Organizational Security Policy +OSP One SSO Provider +SSO Single Sign On +SFP Security Function Policy +SFR Security Functional Requirement +SLM Sentinel Log Manager + June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST +NetIQ Corporation Page 7 of 36 +TERM DEFINITION +SSPR Self Service Password Reset +ST Security Target +TOE Target of Evaluation +TSF TOE Security Function +Table 2 – Acronyms Used in Security Target +TOE Overview +The TOE is NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7. NetIQ Identity Manager provides data sharing and +synchronization services which enable applications, directories, and databases to share +information. It links scattered information and enables you to establish policies that govern +automatic updates to designated systems when identity changes occur. +Identity Manager provides the foundation for account provisioning, security, single sign-on, +user self-service, authentication, authorization, automated workflow, and Web services. It +allows you to integrate, manage, and control your distributed identity information so you can +securely deliver the right resources to the right people. +The following diagram shows a typical TOE deployment: +Identity Reporting Module +Operating System +General Purpose Computing +Platform +Reporting Server +Sentinel Log Management +for Identity Governance +and Administration +Operating System +General Purpose Computing +Platform +Log Manager +Identity Manager Engine +Identity Vault +Operating System +General Purpose Computing +Platform +Identity Applications +(RBPM) +Web Browser +Operating System +General Purpose Computing +(GPC) Platform +Identity Application +4 +1 +2 +8 +10 += TOE Component += IT Environment Component +One SSO Provider +(uname / pass, Kerberos, +SAML) +Operating System +General Purpose Computing +Platform +3 +5 +SSO Provider +Self Service Password +Reset +Web Browser +Operating System +General Purpose Computing +Platform +Self Service Password Reset +11 +9 +12 +7a +Identity Manager +6 +B +Administration +Workstation +(Console) 7b +Separate communication paths to Sentinel Log Manager +7a – Identity Vault to Sentinel Log Manager +7b – iManager to Sentinel Log Manager +C +A +iManager +Designer / Analyzer += TOE Sub Component +OpenSSL +Figure 1 – TOE Deployment with Subsystems1 +The TOE provides the following functions: data synchronization, role management, +auditing/reporting, and management. +11 +Note the Administration Workstation Console is not included in the evaluation as there is no code that is added to it to make it +explicitly a workstation console. It is included in the document as a component required for access.to the TOE. + June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST +NetIQ Corporation Page 8 of 36 + Data synchronization, including password synchronization, is provided by the base +components of the Identity Manager solution: the Identity Vault, Identity Manager +engine, drivers, Remote Loader, and connected applications + Role management is provided by the User Application + Auditing and reporting are provided by the Identity Reporting Module +TOE Description +NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 is a comprehensive identity management suite. It provides an +intelligent identity framework that leverages your existing IT assets and new computing +models like Software as a Service (SaaS) by reducing cost and ensuring compliance across +physical, virtual, and cloud environments. With the NetIQ Identity Manager solution, you can +make sure that your business has the most current user identity information. You can retain +control at the enterprise level by managing, provisioning, and de-provisioning identities within +the firewall and extending to the cloud. Through streamlined user administration and +processes, Identity Manager helps organizations reduce management costs, increase +productivity and security, and comply with government regulations. +The TOE is a software TOE and includes the following functions. +Each function contains the components as follows: +1. Administration Workstation (Console)2 +2. Identity Applications (RBPM) 4.7.3.0.1109 + Designer aka Identity Manager Designer 4.7.3.0.20190614 + Analyzer aka Identity Manager Analyzer +3. Identity Manager + Identity Manager Engine 4.7.3.0.AE +o Identity Vault 9.1.4 +o iManager 3.1.4 +4. Reporting Server + Identity Reporting Module 6.5.0. F14508F +5. Log Manager + Sentinel Log Management for Identity Governance and Administration 8.2.2.0_5415 +6. SSO Provider + One SSO Provider (OSP) 6.3.3.0 +7. Self Service Password Reset + Self Service Password Reset (SSPR) 4.4.0.2 B366 r39762 +Administration Workstation (Console): +The Administration Workstation (Console) is used to access the Identity Applications (RBPM), +Identity Manager, and the Reporting Server. Each of these functions is described below. +Identity Applications (RBPM) +The Identity Applications (RBPM) houses the Designer / Analyzer functions. The Identity +Application is a Web application (browser-based) that gives users and business administrators +the ability to perform a variety of identity self-service and roles provisioning tasks, including +managing passwords and identity data, initiating and monitoring provisioning and role +assignment requests, managing the approval process for provisioning requests, and verifying +2 +The Administration Workstation (Console) is not part of the TOE, in that there is no code added to it in order to function as the +Console it is required to access features and function of the TOE and is included for completeness. + June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST +NetIQ Corporation Page 9 of 36 +attestation reports. It includes the workflow engine that controls the routing of requests +through the appropriate approval process. Designer aka Designer for Identity Manager helps +you design, test, document, and deploy Identity Manager solutions in a network or test +environment. Analyzer aka NetIQ Analyzer for Identity Manager is an identity management +toolset that helps you ensure that internal data quality policies are adhered to by providing +data analysis, data cleansing, data reconciliation, and data monitoring/reporting. Analyzer lets +you analyze, enhance, and control all data stores throughout the enterprise. +Identity Manager: +The Identity Manager houses the Identity Manager Engine (and the Identity Vault which +contains the Identity Applications data) and iManager. The Identity Manager Engine +synchronizes identity data between applications. For example, data synchronized from a +PeopleSoft system to Lotus Notes is first added to the Identity Vault and then sent to the Lotus +Notes system. In addition, the Identity Vault stores information specific to Identity Manager, +such as driver configurations, parameters, and policies. +The following packages are used to provide cryptographic functions, and are not included in +the TOE boundary. NetIQ eDirectory is used for the Identity Vault. eDirectory provides access +to the OpenSSL Cryptographic functionality. +They meet the cryptographic quality requirements as evidenced by the following certificates: +Component CAVP Cert # +AES Certs. #3090 and #3264 +HMAC Certs. #1937 and #2063 +RSA Certs. #1581 and #1664 +Table 3 – CAVP Certificate Numbers +Reporting Server: +The reporting server houses the Identity Reporting Module. The Identity Reporting Module +generates reports that show critical business information about various aspects of your +Identity Manager configuration, including information collected from Identity Vaults and +managed systems such as Active Directory or SAP. The reporting module provides a set of +predefined report definitions you can use to generate reports. In addition, it gives you the +option to import custom reports defined in a third-party tool. The user interface for the +reporting module makes it easy to schedule reports to run at off-peak times to optimize +performance. +The IDM Tools are used to manage the Identity Manager solution. This includes functions to: + Analyze, enhance, and control all data stores throughout the enterprise + Design, deploy, and document the TOE + Manage Identity Manager and receive real-time health and status information +about the Identity Manager system + Define and maintain which authorizations are associated with which business roles +Log Manager: +The Log Manager, also known as Sentinel Log Manager for Identity Governance and +Administration (SLM for IGA), collects and acknowledges receipt of auditing data from all +aspects of the product. +OneSSO Provider: + June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST +NetIQ Corporation Page 10 of 36 +The OneSSO Provider, also known as OSP) is a single interface for access authentication. This +provider can handle user name / password, Kerberos, and SAML tokens. +Self Service Password Reset: +Self Service Password Reset (SSPR) allows users to enroll, update, and reset their passwords +without administrative intervention in the Identity Vault (IDV). +Note: that the components above can be installed on one or multiple distributed systems. Also, +the hardware, operating systems and third-party support software (e.g. DBMS) on each of the +systems are excluded from the TOE boundary. +TOE Delivery: +The TOE software is provided to customers via secure download from the download portal +(https://dl.netiq.com/index.jsp). The software is available as either a gnu zip (.gz), iso +formatted optical disk (.iso). zip (.zip) or dmg (if mac) depending on your destination platform. +Once downloaded, and extracted, the setup files can be executed to perform the installation. +Figure 2 – Sample Download List +TOE Environment +Virtual Machines +The following TOE components can be installed in virtual machines (VM). + Console / Administration Workstation (Identity Applications) + Identity Manager + Reporting Server + Sentinel Log Manager + One SSO Provider + Self Service Password Reset (SSPR) +The hardware and software requirements for the operational environment to support the VM +are listed in the table below: + June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST +NetIQ Corporation Page 11 of 36 +Category Console / +Administration +Workstation +(Identity +Applications3) +Identity +Manager +(Identity +Manager +Engine) +Reporting +Server +(Identity +Reporting +Module) +Log +Manager +(SLM for +Identity +Gov & +Adm) +SSO +Provider +(OneSSO +Provider) +Self Service +Password Reset +(SSPR) +Processor 2 CPU cores 2 CPU +cores +2 CPU +cores +4 to 8 CPU +cores +2 CPU +cores +2 CPU cores +Memory 8 GB 8 GB 8 GB 8 to 16 GB 8 GB 8 GB +Table 4 – Virtual Machine Environment Requirements +Hardware and Software Supplied by the IT Environment +The TOE consists of a set of software applications run on one or multiple distributed systems. +The TOE requires the following software components as part of the evaluated configuration: +Component Requirements +Administration Workstation Mozilla Firefox 65 +Identity Applications (RBPM) +Designer / Analyzer) +SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 SP4 +Identity Manager (Identity +Manager Engine) +SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 SP4 +Reporting Server (Identity +Reporting Module) +SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 SP4 +Log Manager (Sentinel Log +Management for Identity +Governance and +Administration) +SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 SP4 +SSO Provider (OneSSO +Provider) +SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 SP4 +Self Service Password Reset SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 SP4 +Table 5 – IT Environment Component Requirements +In addition to the platform requirements mentioned above, the following hardware resources +are needed in order to install and configure Identity Manager on each platform: + A minimum of 8 GB RAM + 15 GB available disk space to install all the components. + Additional disk space to configure and populate data. This might vary depending +on your connected systems and number of objects in the Identity Vault. +For server-based components, it is recommended that the platform have a minimum of 2 CPUs +or cores +Logical Boundary +This section outlines the boundaries of the security functionality of the TOE; the logical +boundary of the TOE includes the security functionality described in the following table: +3 +The system requirements also apply to the following components that you use with the identity applications: PostgreSQL, Tomcat, +NetIQ One SSO Provider (OSP), and NetIQ Self Service Password Reset. + June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST +NetIQ Corporation Page 12 of 36 +TSF DESCRIPTION +Security +Management +The TOE restricts the ability to enable, modify and disable security +policy rules and user roles to an authorized Administrator. The TOE +also provides the functions necessary for effective management of +the TOE security functions. Administrators configure the TOE with +the Management Console via Web-based connection. +Security Audit The TOE supports the provision of log data from each system +component, such as user login/logout and incident/ticket +management actions. It also records security events such as failed +login attempts, etc. Audit trails can be stored for later review and +analysis. +Cryptographic +Support +The TOE utilizes the OpenSSL cryptographic module to provide +support for HTTPS / TLS communications with administrators and +TOE components. +Identification and +Authentication +The TOE enforces individual I&A. Operators must successfully +authenticate using a unique identifier and password prior to +performing any actions on the TOE. +User Data +Protection +The TOE enforces discretionary access rules using an access control +list with user attributes. +Trusted Path / +Channels +The TOE utilizes HTTPS/TLS to provide trusted paths and inter-TSF +trusted channels. +Table 6 – Logical Boundary Descriptions +TOE Security Functional Policies +The TOE supports the following Security Functional Policy: +Discretionary Access Control SFP +The TOE implements an access control SFP named Discretionary Access Control SFP. This SFP +determines and enforces the privileges associated with operator roles. An authorized +administrator can define specific services available to administrators and users via the +Management Console. +TOE Vendor Documentation / Guidance +In addition to the documentation generated for the certification, the TOE includes the following +product and guidance documentation generated by NetIQ: + Quick Start Guide for Installing NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 February 2018 + NetIQ Identity Manager Setup Guide for Linux February 2018 + NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7, Operational User Guidance and Preparative Procedures +Supplement (AGD-IGS), version 0.6, is supplied for those customers that need +guidance on how to set the TOE in the evaluated configuration. +Features / Functionality NOT Included in the TOE +The following supported operating systems and software were not included in the evaluated +configuration: +Functions Requirements +Administration Workstation (Console) Web Browsers + June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST +NetIQ Corporation Page 13 of 36 +Functions Requirements + Internet Explorer 11 + Google Chrome +Identity Applications (Includes Designer / +Analyzer) +RHEL 7.5 +Windows Server 2016 +Identity Manager (Includes Identity Vault +and, iManager) +RHEL 7.5 +Windows Server 2016 +Reporting Server +(includes Identity Reporting Module) +RHEL 7.5 +Windows Server 2016 +Log Manager (includes Sentinel Log +Management for Identity Governance and +Administration) +RHEL 7.5 +One SSO Provider (uname / pass, Kerberos, +SAML) +RHEL 7.5 +Windows Server 2016 +Self Service Password Reset (SSPR) RHEL 7.5 +Windows Server 2016 +Table 7 – IT Environment Components - Not In TOE + June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST +NetIQ Corporation Page 14 of 36 +2. Conformance Claims +CC Conformance Claim +The TOE is Common Criteria Version 3.1 Revision 5 (April 2017) Part 2 conformant and Part 3 +conformant. +PP Claim +The TOE does not claim conformance to any registered Protection Profile. +Package Claim +The TOE claims conformance to the EAL3 assurance package defined in Part 3 of the Common +Criteria Version 3.1 Revision 5 (April 2017). The TOE does not claim conformance to any +functional package. The TOE EAL3 assurance package is augmented with ALC_FLR.2 +Conformance Rationale +No conformance rationale is necessary for this evaluation since this Security Target does not +claim conformance to a Protection Profile. + June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST +NetIQ Corporation Page 15 of 36 +3. Security Problem Definition +In order to clarify the nature of the security problem that the TOE is intended to solve, this +section describes the following: + Any known or assumed threats to the assets against which specific protection within the TOE or +its environment is required + Any organizational security policy statements or rules with which the TOE must comply + Any assumptions about the security aspects of the environment and/or of the manner in which +the TOE is intended to be used. +This chapter identifies assumptions as A.assumption, threats as T.threat and policies as P.policy. +Threats +The following are threats identified for the TOE and the IT System (or operating environment) +the TOE monitors. The TOE itself has threats and the TOE is also responsible for addressing +threats to the environment in which it resides. The assumed level of expertise of the attacker +for all threats is unsophisticated. +The TOE addresses the following threats: +THREAT DESCRIPTION +T.NO_AUTH An unauthorized user may gain access to the TOE and alter the +TOE configuration. +T.NO_PRIV An authorized user of the TOE exceeds his/her assigned +security privileges resulting in unauthorized modification of the +TOE configuration and/or data. +T.USER_ACCESS_DENY An authorized user may be able to change user authentication data +and or user access policies and deny their access to it later. +T.PASSWD_COMPROMISE An unauthorized user may be able to obtain and use user +passwords. +T.PROT_TRANS An unauthorized user may be able to gather information from +communications between components. +Table 8 – Threats Addressed by the TOE +Organizational Security Policies +The TOE meets the following organizational security policies: +ASSUMPTION DESCRIPTION +P.REMOTE_DATA Passwords and account information from network-attached systems +shall be monitored and managed. +Table 9 – Organizational Security Policies +Assumptions +The TOE is assured to provide effective security measures in a co-operative non-hostile +environment only if it is installed, managed, and used correctly. The following specific +conditions are assumed to exist in an environment where the TOE is employed. + June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST +NetIQ Corporation Page 16 of 36 +ASSUMPTION DESCRIPTION +A.MANAGE Administrators of the TOE are assumed to be appropriately trained to +undertake the installation, configuration and management of the TOE +in a secure and trusted manner. +A.NOEVIL Administrators of the TOE and users on the local area network are not +careless, willfully negligent, nor hostile, and will follow and abide by the +instructions provided by the TOE documentation +A.LOCATE The processing platforms on which the TOE resides are assumed to be +located within a facility that provides controlled access +A.CONFIG The TOE is configured to receive all passwords and associated data +from network-attached systems. +A.TIMESOURCE The TOE has a trusted source for system time via NTP server +Table 10 – Assumptions + June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST +NetIQ Corporation Page 17 of 36 +4. Security Objectives +Security Objectives for the TOE +The IT security objectives for the TOE are addressed below: +OBJECTIVE DESCRIPTION +O.MANAGE_DATA The TOE shall provide a means to manage secrets and data associated +with remote IT systems. +O.MANAGE_POLICY The TOE shall provide a workflow to manage authentication and access +control policies. +O.SEC_ACCESS The TOE shall ensure that only those authorized users and applications +are granted access to security functions and associated data. +O.PASSWD_PROT The TOE shall provide cryptographic mechanisms to protect passwords +via cryptographic processes including the ability to generate and destroy +keys. +O.TRANS_PROT The TOE shall provide mechanisms to protect data that is in transit +between elements within the TOE. +Table 11 – TOE Security Objectives +Security Objectives for the Operational Environment +The security objectives for the operational environment are addressed below: +OBJECTIVE DESCRIPTION +OE.TIME The TOE operating environment shall provide an accurate timestamp +(via reliable NTP server). +OE.ENV_PROTECT The TOE operating environment shall provide mechanisms to isolate the +TOE Security Functions (TSF) and assure that TSF components cannot +be tampered with or bypassed +OE.PERSONNEL Authorized administrators are non-hostile and follow all administrator +guidance and must ensure that the TOE is delivered, installed, managed, +and operated in a manner that maintains the TOE security objectives. +Any operator of the TOE must be trusted not to disclose their +authentication credentials to any individual not authorized for access to +the TOE. +OE.PHYSEC The facility surrounding the processing platform in which the TOE +resides must provide a controlled means of access into the facility +Table 12 – Operational Environment Security Objectives +Security Objectives Rationale + June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST +NetIQ Corporation Page 18 of 36 +This section provides the summary that all security objectives are traced back to aspects of the +addressed assumptions, threats, and Organizational Security Policies. +OBJECTIVES THREATS/ +ASSUMPTIONS/ POLICIES +O.MANAGE_DATA +O.MANAGE_POLICY +O.SEC_ACCESS +O.PASSWD_PROT +O.TRANS_PROT +OE.TIME +OE.ENV_PROTECT +OE.PERSONNEL +OE.PHYSEC +A.CONFIG    +A.MANAGE  +A.NOEVIL  +A.LOCATE  +A.TIMESOURCE  +T.NO_AUTH  +T.NO_PRIV  +T.USER_ACCESS_DENY  +T.PASSWD_COMPROMISE  +T.PROT_TRANS  +P. REMOTE_DATA  +Table 13 – Mapping of Assumptions, Threats, Policies and ORSP s to Security Objectives +Mapping of Objectives +ASSUMPTION /THREAT/ +POLICY +RATIONALE +A.CONFIG This assumption is addressed by + OE.ENV_PROTECT, which ensures that TSF components +cannot be tampered with or bypassed + OE.PERSONNEL, which ensures that the TOE is managed +and administered by in a secure manner by a competent +and security aware personnel in accordance with the +administrator documentation. This objective also ensures +that those responsible for the TOE install, manage, and +operate the TOE in a secure manner + OE.PHYSEC, which ensures that the facility surrounding the +processing platform in which the TOE resides provides a +controlled means of access into the facility + June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST +NetIQ Corporation Page 19 of 36 +ASSUMPTION /THREAT/ +POLICY +RATIONALE +A.MANAGE This assumption is addressed by + OE.PERSONNEL, which ensures that the TOE is managed +and administered by in a secure manner by a competent +and security aware personnel in accordance with the +administrator documentation. This objective also ensures +that those responsible for the TOE install, manage, and +operate the TOE in a secure manner +A.NOEVIL This assumption is addressed by OE.PERSONNEL, which ensures +that the TOE is managed and administered by in a secure manner +by a competent and security aware personnel in accordance with +the administrator documentation. This objective also ensures +that those responsible for the TOE install, manage, and operate +the TOE in a secure manner +A.LOCATE This assumption is addressed by OE.PHYSEC which ensures that +the facility surrounding the processing platform in which the +TOE resides provides a controlled means of access into the +facility +A.TIMESOURCE This assumption is addressed by OE.TIME, which ensures the +provision of an accurate time source. +T.NO_AUTH This threat is countered by the following: + O.SEC_ACCESS, which ensures that the TOE allows access to +the security functions, configuration, and associated data +only by authorized users and applications +T.NO_PRIV This threat is countered by O.SEC_ACCESS, which ensures that +the TOE allows access to the security functions, configuration, +and associated data only by authorized users and applications. +T.PASSWD_COMPROMISE This threat is countered by O.PASSWD_PROT, which ensures +the passwords are not in the clear and cannot be exposed to un +authorized users for use. +T.PROT_TRANS This threat is countered by O.TRANS_PROT, which protects data +that is in transit between elements within the TOE. +P.REMOTE_DATA This organizational security policy is enforced by + O.MANAGE_DATA, which ensures that the TOE provide a +means to manage secrets and data associated with remote +IT systems. +T.USER_ACCESS_DENY This threat is countered by O.MANAGE_POLICY which ensures +that the TOE provides a workflow to manage authentication and +access control policies. +Table 14 – Mapping of Threats, Policies, and Assumptions to Objectives + June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST +NetIQ Corporation Page 20 of 36 +5. Extended Components Definition +This Security Target does include any extended components. + June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST +NetIQ Corporation Page 21 of 36 +6. Security Requirements +The security requirements that are levied on the TOE and the IT environment are specified in +this section of the ST. +Security Functional Requirements +The functional security requirements for this Security Target consist of the following +components from Part 2 of the CC, which are summarized in the following table: +CLASS HEADING CLASS_FAMILY DESCRIPTION +Security Audit +FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation +FAU_SAR.1 Audit Review +Cryptographic Support FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation +FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction +FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation +User Data Protection +FDP_ACC.1 Subset Access Control +FDP_ACF.1 Security Attribute Based Access Control +Identification and +Authentication +FIA_ATD.1 User Attribute Definition +FIA_UID.2 User Identification before Any Action +FIA_UAU.2 User Authentication before Any Action +Security Management +FMT_MSA.1 Management of Security Attributes +FMT_MSA.2 Secure Security Attributes +FMT_MSA.3 Static Attribute Initialization +FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF Data +FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions +FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles +Protection of the TSF FPT_TDC.1 Inter-TSF basic TSF data consistency +Trusted Path / Channels +FTP_ITC.1 Trusted Channel +FTP_TRP.1 Trusted Path +Table 15 – TOE Security Functional Requirements +Security Audit (FAU) +FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation +FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following +auditable events: +a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions; +b) All auditable events for the [not specified] level of audit; and +c) [User login/logout and; +d) Login failures;] + June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST +NetIQ Corporation Page 22 of 36 +FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following +information: +a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if +applicable), and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; +and +b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event +definitions of the functional components included in the PP/ST, +[no other audit relevant information]. +FAU_SAR.1 Audit Review +FAU_SAR.1.1 The TSF shall provide [the Administrator] with the capability to read +[all audit data generated within the TOE] from the audit records. +FAU_SAR.1.2 The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the +user to interpret the information. +Cryptographic Support +FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation +FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a +specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [cryptographic key +generation algorithm in Table 16] and specified cryptographic key +sizes [cryptographic key sizes in Table 16] that meet the following: [list +of standards in Table 16]. +Usage Key Generation Algorithm Key Size (bits), Elliptical Curves Standard +RSA RSA Key Generation 2048 FIPS 186-4 +AES Deterministic Random Bit +Generator (DRBG) +128, 256 SP 800-90A +Diffie-Hellman Diffie-Hellman Key +Generation +1024, 2048 FIPS 186-4 +Table 16 – Cryptographic Standards +FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction +FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a +specified cryptographic key destruction method [zeroize] that meets +the following: [FIPS 140-2]. +FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation (Encryption / Decryption) +FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operations in Table 17] in +accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic +algorithm in Table 17] and cryptographic key sizes [cryptographic key +sizes in Table 17] that meet the following: [list of standards in Table +17]. + June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST +NetIQ Corporation Page 23 of 36 +Application Note: AES in CBC mode is used for encrypting/decrypting +data in support of TLS. +Operation Algorithm Key Size, Curve or +Digest +Standard +Encryption and +Decryption in support of +TLS +AES (Advanced +Encryption +Standard) +128, 256 FIPS PUB +197 +Key agreement in +support TLS +Key Agreement +Schemes (KAS) and +Key Confirmation +P-256, P384, P521 SP800- +56A +Authentication algorithm +in support of TLS +ECDSA (Elliptic +Curve Digital +Signature +Algorithm) +P-256, P384, P521 FIPS 186-4 +Secure Hashing in +support of TLS +Secure Hash +Algorithm (SHA) +160 (SHA-1) +256 (SHA-256) +384 (SHA-384) +FIPS PUB +180-4 +Message Authentication +in support of TLS +Keyed-Hash +Message +Authentication Code +(HMAC) +160 (HMAC-SHA1) 256 +(HMAC-SHA2-256) 384 +(HMAC-SHA2-384) +FIPS 198-1 +Asymmetric +cryptography in support +of TLS +Rivest, Shamir, +Adleman (RSA) +2048 FIPS 186-4 +Table 17 – Cryptographic Operations +Information Flow Control (FDP) +FDP_ACC.1 Subset Access Control +FDP_ACC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Discretionary Access Control SFP] on [ +Subjects: All users +Objects: System reports, component audit logs, TOE configuration, +operator account attributes +Operations: all user actions] +FDP_ACF.1 Security Attribute Based Access Control +FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Discretionary Access Control SFP]to objects +based on the following: [ +Subjects: All users +Objects: System reports, component audit logs, TOE configuration, +operator account attributes +Operations: all user actions] +FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation +among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: [if the + June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST +NetIQ Corporation Page 24 of 36 +ACL identifies the user or a group of users that contains the user +requesting access for the type of resource that the user is requesting, +and the user (or group of users) has the specific rights required for the +type of operation requested on the object then the user is granted +access]. +FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based +on the following additional rules: [password restrictions, login +restrictions, time based access controls, ip access controls, intruder +lockout]. +FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the +following additional rules [ password restrictions, login restrictions, +time based access controls, ip access controls, intruder lockout] +Identification and Authentication (FIA) +FIA_ATD.1 – User Attribute Definition +FIA_ATD.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes +belonging to individual users: [User Identity, Authentication Status, +and Privilege Level]. +FIA_UAU.2 User Authentication before Any Action +FIA_UAU.2.1 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated +before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user. +FIA_UID.2 User Identification before Any Action +FIA_UID.2.1 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before +allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user. +Security Management (FMT) +FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes +FMT_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Discretionary Access Control SFP] to +restrict the ability to [query, modify, delete] the security attributes +[Accounts, privileges, ACLs] to [Administrator]. +FMT_MSA.2 Secure Security Attributes +FMT_MSA.2.1 The TSF shall ensure that only secure values are accepted for +[security attributes listed with Discretionary Access Control SFP]. +FMT_MSA.3 Static Attribute Initialization +FMT_MSA.3.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Discretionary Access Control SFP] to +provide [restrictive] default values for security attributes that are +used to enforce the SFP. + June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST +NetIQ Corporation Page 25 of 36 +FMT_MSA.3.2 The TSF shall allow the [Administrator] to specify alternative initial +values to override the default values when an object or information +is created. +FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF Data +FMT_MTD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to [control] the [data described in the +table below] to [Administrator]: +DATA CHANGE QUERY MODIFY DELETE CLEAR +Discretionary +Access Control SFP +     +User Account +Attributes +  +Audit Logs  +Date/Time  +Table 18 – Management of TSF data +FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions +FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management +functions: [ +a) Create accounts +b) Modify accounts +c) Define privilege levels Change Default, +Query, Modify, Delete, Clear the attributes +associated with the Discretionary Access +Control SFP +d) Modify the behavior of the Discretionary +Access Control SFP +e) Manage ACLs]. +FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles +FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles [Administrator, User]. +FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles. +Protection of the TSF (FPT) +FPT_TDC.1 Inter-TSF Basic TSF Data Consistency +FPT_TDC.1.1 The TSF shall provide the capability to consistently interpret [secrets +(passwords)] when shared between the TSF and another trusted IT +product. +FPT_TDC.1.2 The TSF shall use [the secret with the newest associated timestamp] +when interpreting the TSF data from another trusted IT product. + June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST +NetIQ Corporation Page 26 of 36 +Trusted Path / Channel (FTP) +FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel +FTP_ITC.1.1 The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and +[another trusted IT product] that is logically distinct from other +communication channels and provides assured identification of its end +points and protection of the channel data from [modification or +disclosure]. +FTP_ITC.1.2 The TSF shall permit [the TSF] to initiate communication via the +trusted channel. +FTP_ITC.1.3 The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for +[HTTPS/TLS connections + for communications labeled 1 – 12 in Figure 1] +Application Note: The TOE supports TLS v1.1 and 1.2 as configured by +the Administrator. +Application Note: Crypto as claimed in FCS_COP_1 is used to support +TLS. +FTP_TRP.1 Trusted Path +FTP_TRP.1.1 The TSF shall provide a communication path between itself and [local] +users that is logically distinct from other communication paths and +provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the +communicated data from [disclosure]. +FTP_TRP.1.2 The TSF shall permit [the TSF] to initiate communication via the +trusted path. +FTP_TRP.1.3 The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for [key requests, and +encryption operations + for communications labeled A, B, and C in Figure 1] +Security Assurance Requirements +The Security Assurance Requirements for this evaluation are listed in Section 6.3.4 – Security +Assurance Requirements. +Security Requirements Rationale +Security Functional Requirements +The following table provides the correspondence mapping between security objectives and the +requirements that satisfy them. + June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST +NetIQ Corporation Page 27 of 36 +OBJECTIVE +SFR +O.MANAGE_DATA +O.MANAGE_POLICY +O.SEC_ACCESS +O.PASSWD_PROT +O.TRANS_PROT +FAU_GEN.1  +FAU_SAR.1  +FCS_CKM.1  +FCS_CKM.4  +FCS_COP.1  +FDP_ACC.1  +FDP_ACF.1  +FIA_ATD.1  +FIA_UID.2  +FIA_UAU.2  +FMT_MSA.1  +FMT_MSA.2  +FMT_MSA.3  +FMT_MTD.1  +FMT_SMF.1  +FMT_SMR.1  +FPT_TDC.1  +FTP_ITC.1  +FTP_TRP.1  +Table 19 – Mapping of TOE Security Functional Requirements and Objectives +Dependency Rationale +This ST satisfies all the security functional requirement dependencies of the Common Criteria. +The table below lists each SFR to which the TOE claims conformance with a dependency and +indicates whether the dependent requirement was included. As the table indicates, all +dependencies have been met. +SFR CLAIM DEPENDENCIES DEPENDENCY MET RATIONALE +FAU_GEN.1 FPT_STM.1 YES +Satisfied by the Operational +Environment (OE.TIME) +FAU_SAR.1 +FAU_GEN.1 +FPT_STM.1 +YES +FPT_STM.1 satisfied by the +Operational Environment +(OE.TIME) + June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST +NetIQ Corporation Page 28 of 36 +SFR CLAIM DEPENDENCIES DEPENDENCY MET RATIONALE +FCS_CKM.1 +FCS_CKM.1 or +FCS_COP.1 and +FCS_CKM.4 +YES +Satisfied by FCS_COP.1 and +FCS_CKM.4 +FCS_CKM.4 FTP_ITC.1 or +FTP_ITC.2 or +FCS_CKM.1 +YES Satisfied by FCS_CKM.1 for AES +FCS_COP.1 FTP_ITC.1 or +FTP_ITC.2 or +FCS_CKM.1 and +FCS_CKM.4 +YES Satisfied by FCS_CKM.1 and +FCS_CKM.4 +FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACF.1 YES +FDP_ACF.1 +FDP_ACC.1 +FMT_MSA.3 +YES +FIA_ATD.1 N/A N/A +FIA_UID.2 N/A N/A +FMT_MSA.1 +FDP_ACC.1 +FMT_SMF.1 +FMT_SMR.1 +YES +FMT_MSA.2 +FDP_ACC.1 +FMT_MSA.1 +FMT_SMR.1 +YES +FMT_MSA.3 +FMT_MSA.1 +FMT_SMR.1 +YES +FMT_MTD.1 +FMT_SMF.1 +FMT_SMR.1 +YES +FMT_SMF.1 N/A N/A +FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1 YES +Although FIA_UID.1 is not +included, FIA_UID.2, which is +hierarchical to FIA_UID.1 is +included. This satisfies this +dependency. +FPT_TDC.1 N/A N/A +FTP_ITC.1 N/A N/A +FTP_TRP.1 N/A N/A +Table 20 – Mapping of SFR to Dependencies and Rationales +Sufficiency of Security Requirements +The following table presents a mapping of the rationale of TOE Security Requirements to +Objectives. + June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST +NetIQ Corporation Page 29 of 36 +OBJECTIVE RATIONALE +O.MANAGE_DATA The objective to ensure that the TOE will collect events from security +products and non-security products deployed within a network and +applies analytical processes to derive conclusions about the events is +met by the following security requirements: + FPT_TDC.1 ensures that the TOE provides consistency between +passwords used on remote IT systems and those +stored/managed within the TOE. +O.MANAGE_POLICY The objective to ensure that the TOE provides a workflow to manage +authentication and access control policies is met by the following +security requirements: + FAU_GEN.1 and FAU_SAR.1 define the auditing capability for +incidents and administrative access control and requires that +authorized users will have the capability to read and interpret +data stored in the audit logs + FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1 support the security functions +relevant to the TOE and ensure the definition of an authorized +administrator role +O.SEC_ACCESS This objective ensures that the TOE allows access to the security +functions, configuration, and associated data only by authorized users +and applications. + FDP_ACC.1 requires that all user actions resulting in the access +to TOE security functions and configuration data are controlled + FDP_ACF.1 supports FDP_ACC.1 by ensuring that access to TOE +security functions, configuration data, audit logs, and account +attributes is based on the user privilege level and their +allowable actions + FIA_UID.2 requires the TOE to enforce identification of all users +prior to configuration of the TOE + FIA_UAU.2 requires the TOE to enforce authentication of all +users prior to configuration of the TOE + FIA_ATD.1 specifies security attributes for users of the TOE + FMT_MTD.1 restricts the ability to query, add or modify TSF +data to authorized users. + FMT_MSA.1 specifies that only privileged administrators can +access the TOE security functions and related configuration +data. + FMT_MSA.2 specifies that only secure values are accepted for +security attributes listed with access control policies. + FMT_MSA.3 ensures that the default values of security +attributes are restrictive in nature as to enforce the access +control policy for the TOE + FTP_ITC.1 specifies that the trusted channel exists for components +HTTPS/TLS. + FTP_TRP.1 specifies that the trusted path exists for components +HTTPS/TLS. + June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST +NetIQ Corporation Page 30 of 36 +OBJECTIVE RATIONALE +O.PASSWD_PROT This objective ensures that the TOE provides cryptographic +mechanisms to generate and destroy keys. This objective is met by: +FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM. 4, and FCS_COP.1 which provide the +cryptographic support functions for secure communications within the +TOE and with external IT entities. +O.TRANS_PROT This objective ensures that the TOE protects data in transit between +elements within the TOE. This objective is met by FTP_ITC (which +specifies that the trusted channel exists for components) and FTP_TRP +(which ensures that the trusted path exists for components). +Table 21 – Rationale for TOE SFRs to Objectives +Security Assurance Requirements +The assurance security requirements for this Security Target are taken from Part 3 of the CC. +These assurance requirements compose an Evaluation Assurance Level 3 (EAL3). The assurance +components are summarized in the following table: +CLASS HEADING CLASS_FAMILY DESCRIPTION +ADV: Development +ADV_ARC.1 Security Architecture Description +ADV_FSP.3 +Functional Specification with Complete +Summary +ADV_TDS.2 Architectural Design +AGD: Guidance +Documents +AGD_OPE.1 Operational User Guidance +AGD_PRE.1 Preparative Procedures +ALC: Lifecycle Support +ALC_CMC.3 Authorization Controls +ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage +ALC_DEL.1 Delivery Procedures +ALC_DVS.1 Identification of Security Measures +ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model +ALC_FLR.2 Flaw Reporting Procedures +ATE: Tests +ATE_COV.2 Analysis of Coverage +ATE_DPT.1 Testing: Basic Design +ATE_FUN.1 Functional Testing +ATE_IND.2 Independent Testing - Sample +AVA: Vulnerability +Assessment +AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability Analysis +Table 22 – Security Assurance Requirements at EAL3 +Security Assurance Requirements Rationale +The ST specifies Evaluation Assurance Level 3. EAL3 was chosen because it is based upon good +commercial development practices with thorough functional testing. EAL3 provides the +developers and users a moderate level of independently assured security in conventional +commercial TOEs. The threat of malicious attacks is not greater than low, the security +environment provides physical protection, and the TOE itself offers a very limited interface, + June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST +NetIQ Corporation Page 31 of 36 +offering essentially no opportunity for an attacker to subvert the security policies without +physical access. The product was augmented to comply with ALC_FLR.2 in order to document +and address requirements for remediation and reporting of faults that may be discovered in the +product after release. +Security Assurance Requirements Evidence +This section identifies the measures applied to satisfy CC assurance requirements. +SECURITY ASSURANCE +REQUIREMENT +EVIDENCE TITLE +ADV_ARC.1 Security Architecture +Description +NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 +Security Architecture (ADV_ARC) +ADV_FSP.3 Functional Specification +with Complete Summary +NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 +Functional Specification (ADV_FSP) +ADV_TDS.2 Architectural Design +NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 +Architectural Design (IDM TDS) +AGD_OPE.1 Operational User +Guidance4 +NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 +Operational User Guidance and Preparative +Procedures Supplement (AGD-IGS) +AGD_PRE.1Preparative Procedures +NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 +Operational User Guidance and Preparative +Procedures Supplement (AGD-IGS) +ALC_CMC.3 Authorization Controls +NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 +Configuration Management Processes and +Procedures (ALC_CM) +ALC_CMS.3 Implementation +representation CM coverage +NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 +Configuration Management Processes and +Procedures (ALC_CM) +ALC_DEL.1 Delivery Procedures +NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 +Secure Delivery Processes and Procedures +(ALC_DEL) +ALC_DVS.1 Identification of Security +Measures +NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 +Development Security Measures (ALC_DVS) +ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life- +cycle model +NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 +Life Cycle Development Process (ALC_LCD) +ALC_FLR.2: Flaw Remediation +Procedures +NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 +Flaw reporting Procedures (ALC_FLR) +ATE_COV.2 Analysis of Coverage +NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 +Test Plan and Coverage Analysis (ATE) +ATE_DPT.1 Testing: Basic Design +NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 +Test Plan and Coverage Analysis (ATE) +4 +Additional documents can be found in Appendix A + June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST +NetIQ Corporation Page 32 of 36 +SECURITY ASSURANCE +REQUIREMENT +EVIDENCE TITLE +ATE_FUN.1Functional Testing +NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 +Test Plan and Coverage Analysis (ATE) +Table 23 – Security Assurance Rationale and Measures + June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST +NetIQ Corporation Page 33 of 36 +7. TOE Summary Specification +This section presents the Security Functions implemented by the TOE. +TOE Security Functions +The security functions performed by the TOE are as follows: + Security Management + Security Audit + Identification and Authentication + User Data Protection + Trusted Path / Channels + Cryptographic Support +Security Audit +The TOE generates the following audit data: + Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions (instantiated by startup of the TOE) + User login/logout + Login failures +The TOE provides the Administrator with the capability to read all audit data generated within +the TOE via the console. The GUI provides a suitable means for an Administrator to interpret the +information from the audit log. +The A.TIMESOURCE is added to the assumptions on operational environment, and OE.TIME is +added to the operational environment security objectives. The time and date provided by the +operational environment are used to form the timestamps. The TOE ensures that the audit trail +data is stamped when recorded with a dependable date and time received from the OE +(operating system). In this manner, accurate time and date is maintained on the TOE. +The Security Audit function is designed to satisfy the following security functional requirements: + FAU_GEN.1 + FAU_SAR.1 +Identification and Authentication +The IDM console application provides user interfaces that administrators may use to manage +TOE functions. The operating system and the database in the TOE Environment are queried to +individually authenticate administrators or users. The TOE maintains authorization information +that determines which TOE functions an authenticated administrators or users (of a given role) +may perform. +The TOE maintains the following list of security attributes belonging to individual users: + User Identity (i.e., user name) + Authentication Status (whether the IT Environment validated the username/password) + Privilege Level (Administrator or User) +The Identification and Authentication function is designed to satisfy the following security +functional requirements: + FIA_ATD.1 + FIA_UAU.2 + FIA_UID.2 +User Data Protection + June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST +NetIQ Corporation Page 34 of 36 +The TOE implements a discretionary access control policy to define what roles can access +particular functions of the TOE. All access and actions for system reports, component audit logs, +TOE configuration, operator account attributes (defined in FIA_ATD.1) are protected via access +control list. When a user requests to perform an action on an object, the TOE verifies the role +associated with the user name. Access is granted if the user (or group of users) has the specific +rights required for the type of operation requested on the object. +Identity Manager can enforce password policies on incoming passwords from connected +systems and on passwords set or changed through the User Application password self-service. +If the new password does not comply, you can specify that Identity Manager not accept the +password. This also means that passwords that don't comply with your policies are not +distributed to other connected systems. +In addition, can enforce password policies on connected systems. If the password being +published to the Identity Vault does not comply with rules in a policy, you can specify that +Identity Manager not only does not accept the password for distribution, but actually resets the +noncompliant password on the connected system by using the current Distribution password in +the Identity Vault. +The User Data Protection function is designed to satisfy the following security functional +requirements: + FDP_ACC.1 + FDP_ACF.1 + FPT_TDC.1 +Security Management +The TOE maintains the operator roles described in the following table. The individual roles are +categorized into two main roles: the Administrator and the User. +ROLE MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS +Administrator A user who has rights to configure and manage all aspects of the TOE +User The user’s capabilities can be configured to: +View hierarchical relationships between User objects +View and edit user information (with appropriate rights). +Search for users or resources using advanced search criteria +(which can be saved for later reuse). +Recover forgotten passwords. +Table 24 – Roles and Functions +Only an Administrator can determine the behavior of, disable, enable, and modify the behavior +of the functions that implement the Discretionary Access Control SFP. The TPE ensures only +secure values are accepted for the security attributes listed with Discretionary Access Control +SFP. +The Security Management function is designed to satisfy the following security functional +requirements: + FMT_MTD.1 + FMT_MSA.1 + FMT_MSA.2 + FMT_MSA.3 + FMT_SMF.1 + FMT_SMR.1 + June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST +NetIQ Corporation Page 35 of 36 +Trusted Path / Channels +The Trusted Path/Channels function is designed to satisfy the following security functional +requirements: + FTP_ITC.1 – the TOE supports establishment of trusted channels for communicating +TOE entities using HTTPS. + FTP_TRP.1 – the TOE provides a trusted path for TOE Users, using HTTPS +Trusted Channel +The TOE provides a trusted channel between the TOE and external web servers. +Trusted channels are implemented using HTTPS. The TOE supports TLS v1.1 and TLS v1.2. The +TOE supports the following TLS cipher suites, as defined in RFC 2246, RFC 4346 and RFC 5246: + TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_ CBC_SHA + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 +Trusted Path: +The TOE provides a trusted path for TOE administrators and TOE users to communicate with +the TOE. The trusted path is implemented using HTTPS. The TOE’s implementation of TLS is +described in the previous section (Trusted Channel). +Cryptographic Support +Cryptographic protection of data in transit between the TOE and remote users, and between +the TOE and external web servers is provided by the OpenSSL FIPS Object Module software +version 2.0.10 (Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) certificate number 1747) +libraries. +The following table identifies the CAVP algorithm certificates. +Operation Algorithm CAVP Certificate +Encryption and Decryption in +support of TLS +AES (Advanced Encryption +Standard) +AES 3264 +Key Generation in support of +TLS +DRBG (Deterministic +Random Bit Generation) +DRBG 723 +Key agreement in support of +TLS +Key Agreement Schemes +(KAS) and Key Confirmation +CVL 472 +Keyed-Hash Message +Authentication in support of +TLS +HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA2- +256, HMAC-SHA2-384 +HMAC 2063 +Secure Hash in support of TLS SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384 SHS 2702 + June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST +NetIQ Corporation Page 36 of 36 +Asymmetric cryptography in +support of TLS +RSA RSA 1664 +Authentication algorithm in +support of TLS +ECDSA ECDSA 620 +Table 25 – CAVP +The Cryptographic Support function is designed to satisfy the following security functional +requirements: + FCS_CKM.1 + FCS_CKM.4 + FCS_COP.1 + \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/data/test_cc_oop/target_869415cc4b91282e.txt b/tests/data/test_cc_oop/target_869415cc4b91282e.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 9435c203..00000000 --- a/tests/data/test_cc_oop/target_869415cc4b91282e.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1497 +0,0 @@ -NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 -Security Target (ST) -Date: June 1, 2020 -Version: 2.6 -Prepared By: NetIQ Corporation -Prepared For: NetIQ Corporation -515 Post Oak Blvd -Suite 1200 -Houston, Texas 77027 -Abstract -This document provides the basis for an evaluation of a specific Target of Evaluation (TOE), Identity -Manager 4.7. This Security Target (ST) defines a set of assumptions about the aspects of the environment, -a list of threats that the product intends to counter, a set of security objectives, a set of security requirements -and the IT security functions provided by the TOE which meet the set of requirements. - June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST -NetIQ Corporation Page 2 of 36 -Table of Contents -Table of Contents...................................................................................................................................2 -List of Tables.........................................................................................................................................3 -List of Figures........................................................................................................................................4 -1. Introduction ...........................................................................................................................................5 -Security Target Reference:............................................................................................................5 -TOE Reference..............................................................................................................................5 -Document Organization................................................................................................................5 -Document Conventions.................................................................................................................6 -Document Terminology................................................................................................................6 -TOE Overview..............................................................................................................................7 -TOE Description...........................................................................................................................8 -Administration Workstation (Console):........................................................................................8 -Identity Applications (RBPM)......................................................................................................8 -Identity Manager:..........................................................................................................................9 -Reporting Server:..........................................................................................................................9 -Log Manager:................................................................................................................................9 -OneSSO Provider:.........................................................................................................................9 -Self Service Password Reset:......................................................................................................10 -TOE Delivery:.............................................................................................................................10 -TOE Environment.......................................................................................................................10 -Virtual Machines.........................................................................................................................10 -Hardware and Software Supplied by the IT Environment..........................................................11 -Logical Boundary........................................................................................................................11 -TOE Security Functional Policies...............................................................................................12 -Discretionary Access Control SFP..............................................................................................12 -TOE Vendor Documentation / Guidance....................................................................................12 -Features / Functionality NOT Included in the TOE....................................................................12 -2. Conformance Claims ...........................................................................................................................14 -CC Conformance Claim..............................................................................................................14 -PP Claim .....................................................................................................................................14 -Package Claim ............................................................................................................................14 -Conformance Rationale...............................................................................................................14 -3. Security Problem Definition................................................................................................................15 -Threats.........................................................................................................................................15 -Organizational Security Policies.................................................................................................15 -Assumptions................................................................................................................................15 -4. Security Objectives..............................................................................................................................17 -Security Objectives for the TOE.................................................................................................17 -Security Objectives for the Operational Environment................................................................17 -Security Objectives Rationale.....................................................................................................17 -Mapping of Objectives................................................................................................................18 -5. Extended Components Definition........................................................................................................20 -6. Security Requirements.........................................................................................................................21 -Security Functional Requirements..............................................................................................21 -Security Audit (FAU) .................................................................................................................21 -FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation..........................................................................................21 -FAU_SAR.1 Audit Review.........................................................................................................22 - June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST -NetIQ Corporation Page 3 of 36 -Cryptographic Support................................................................................................................22 -FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation...............................................................................22 -FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction..............................................................................22 -FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation (Encryption / Decryption) ..............................................22 -Information Flow Control (FDP) ................................................................................................23 -FDP_ACC.1 Subset Access Control...........................................................................................23 -FDP_ACF.1 Security Attribute Based Access Control...............................................................23 -Identification and Authentication (FIA) .....................................................................................24 -FIA_ATD.1 User Attribute Definition.....................................................................................24 -FIA_UAU.2 User Authentication before Any Action ................................................................24 -FIA_UID.2 User Identification before Any Action....................................................................24 -Security Management (FMT)......................................................................................................24 -FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes .......................................................................24 -FMT_MSA.2 Secure Security Attributes....................................................................................24 -FMT_MSA.3 Static Attribute Initialization................................................................................24 -FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF Data....................................................................................25 -FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions ..............................................................25 -FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles.......................................................................................................25 -Protection of the TSF (FPT)........................................................................................................25 -FPT_TDC.1 Inter-TSF Basic TSF Data Consistency .................................................................25 -Trusted Path / Channel (FTP) .....................................................................................................26 -FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel ........................................................................................26 -FTP_TRP.1 Trusted Path............................................................................................................26 -Security Assurance Requirements ..............................................................................................26 -Security Requirements Rationale................................................................................................26 -Security Functional Requirements..............................................................................................26 -Dependency Rationale ................................................................................................................27 -Sufficiency of Security Requirements ........................................................................................28 -Security Assurance Requirements ..............................................................................................30 -Security Assurance Requirements Rationale ..............................................................................30 -Security Assurance Requirements Evidence...............................................................................31 -7. TOE Summary Specification...............................................................................................................33 -TOE Security Functions..............................................................................................................33 -Security Audit.............................................................................................................................33 -Identification and Authentication................................................................................................33 -User Data Protection...................................................................................................................33 -Security Management .................................................................................................................34 -Trusted Path / Channels ..............................................................................................................35 -Trusted Channel..........................................................................................................................35 -Trusted Path:...............................................................................................................................35 -Cryptographic Support................................................................................................................35 -List of Tables -Table 1 ST Organization and Section Descriptions...................................................................................6 -Table 2 Acronyms Used in Security Target...............................................................................................7 -Table 3 CAVP Certificate Numbers ..........................................................................................................9 -Table 4 Virtual Machine Environment Requirements .............................................................................11 -Table 5 IT Environment Component Requirements................................................................................11 -Table 6 Logical Boundary Descriptions ..................................................................................................12 -Table 7 IT Environment Components - Not In TOE ...............................................................................13 - June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST -NetIQ Corporation Page 4 of 36 -Table 8 Threats Addressed by the TOE...................................................................................................15 -Table 9 Organizational Security Policies.................................................................................................15 -Table 10 Assumptions..............................................................................................................................16 -Table 11 TOE Security Objectives ..........................................................................................................17 -Table 12 Operational Environment Security Objectives .........................................................................17 -Table 13 Mapping of Assumptions, Threats, Policies and ORSP s to Security Objectives.....................18 -Table 14 Mapping of Threats, Policies, and Assumptions to Objectives ................................................19 -Table 15 TOE Security Functional Requirements ...................................................................................21 -Table 16 Cryptographic Standards...........................................................................................................22 -Table 17 Cryptographic Operations.........................................................................................................23 -Table 18 Management of TSF data..........................................................................................................25 -Table 19 Mapping of TOE Security Functional Requirements and Objectives.......................................27 -Table 20 Mapping of SFR to Dependencies and Rationales....................................................................28 -Table 20 Rationale for TOE SFRs to Objectives.....................................................................................30 -Table 22 Security Assurance Requirements at EAL3..............................................................................30 -Table 23 Security Assurance Rationale and Measures ............................................................................32 -Table 24 Roles and Functions..................................................................................................................34 -Table 22 CAVP........................................................................................................................................36 -List of Figures -Figure 1 TOE Deployment with Subsystems.............................................................................................7 -Figure 2 Sample Download List ..............................................................................................................10 - June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST -NetIQ Corporation Page 5 of 36 -1. Introduction -This section identifies the Security Target (ST), Target of Evaluation (TOE), Security Target -organization, document conventions, and terminology. It also includes an overview of the -evaluated product. -Security Target Reference: -ST Title NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 Security Target: -ST Revision 2.6 -ST Publication Date June 1, 2020 -ST Author Michael F. Angelo -TOE Reference -TOE Reference NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 -TOE Developer NetIQ Corporation -Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) EAL3+ -Note: The file download name is: Identity_Manager_4.7_Linux.iso . -Note: The official name of the product is NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 Advanced Edition. The -released product can be uniquely identified as: NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7.3. The product name -may also be abbreviated as Identity Manager 4.7 AE, Identity Manager, IDM 4.7.3AE or IDM 4.7 -or simply IDM . Finally the TOE, if examined for the build number will be identified as NetIQ -Identity Manager 4.7.3.0.317. For the purpose of this document all of the above references are -equivalent, and the document may refer to the product simply as IDM or the TOE. -Document Organization -This Security Target follows the following format: -SECTION TITLE DESCRIPTION -1 Introduction Provides an overview of the TOE and defines the -hardware and software that make up the TOE as well -as the physical and logical boundaries of the TOE -2 Conformance Claims Lists evaluation conformance to Common Criteria -versions, Protection Profiles, or Packages where -applicable -3 Security Problem -Definition -Specifies the threats, assumptions and organizational -security policies that affect the TOE -4 Security Objectives Defines the security objectives for the -TOE/operational environment and provides a -rationale to demonstrate that the security objectives -satisfy the threats -5 Extended -Components -Definition -Describes extended components of the evaluation (if -any) -6 Security -Requirements -Contains the functional and assurance requirements -for this TOE - June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST -NetIQ Corporation Page 6 of 36 -SECTION TITLE DESCRIPTION -7 TOE Summary -Specification -Identifies the IT security functions provided by the -TOE and also identifies the assurance measures -targeted to meet the assurance requirements. -Table 1 ST Organization and Section Descriptions -Document Conventions -The notation, formatting, and conventions used in this Security Target are consistent with those -used in Version 3.1 of the Common Criteria. Selected presentation choices are discussed here -to aid the Security Target reader. The Common Criteria allows several operations to be -performed on functional requirements: The allowable operations defined in Part 2 of the -Common Criteria are refinement, selection, assignment and iteration. - The refinement operation is used to add detail to a requirement, and thus further -restricts a requirement. Refinement of security requirements is denoted by bold text. -Any text removed is indicated with a strikethrough format (Example: TSF). - The selection operation is picking one or more items from a list in order to narrow the -scope of a component element. Selections are denoted by italicized text. - The assignment operation is used to assign a specific value to an unspecified parameter, -such as the length of a password. An assignment operation is indicated by showing the -value in square brackets, i.e. [assignment_value(s)]. - Iterated functional and assurance requirements are given unique identifiers by -appending to the base requirement identifier from the Common Criteria an iteration -number inside parenthesis, for example, FMT_MTD.1.1 (1) and FMT_MTD.1.1 (2) refer -to separate instances of the FMT_MTD.1 security functional requirement component. -When not embedded in a Security Functional Requirement, italicized text is used for both -official document titles and text meant to be emphasized more than plain text. -Document Terminology -The following table describes the acronyms used in this document: -TERM DEFINITION -CC Common Criteria version 3.1 -EAL Evaluation Assurance Level -IDM Identity Manager -IDV Identity Vault -IGA Identity Governance and Administration -NMAS NetIQ Modular Authentication Service -NTP Network Time Protocol -ORSP Organizational Security Policy -OSP One SSO Provider -SSO Single Sign On -SFP Security Function Policy -SFR Security Functional Requirement -SLM Sentinel Log Manager - June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST -NetIQ Corporation Page 7 of 36 -TERM DEFINITION -SSPR Self Service Password Reset -ST Security Target -TOE Target of Evaluation -TSF TOE Security Function -Table 2 Acronyms Used in Security Target -TOE Overview -The TOE is NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7. NetIQ Identity Manager provides data sharing and -synchronization services which enable applications, directories, and databases to share -information. It links scattered information and enables you to establish policies that govern -automatic updates to designated systems when identity changes occur. -Identity Manager provides the foundation for account provisioning, security, single sign-on, -user self-service, authentication, authorization, automated workflow, and Web services. It -allows you to integrate, manage, and control your distributed identity information so you can -securely deliver the right resources to the right people. -The following diagram shows a typical TOE deployment: -Identity Reporting Module -Operating System -General Purpose Computing -Platform -Reporting Server -Sentinel Log Management -for Identity Governance -and Administration -Operating System -General Purpose Computing -Platform -Log Manager -Identity Manager Engine -Identity Vault -Operating System -General Purpose Computing -Platform -Identity Applications -(RBPM) -Web Browser -Operating System -General Purpose Computing -(GPC) Platform -Identity Application -4 -1 -2 -8 -10 -= TOE Component -= IT Environment Component -One SSO Provider -(uname / pass, Kerberos, -SAML) -Operating System -General Purpose Computing -Platform -3 -5 -SSO Provider -Self Service Password -Reset -Web Browser -Operating System -General Purpose Computing -Platform -Self Service Password Reset -11 -9 -12 -7a -Identity Manager -6 -B -Administration -Workstation -(Console) 7b -Separate communication paths to Sentinel Log Manager -7a Identity Vault to Sentinel Log Manager -7b iManager to Sentinel Log Manager -C -A -iManager -Designer / Analyzer -= TOE Sub Component -OpenSSL -Figure 1 TOE Deployment with Subsystems1 -The TOE provides the following functions: data synchronization, role management, -auditing/reporting, and management. -11 -Note the Administration Workstation Console is not included in the evaluation as there is no code that is added to it to make it -explicitly a workstation console. It is included in the document as a component required for access.to the TOE. - June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST -NetIQ Corporation Page 8 of 36 - Data synchronization, including password synchronization, is provided by the base -components of the Identity Manager solution: the Identity Vault, Identity Manager -engine, drivers, Remote Loader, and connected applications - Role management is provided by the User Application - Auditing and reporting are provided by the Identity Reporting Module -TOE Description -NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 is a comprehensive identity management suite. It provides an -intelligent identity framework that leverages your existing IT assets and new computing -models like Software as a Service (SaaS) by reducing cost and ensuring compliance across -physical, virtual, and cloud environments. With the NetIQ Identity Manager solution, you can -make sure that your business has the most current user identity information. You can retain -control at the enterprise level by managing, provisioning, and de-provisioning identities within -the firewall and extending to the cloud. Through streamlined user administration and -processes, Identity Manager helps organizations reduce management costs, increase -productivity and security, and comply with government regulations. -The TOE is a software TOE and includes the following functions. -Each function contains the components as follows: -1. Administration Workstation (Console)2 -2. Identity Applications (RBPM) 4.7.3.0.1109 - Designer aka Identity Manager Designer 4.7.3.0.20190614 - Analyzer aka Identity Manager Analyzer -3. Identity Manager - Identity Manager Engine 4.7.3.0.AE -o Identity Vault 9.1.4 -o iManager 3.1.4 -4. Reporting Server - Identity Reporting Module 6.5.0. F14508F -5. Log Manager - Sentinel Log Management for Identity Governance and Administration 8.2.2.0_5415 -6. SSO Provider - One SSO Provider (OSP) 6.3.3.0 -7. Self Service Password Reset - Self Service Password Reset (SSPR) 4.4.0.2 B366 r39762 -Administration Workstation (Console): -The Administration Workstation (Console) is used to access the Identity Applications (RBPM), -Identity Manager, and the Reporting Server. Each of these functions is described below. -Identity Applications (RBPM) -The Identity Applications (RBPM) houses the Designer / Analyzer functions. The Identity -Application is a Web application (browser-based) that gives users and business administrators -the ability to perform a variety of identity self-service and roles provisioning tasks, including -managing passwords and identity data, initiating and monitoring provisioning and role -assignment requests, managing the approval process for provisioning requests, and verifying -2 -The Administration Workstation (Console) is not part of the TOE, in that there is no code added to it in order to function as the -Console it is required to access features and function of the TOE and is included for completeness. - June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST -NetIQ Corporation Page 9 of 36 -attestation reports. It includes the workflow engine that controls the routing of requests -through the appropriate approval process. Designer aka Designer for Identity Manager helps -you design, test, document, and deploy Identity Manager solutions in a network or test -environment. Analyzer aka NetIQ Analyzer for Identity Manager is an identity management -toolset that helps you ensure that internal data quality policies are adhered to by providing -data analysis, data cleansing, data reconciliation, and data monitoring/reporting. Analyzer lets -you analyze, enhance, and control all data stores throughout the enterprise. -Identity Manager: -The Identity Manager houses the Identity Manager Engine (and the Identity Vault which -contains the Identity Applications data) and iManager. The Identity Manager Engine -synchronizes identity data between applications. For example, data synchronized from a -PeopleSoft system to Lotus Notes is first added to the Identity Vault and then sent to the Lotus -Notes system. In addition, the Identity Vault stores information specific to Identity Manager, -such as driver configurations, parameters, and policies. -The following packages are used to provide cryptographic functions, and are not included in -the TOE boundary. NetIQ eDirectory is used for the Identity Vault. eDirectory provides access -to the OpenSSL Cryptographic functionality. -They meet the cryptographic quality requirements as evidenced by the following certificates: -Component CAVP Cert # -AES Certs. #3090 and #3264 -HMAC Certs. #1937 and #2063 -RSA Certs. #1581 and #1664 -Table 3 CAVP Certificate Numbers -Reporting Server: -The reporting server houses the Identity Reporting Module. The Identity Reporting Module -generates reports that show critical business information about various aspects of your -Identity Manager configuration, including information collected from Identity Vaults and -managed systems such as Active Directory or SAP. The reporting module provides a set of -predefined report definitions you can use to generate reports. In addition, it gives you the -option to import custom reports defined in a third-party tool. The user interface for the -reporting module makes it easy to schedule reports to run at off-peak times to optimize -performance. -The IDM Tools are used to manage the Identity Manager solution. This includes functions to: - Analyze, enhance, and control all data stores throughout the enterprise - Design, deploy, and document the TOE - Manage Identity Manager and receive real-time health and status information -about the Identity Manager system - Define and maintain which authorizations are associated with which business roles -Log Manager: -The Log Manager, also known as Sentinel Log Manager for Identity Governance and -Administration (SLM for IGA), collects and acknowledges receipt of auditing data from all -aspects of the product. -OneSSO Provider: - June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST -NetIQ Corporation Page 10 of 36 -The OneSSO Provider, also known as OSP) is a single interface for access authentication. This -provider can handle user name / password, Kerberos, and SAML tokens. -Self Service Password Reset: -Self Service Password Reset (SSPR) allows users to enroll, update, and reset their passwords -without administrative intervention in the Identity Vault (IDV). -Note: that the components above can be installed on one or multiple distributed systems. Also, -the hardware, operating systems and third-party support software (e.g. DBMS) on each of the -systems are excluded from the TOE boundary. -TOE Delivery: -The TOE software is provided to customers via secure download from the download portal -(https://dl.netiq.com/index.jsp). The software is available as either a gnu zip (.gz), iso -formatted optical disk (.iso). zip (.zip) or dmg (if mac) depending on your destination platform. -Once downloaded, and extracted, the setup files can be executed to perform the installation. -Figure 2 Sample Download List -TOE Environment -Virtual Machines -The following TOE components can be installed in virtual machines (VM). - Console / Administration Workstation (Identity Applications) - Identity Manager - Reporting Server - Sentinel Log Manager - One SSO Provider - Self Service Password Reset (SSPR) -The hardware and software requirements for the operational environment to support the VM -are listed in the table below: - June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST -NetIQ Corporation Page 11 of 36 -Category Console / -Administration -Workstation -(Identity -Applications3) -Identity -Manager -(Identity -Manager -Engine) -Reporting -Server -(Identity -Reporting -Module) -Log -Manager -(SLM for -Identity -Gov & -Adm) -SSO -Provider -(OneSSO -Provider) -Self Service -Password Reset -(SSPR) -Processor 2 CPU cores 2 CPU -cores -2 CPU -cores -4 to 8 CPU -cores -2 CPU -cores -2 CPU cores -Memory 8 GB 8 GB 8 GB 8 to 16 GB 8 GB 8 GB -Table 4 Virtual Machine Environment Requirements -Hardware and Software Supplied by the IT Environment -The TOE consists of a set of software applications run on one or multiple distributed systems. -The TOE requires the following software components as part of the evaluated configuration: -Component Requirements -Administration Workstation Mozilla Firefox 65 -Identity Applications (RBPM) -Designer / Analyzer) -SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 SP4 -Identity Manager (Identity -Manager Engine) -SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 SP4 -Reporting Server (Identity -Reporting Module) -SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 SP4 -Log Manager (Sentinel Log -Management for Identity -Governance and -Administration) -SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 SP4 -SSO Provider (OneSSO -Provider) -SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 SP4 -Self Service Password Reset SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 SP4 -Table 5 IT Environment Component Requirements -In addition to the platform requirements mentioned above, the following hardware resources -are needed in order to install and configure Identity Manager on each platform: - A minimum of 8 GB RAM - 15 GB available disk space to install all the components. - Additional disk space to configure and populate data. This might vary depending -on your connected systems and number of objects in the Identity Vault. -For server-based components, it is recommended that the platform have a minimum of 2 CPUs -or cores -Logical Boundary -This section outlines the boundaries of the security functionality of the TOE; the logical -boundary of the TOE includes the security functionality described in the following table: -3 -The system requirements also apply to the following components that you use with the identity applications: PostgreSQL, Tomcat, -NetIQ One SSO Provider (OSP), and NetIQ Self Service Password Reset. - June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST -NetIQ Corporation Page 12 of 36 -TSF DESCRIPTION -Security -Management -The TOE restricts the ability to enable, modify and disable security -policy rules and user roles to an authorized Administrator. The TOE -also provides the functions necessary for effective management of -the TOE security functions. Administrators configure the TOE with -the Management Console via Web-based connection. -Security Audit The TOE supports the provision of log data from each system -component, such as user login/logout and incident/ticket -management actions. It also records security events such as failed -login attempts, etc. Audit trails can be stored for later review and -analysis. -Cryptographic -Support -The TOE utilizes the OpenSSL cryptographic module to provide -support for HTTPS / TLS communications with administrators and -TOE components. -Identification and -Authentication -The TOE enforces individual I&A. Operators must successfully -authenticate using a unique identifier and password prior to -performing any actions on the TOE. -User Data -Protection -The TOE enforces discretionary access rules using an access control -list with user attributes. -Trusted Path / -Channels -The TOE utilizes HTTPS/TLS to provide trusted paths and inter-TSF -trusted channels. -Table 6 Logical Boundary Descriptions -TOE Security Functional Policies -The TOE supports the following Security Functional Policy: -Discretionary Access Control SFP -The TOE implements an access control SFP named Discretionary Access Control SFP. This SFP -determines and enforces the privileges associated with operator roles. An authorized -administrator can define specific services available to administrators and users via the -Management Console. -TOE Vendor Documentation / Guidance -In addition to the documentation generated for the certification, the TOE includes the following -product and guidance documentation generated by NetIQ: - Quick Start Guide for Installing NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 February 2018 - NetIQ Identity Manager Setup Guide for Linux February 2018 - NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7, Operational User Guidance and Preparative Procedures -Supplement (AGD-IGS), version 0.6, is supplied for those customers that need -guidance on how to set the TOE in the evaluated configuration. -Features / Functionality NOT Included in the TOE -The following supported operating systems and software were not included in the evaluated -configuration: -Functions Requirements -Administration Workstation (Console) Web Browsers - June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST -NetIQ Corporation Page 13 of 36 -Functions Requirements - Internet Explorer 11 - Google Chrome -Identity Applications (Includes Designer / -Analyzer) -RHEL 7.5 -Windows Server 2016 -Identity Manager (Includes Identity Vault -and, iManager) -RHEL 7.5 -Windows Server 2016 -Reporting Server -(includes Identity Reporting Module) -RHEL 7.5 -Windows Server 2016 -Log Manager (includes Sentinel Log -Management for Identity Governance and -Administration) -RHEL 7.5 -One SSO Provider (uname / pass, Kerberos, -SAML) -RHEL 7.5 -Windows Server 2016 -Self Service Password Reset (SSPR) RHEL 7.5 -Windows Server 2016 -Table 7 IT Environment Components - Not In TOE - June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST -NetIQ Corporation Page 14 of 36 -2. Conformance Claims -CC Conformance Claim -The TOE is Common Criteria Version 3.1 Revision 5 (April 2017) Part 2 conformant and Part 3 -conformant. -PP Claim -The TOE does not claim conformance to any registered Protection Profile. -Package Claim -The TOE claims conformance to the EAL3 assurance package defined in Part 3 of the Common -Criteria Version 3.1 Revision 5 (April 2017). The TOE does not claim conformance to any -functional package. The TOE EAL3 assurance package is augmented with ALC_FLR.2 -Conformance Rationale -No conformance rationale is necessary for this evaluation since this Security Target does not -claim conformance to a Protection Profile. - June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST -NetIQ Corporation Page 15 of 36 -3. Security Problem Definition -In order to clarify the nature of the security problem that the TOE is intended to solve, this -section describes the following: - Any known or assumed threats to the assets against which specific protection within the TOE or -its environment is required - Any organizational security policy statements or rules with which the TOE must comply - Any assumptions about the security aspects of the environment and/or of the manner in which -the TOE is intended to be used. -This chapter identifies assumptions as A.assumption, threats as T.threat and policies as P.policy. -Threats -The following are threats identified for the TOE and the IT System (or operating environment) -the TOE monitors. The TOE itself has threats and the TOE is also responsible for addressing -threats to the environment in which it resides. The assumed level of expertise of the attacker -for all threats is unsophisticated. -The TOE addresses the following threats: -THREAT DESCRIPTION -T.NO_AUTH An unauthorized user may gain access to the TOE and alter the -TOE configuration. -T.NO_PRIV An authorized user of the TOE exceeds his/her assigned -security privileges resulting in unauthorized modification of the -TOE configuration and/or data. -T.USER_ACCESS_DENY An authorized user may be able to change user authentication data -and or user access policies and deny their access to it later. -T.PASSWD_COMPROMISE An unauthorized user may be able to obtain and use user -passwords. -T.PROT_TRANS An unauthorized user may be able to gather information from -communications between components. -Table 8 Threats Addressed by the TOE -Organizational Security Policies -The TOE meets the following organizational security policies: -ASSUMPTION DESCRIPTION -P.REMOTE_DATA Passwords and account information from network-attached systems -shall be monitored and managed. -Table 9 Organizational Security Policies -Assumptions -The TOE is assured to provide effective security measures in a co-operative non-hostile -environment only if it is installed, managed, and used correctly. The following specific -conditions are assumed to exist in an environment where the TOE is employed. - June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST -NetIQ Corporation Page 16 of 36 -ASSUMPTION DESCRIPTION -A.MANAGE Administrators of the TOE are assumed to be appropriately trained to -undertake the installation, configuration and management of the TOE -in a secure and trusted manner. -A.NOEVIL Administrators of the TOE and users on the local area network are not -careless, willfully negligent, nor hostile, and will follow and abide by the -instructions provided by the TOE documentation -A.LOCATE The processing platforms on which the TOE resides are assumed to be -located within a facility that provides controlled access -A.CONFIG The TOE is configured to receive all passwords and associated data -from network-attached systems. -A.TIMESOURCE The TOE has a trusted source for system time via NTP server -Table 10 Assumptions - June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST -NetIQ Corporation Page 17 of 36 -4. Security Objectives -Security Objectives for the TOE -The IT security objectives for the TOE are addressed below: -OBJECTIVE DESCRIPTION -O.MANAGE_DATA The TOE shall provide a means to manage secrets and data associated -with remote IT systems. -O.MANAGE_POLICY The TOE shall provide a workflow to manage authentication and access -control policies. -O.SEC_ACCESS The TOE shall ensure that only those authorized users and applications -are granted access to security functions and associated data. -O.PASSWD_PROT The TOE shall provide cryptographic mechanisms to protect passwords -via cryptographic processes including the ability to generate and destroy -keys. -O.TRANS_PROT The TOE shall provide mechanisms to protect data that is in transit -between elements within the TOE. -Table 11 TOE Security Objectives -Security Objectives for the Operational Environment -The security objectives for the operational environment are addressed below: -OBJECTIVE DESCRIPTION -OE.TIME The TOE operating environment shall provide an accurate timestamp -(via reliable NTP server). -OE.ENV_PROTECT The TOE operating environment shall provide mechanisms to isolate the -TOE Security Functions (TSF) and assure that TSF components cannot -be tampered with or bypassed -OE.PERSONNEL Authorized administrators are non-hostile and follow all administrator -guidance and must ensure that the TOE is delivered, installed, managed, -and operated in a manner that maintains the TOE security objectives. -Any operator of the TOE must be trusted not to disclose their -authentication credentials to any individual not authorized for access to -the TOE. -OE.PHYSEC The facility surrounding the processing platform in which the TOE -resides must provide a controlled means of access into the facility -Table 12 Operational Environment Security Objectives -Security Objectives Rationale - June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST -NetIQ Corporation Page 18 of 36 -This section provides the summary that all security objectives are traced back to aspects of the -addressed assumptions, threats, and Organizational Security Policies. -OBJECTIVES THREATS/ -ASSUMPTIONS/ POLICIES -O.MANAGE_DATA -O.MANAGE_POLICY -O.SEC_ACCESS -O.PASSWD_PROT -O.TRANS_PROT -OE.TIME -OE.ENV_PROTECT -OE.PERSONNEL -OE.PHYSEC -A.CONFIG -A.MANAGE -A.NOEVIL -A.LOCATE -A.TIMESOURCE -T.NO_AUTH -T.NO_PRIV -T.USER_ACCESS_DENY -T.PASSWD_COMPROMISE -T.PROT_TRANS -P. REMOTE_DATA -Table 13 Mapping of Assumptions, Threats, Policies and ORSP s to Security Objectives -Mapping of Objectives -ASSUMPTION /THREAT/ -POLICY -RATIONALE -A.CONFIG This assumption is addressed by - OE.ENV_PROTECT, which ensures that TSF components -cannot be tampered with or bypassed - OE.PERSONNEL, which ensures that the TOE is managed -and administered by in a secure manner by a competent -and security aware personnel in accordance with the -administrator documentation. This objective also ensures -that those responsible for the TOE install, manage, and -operate the TOE in a secure manner - OE.PHYSEC, which ensures that the facility surrounding the -processing platform in which the TOE resides provides a -controlled means of access into the facility - June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST -NetIQ Corporation Page 19 of 36 -ASSUMPTION /THREAT/ -POLICY -RATIONALE -A.MANAGE This assumption is addressed by - OE.PERSONNEL, which ensures that the TOE is managed -and administered by in a secure manner by a competent -and security aware personnel in accordance with the -administrator documentation. This objective also ensures -that those responsible for the TOE install, manage, and -operate the TOE in a secure manner -A.NOEVIL This assumption is addressed by OE.PERSONNEL, which ensures -that the TOE is managed and administered by in a secure manner -by a competent and security aware personnel in accordance with -the administrator documentation. This objective also ensures -that those responsible for the TOE install, manage, and operate -the TOE in a secure manner -A.LOCATE This assumption is addressed by OE.PHYSEC which ensures that -the facility surrounding the processing platform in which the -TOE resides provides a controlled means of access into the -facility -A.TIMESOURCE This assumption is addressed by OE.TIME, which ensures the -provision of an accurate time source. -T.NO_AUTH This threat is countered by the following: - O.SEC_ACCESS, which ensures that the TOE allows access to -the security functions, configuration, and associated data -only by authorized users and applications -T.NO_PRIV This threat is countered by O.SEC_ACCESS, which ensures that -the TOE allows access to the security functions, configuration, -and associated data only by authorized users and applications. -T.PASSWD_COMPROMISE This threat is countered by O.PASSWD_PROT, which ensures -the passwords are not in the clear and cannot be exposed to un -authorized users for use. -T.PROT_TRANS This threat is countered by O.TRANS_PROT, which protects data -that is in transit between elements within the TOE. -P.REMOTE_DATA This organizational security policy is enforced by - O.MANAGE_DATA, which ensures that the TOE provide a -means to manage secrets and data associated with remote -IT systems. -T.USER_ACCESS_DENY This threat is countered by O.MANAGE_POLICY which ensures -that the TOE provides a workflow to manage authentication and -access control policies. -Table 14 Mapping of Threats, Policies, and Assumptions to Objectives - June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST -NetIQ Corporation Page 20 of 36 -5. Extended Components Definition -This Security Target does include any extended components. - June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST -NetIQ Corporation Page 21 of 36 -6. Security Requirements -The security requirements that are levied on the TOE and the IT environment are specified in -this section of the ST. -Security Functional Requirements -The functional security requirements for this Security Target consist of the following -components from Part 2 of the CC, which are summarized in the following table: -CLASS HEADING CLASS_FAMILY DESCRIPTION -Security Audit -FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation -FAU_SAR.1 Audit Review -Cryptographic Support FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation -FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction -FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation -User Data Protection -FDP_ACC.1 Subset Access Control -FDP_ACF.1 Security Attribute Based Access Control -Identification and -Authentication -FIA_ATD.1 User Attribute Definition -FIA_UID.2 User Identification before Any Action -FIA_UAU.2 User Authentication before Any Action -Security Management -FMT_MSA.1 Management of Security Attributes -FMT_MSA.2 Secure Security Attributes -FMT_MSA.3 Static Attribute Initialization -FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF Data -FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions -FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles -Protection of the TSF FPT_TDC.1 Inter-TSF basic TSF data consistency -Trusted Path / Channels -FTP_ITC.1 Trusted Channel -FTP_TRP.1 Trusted Path -Table 15 TOE Security Functional Requirements -Security Audit (FAU) -FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation -FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following -auditable events: -a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions; -b) All auditable events for the [not specified] level of audit; and -c) [User login/logout and; -d) Login failures;] - June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST -NetIQ Corporation Page 22 of 36 -FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following -information: -a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if -applicable), and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; -and -b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event -definitions of the functional components included in the PP/ST, -[no other audit relevant information]. -FAU_SAR.1 Audit Review -FAU_SAR.1.1 The TSF shall provide [the Administrator] with the capability to read -[all audit data generated within the TOE] from the audit records. -FAU_SAR.1.2 The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the -user to interpret the information. -Cryptographic Support -FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation -FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a -specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [cryptographic key -generation algorithm in Table 16] and specified cryptographic key -sizes [cryptographic key sizes in Table 16] that meet the following: [list -of standards in Table 16]. -Usage Key Generation Algorithm Key Size (bits), Elliptical Curves Standard -RSA RSA Key Generation 2048 FIPS 186-4 -AES Deterministic Random Bit -Generator (DRBG) -128, 256 SP 800-90A -Diffie-Hellman Diffie-Hellman Key -Generation -1024, 2048 FIPS 186-4 -Table 16 Cryptographic Standards -FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction -FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a -specified cryptographic key destruction method [zeroize] that meets -the following: [FIPS 140-2]. -FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation (Encryption / Decryption) -FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operations in Table 17] in -accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic -algorithm in Table 17] and cryptographic key sizes [cryptographic key -sizes in Table 17] that meet the following: [list of standards in Table -17]. - June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST -NetIQ Corporation Page 23 of 36 -Application Note: AES in CBC mode is used for encrypting/decrypting -data in support of TLS. -Operation Algorithm Key Size, Curve or -Digest -Standard -Encryption and -Decryption in support of -TLS -AES (Advanced -Encryption -Standard) -128, 256 FIPS PUB -197 -Key agreement in -support TLS -Key Agreement -Schemes (KAS) and -Key Confirmation -P-256, P384, P521 SP800- -56A -Authentication algorithm -in support of TLS -ECDSA (Elliptic -Curve Digital -Signature -Algorithm) -P-256, P384, P521 FIPS 186-4 -Secure Hashing in -support of TLS -Secure Hash -Algorithm (SHA) -160 (SHA-1) -256 (SHA-256) -384 (SHA-384) -FIPS PUB -180-4 -Message Authentication -in support of TLS -Keyed-Hash -Message -Authentication Code -(HMAC) -160 (HMAC-SHA1) 256 -(HMAC-SHA2-256) 384 -(HMAC-SHA2-384) -FIPS 198-1 -Asymmetric -cryptography in support -of TLS -Rivest, Shamir, -Adleman (RSA) -2048 FIPS 186-4 -Table 17 Cryptographic Operations -Information Flow Control (FDP) -FDP_ACC.1 Subset Access Control -FDP_ACC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Discretionary Access Control SFP] on [ -Subjects: All users -Objects: System reports, component audit logs, TOE configuration, -operator account attributes -Operations: all user actions] -FDP_ACF.1 Security Attribute Based Access Control -FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Discretionary Access Control SFP]to objects -based on the following: [ -Subjects: All users -Objects: System reports, component audit logs, TOE configuration, -operator account attributes -Operations: all user actions] -FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation -among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: [if the - June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST -NetIQ Corporation Page 24 of 36 -ACL identifies the user or a group of users that contains the user -requesting access for the type of resource that the user is requesting, -and the user (or group of users) has the specific rights required for the -type of operation requested on the object then the user is granted -access]. -FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based -on the following additional rules: [password restrictions, login -restrictions, time based access controls, ip access controls, intruder -lockout]. -FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the -following additional rules [ password restrictions, login restrictions, -time based access controls, ip access controls, intruder lockout] -Identification and Authentication (FIA) -FIA_ATD.1 User Attribute Definition -FIA_ATD.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes -belonging to individual users: [User Identity, Authentication Status, -and Privilege Level]. -FIA_UAU.2 User Authentication before Any Action -FIA_UAU.2.1 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated -before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user. -FIA_UID.2 User Identification before Any Action -FIA_UID.2.1 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before -allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user. -Security Management (FMT) -FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes -FMT_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Discretionary Access Control SFP] to -restrict the ability to [query, modify, delete] the security attributes -[Accounts, privileges, ACLs] to [Administrator]. -FMT_MSA.2 Secure Security Attributes -FMT_MSA.2.1 The TSF shall ensure that only secure values are accepted for -[security attributes listed with Discretionary Access Control SFP]. -FMT_MSA.3 Static Attribute Initialization -FMT_MSA.3.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Discretionary Access Control SFP] to -provide [restrictive] default values for security attributes that are -used to enforce the SFP. - June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST -NetIQ Corporation Page 25 of 36 -FMT_MSA.3.2 The TSF shall allow the [Administrator] to specify alternative initial -values to override the default values when an object or information -is created. -FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF Data -FMT_MTD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to [control] the [data described in the -table below] to [Administrator]: -DATA CHANGE QUERY MODIFY DELETE CLEAR -Discretionary -Access Control SFP - -User Account -Attributes - -Audit Logs -Date/Time -Table 18 Management of TSF data -FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions -FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management -functions: [ -a) Create accounts -b) Modify accounts -c) Define privilege levels Change Default, -Query, Modify, Delete, Clear the attributes -associated with the Discretionary Access -Control SFP -d) Modify the behavior of the Discretionary -Access Control SFP -e) Manage ACLs]. -FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles -FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles [Administrator, User]. -FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles. -Protection of the TSF (FPT) -FPT_TDC.1 Inter-TSF Basic TSF Data Consistency -FPT_TDC.1.1 The TSF shall provide the capability to consistently interpret [secrets -(passwords)] when shared between the TSF and another trusted IT -product. -FPT_TDC.1.2 The TSF shall use [the secret with the newest associated timestamp] -when interpreting the TSF data from another trusted IT product. - June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST -NetIQ Corporation Page 26 of 36 -Trusted Path / Channel (FTP) -FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel -FTP_ITC.1.1 The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and -[another trusted IT product] that is logically distinct from other -communication channels and provides assured identification of its end -points and protection of the channel data from [modification or -disclosure]. -FTP_ITC.1.2 The TSF shall permit [the TSF] to initiate communication via the -trusted channel. -FTP_ITC.1.3 The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for -[HTTPS/TLS connections - for communications labeled 1 12 in Figure 1] -Application Note: The TOE supports TLS v1.1 and 1.2 as configured by -the Administrator. -Application Note: Crypto as claimed in FCS_COP_1 is used to support -TLS. -FTP_TRP.1 Trusted Path -FTP_TRP.1.1 The TSF shall provide a communication path between itself and [local] -users that is logically distinct from other communication paths and -provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the -communicated data from [disclosure]. -FTP_TRP.1.2 The TSF shall permit [the TSF] to initiate communication via the -trusted path. -FTP_TRP.1.3 The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for [key requests, and -encryption operations - for communications labeled A, B, and C in Figure 1] -Security Assurance Requirements -The Security Assurance Requirements for this evaluation are listed in Section 6.3.4 Security -Assurance Requirements. -Security Requirements Rationale -Security Functional Requirements -The following table provides the correspondence mapping between security objectives and the -requirements that satisfy them. - June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST -NetIQ Corporation Page 27 of 36 -OBJECTIVE -SFR -O.MANAGE_DATA -O.MANAGE_POLICY -O.SEC_ACCESS -O.PASSWD_PROT -O.TRANS_PROT -FAU_GEN.1 -FAU_SAR.1 -FCS_CKM.1 -FCS_CKM.4 -FCS_COP.1 -FDP_ACC.1 -FDP_ACF.1 -FIA_ATD.1 -FIA_UID.2 -FIA_UAU.2 -FMT_MSA.1 -FMT_MSA.2 -FMT_MSA.3 -FMT_MTD.1 -FMT_SMF.1 -FMT_SMR.1 -FPT_TDC.1 -FTP_ITC.1 -FTP_TRP.1 -Table 19 Mapping of TOE Security Functional Requirements and Objectives -Dependency Rationale -This ST satisfies all the security functional requirement dependencies of the Common Criteria. -The table below lists each SFR to which the TOE claims conformance with a dependency and -indicates whether the dependent requirement was included. As the table indicates, all -dependencies have been met. -SFR CLAIM DEPENDENCIES DEPENDENCY MET RATIONALE -FAU_GEN.1 FPT_STM.1 YES -Satisfied by the Operational -Environment (OE.TIME) -FAU_SAR.1 -FAU_GEN.1 -FPT_STM.1 -YES -FPT_STM.1 satisfied by the -Operational Environment -(OE.TIME) - June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST -NetIQ Corporation Page 28 of 36 -SFR CLAIM DEPENDENCIES DEPENDENCY MET RATIONALE -FCS_CKM.1 -FCS_CKM.1 or -FCS_COP.1 and -FCS_CKM.4 -YES -Satisfied by FCS_COP.1 and -FCS_CKM.4 -FCS_CKM.4 FTP_ITC.1 or -FTP_ITC.2 or -FCS_CKM.1 -YES Satisfied by FCS_CKM.1 for AES -FCS_COP.1 FTP_ITC.1 or -FTP_ITC.2 or -FCS_CKM.1 and -FCS_CKM.4 -YES Satisfied by FCS_CKM.1 and -FCS_CKM.4 -FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACF.1 YES -FDP_ACF.1 -FDP_ACC.1 -FMT_MSA.3 -YES -FIA_ATD.1 N/A N/A -FIA_UID.2 N/A N/A -FMT_MSA.1 -FDP_ACC.1 -FMT_SMF.1 -FMT_SMR.1 -YES -FMT_MSA.2 -FDP_ACC.1 -FMT_MSA.1 -FMT_SMR.1 -YES -FMT_MSA.3 -FMT_MSA.1 -FMT_SMR.1 -YES -FMT_MTD.1 -FMT_SMF.1 -FMT_SMR.1 -YES -FMT_SMF.1 N/A N/A -FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1 YES -Although FIA_UID.1 is not -included, FIA_UID.2, which is -hierarchical to FIA_UID.1 is -included. This satisfies this -dependency. -FPT_TDC.1 N/A N/A -FTP_ITC.1 N/A N/A -FTP_TRP.1 N/A N/A -Table 20 Mapping of SFR to Dependencies and Rationales -Sufficiency of Security Requirements -The following table presents a mapping of the rationale of TOE Security Requirements to -Objectives. - June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST -NetIQ Corporation Page 29 of 36 -OBJECTIVE RATIONALE -O.MANAGE_DATA The objective to ensure that the TOE will collect events from security -products and non-security products deployed within a network and -applies analytical processes to derive conclusions about the events is -met by the following security requirements: - FPT_TDC.1 ensures that the TOE provides consistency between -passwords used on remote IT systems and those -stored/managed within the TOE. -O.MANAGE_POLICY The objective to ensure that the TOE provides a workflow to manage -authentication and access control policies is met by the following -security requirements: - FAU_GEN.1 and FAU_SAR.1 define the auditing capability for -incidents and administrative access control and requires that -authorized users will have the capability to read and interpret -data stored in the audit logs - FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1 support the security functions -relevant to the TOE and ensure the definition of an authorized -administrator role -O.SEC_ACCESS This objective ensures that the TOE allows access to the security -functions, configuration, and associated data only by authorized users -and applications. - FDP_ACC.1 requires that all user actions resulting in the access -to TOE security functions and configuration data are controlled - FDP_ACF.1 supports FDP_ACC.1 by ensuring that access to TOE -security functions, configuration data, audit logs, and account -attributes is based on the user privilege level and their -allowable actions - FIA_UID.2 requires the TOE to enforce identification of all users -prior to configuration of the TOE - FIA_UAU.2 requires the TOE to enforce authentication of all -users prior to configuration of the TOE - FIA_ATD.1 specifies security attributes for users of the TOE - FMT_MTD.1 restricts the ability to query, add or modify TSF -data to authorized users. - FMT_MSA.1 specifies that only privileged administrators can -access the TOE security functions and related configuration -data. - FMT_MSA.2 specifies that only secure values are accepted for -security attributes listed with access control policies. - FMT_MSA.3 ensures that the default values of security -attributes are restrictive in nature as to enforce the access -control policy for the TOE - FTP_ITC.1 specifies that the trusted channel exists for components -HTTPS/TLS. - FTP_TRP.1 specifies that the trusted path exists for components -HTTPS/TLS. - June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST -NetIQ Corporation Page 30 of 36 -OBJECTIVE RATIONALE -O.PASSWD_PROT This objective ensures that the TOE provides cryptographic -mechanisms to generate and destroy keys. This objective is met by: -FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM. 4, and FCS_COP.1 which provide the -cryptographic support functions for secure communications within the -TOE and with external IT entities. -O.TRANS_PROT This objective ensures that the TOE protects data in transit between -elements within the TOE. This objective is met by FTP_ITC (which -specifies that the trusted channel exists for components) and FTP_TRP -(which ensures that the trusted path exists for components). -Table 21 Rationale for TOE SFRs to Objectives -Security Assurance Requirements -The assurance security requirements for this Security Target are taken from Part 3 of the CC. -These assurance requirements compose an Evaluation Assurance Level 3 (EAL3). The assurance -components are summarized in the following table: -CLASS HEADING CLASS_FAMILY DESCRIPTION -ADV: Development -ADV_ARC.1 Security Architecture Description -ADV_FSP.3 -Functional Specification with Complete -Summary -ADV_TDS.2 Architectural Design -AGD: Guidance -Documents -AGD_OPE.1 Operational User Guidance -AGD_PRE.1 Preparative Procedures -ALC: Lifecycle Support -ALC_CMC.3 Authorization Controls -ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage -ALC_DEL.1 Delivery Procedures -ALC_DVS.1 Identification of Security Measures -ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model -ALC_FLR.2 Flaw Reporting Procedures -ATE: Tests -ATE_COV.2 Analysis of Coverage -ATE_DPT.1 Testing: Basic Design -ATE_FUN.1 Functional Testing -ATE_IND.2 Independent Testing - Sample -AVA: Vulnerability -Assessment -AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability Analysis -Table 22 Security Assurance Requirements at EAL3 -Security Assurance Requirements Rationale -The ST specifies Evaluation Assurance Level 3. EAL3 was chosen because it is based upon good -commercial development practices with thorough functional testing. EAL3 provides the -developers and users a moderate level of independently assured security in conventional -commercial TOEs. The threat of malicious attacks is not greater than low, the security -environment provides physical protection, and the TOE itself offers a very limited interface, - June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST -NetIQ Corporation Page 31 of 36 -offering essentially no opportunity for an attacker to subvert the security policies without -physical access. The product was augmented to comply with ALC_FLR.2 in order to document -and address requirements for remediation and reporting of faults that may be discovered in the -product after release. -Security Assurance Requirements Evidence -This section identifies the measures applied to satisfy CC assurance requirements. -SECURITY ASSURANCE -REQUIREMENT -EVIDENCE TITLE -ADV_ARC.1 Security Architecture -Description -NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 -Security Architecture (ADV_ARC) -ADV_FSP.3 Functional Specification -with Complete Summary -NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 -Functional Specification (ADV_FSP) -ADV_TDS.2 Architectural Design -NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 -Architectural Design (IDM TDS) -AGD_OPE.1 Operational User -Guidance4 -NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 -Operational User Guidance and Preparative -Procedures Supplement (AGD-IGS) -AGD_PRE.1Preparative Procedures -NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 -Operational User Guidance and Preparative -Procedures Supplement (AGD-IGS) -ALC_CMC.3 Authorization Controls -NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 -Configuration Management Processes and -Procedures (ALC_CM) -ALC_CMS.3 Implementation -representation CM coverage -NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 -Configuration Management Processes and -Procedures (ALC_CM) -ALC_DEL.1 Delivery Procedures -NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 -Secure Delivery Processes and Procedures -(ALC_DEL) -ALC_DVS.1 Identification of Security -Measures -NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 -Development Security Measures (ALC_DVS) -ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life- -cycle model -NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 -Life Cycle Development Process (ALC_LCD) -ALC_FLR.2: Flaw Remediation -Procedures -NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 -Flaw reporting Procedures (ALC_FLR) -ATE_COV.2 Analysis of Coverage -NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 -Test Plan and Coverage Analysis (ATE) -ATE_DPT.1 Testing: Basic Design -NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 -Test Plan and Coverage Analysis (ATE) -4 -Additional documents can be found in Appendix A - June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST -NetIQ Corporation Page 32 of 36 -SECURITY ASSURANCE -REQUIREMENT -EVIDENCE TITLE -ATE_FUN.1Functional Testing -NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 -Test Plan and Coverage Analysis (ATE) -Table 23 Security Assurance Rationale and Measures - June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST -NetIQ Corporation Page 33 of 36 -7. TOE Summary Specification -This section presents the Security Functions implemented by the TOE. -TOE Security Functions -The security functions performed by the TOE are as follows: - Security Management - Security Audit - Identification and Authentication - User Data Protection - Trusted Path / Channels - Cryptographic Support -Security Audit -The TOE generates the following audit data: - Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions (instantiated by startup of the TOE) - User login/logout - Login failures -The TOE provides the Administrator with the capability to read all audit data generated within -the TOE via the console. The GUI provides a suitable means for an Administrator to interpret the -information from the audit log. -The A.TIMESOURCE is added to the assumptions on operational environment, and OE.TIME is -added to the operational environment security objectives. The time and date provided by the -operational environment are used to form the timestamps. The TOE ensures that the audit trail -data is stamped when recorded with a dependable date and time received from the OE -(operating system). In this manner, accurate time and date is maintained on the TOE. -The Security Audit function is designed to satisfy the following security functional requirements: - FAU_GEN.1 - FAU_SAR.1 -Identification and Authentication -The IDM console application provides user interfaces that administrators may use to manage -TOE functions. The operating system and the database in the TOE Environment are queried to -individually authenticate administrators or users. The TOE maintains authorization information -that determines which TOE functions an authenticated administrators or users (of a given role) -may perform. -The TOE maintains the following list of security attributes belonging to individual users: - User Identity (i.e., user name) - Authentication Status (whether the IT Environment validated the username/password) - Privilege Level (Administrator or User) -The Identification and Authentication function is designed to satisfy the following security -functional requirements: - FIA_ATD.1 - FIA_UAU.2 - FIA_UID.2 -User Data Protection - June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST -NetIQ Corporation Page 34 of 36 -The TOE implements a discretionary access control policy to define what roles can access -particular functions of the TOE. All access and actions for system reports, component audit logs, -TOE configuration, operator account attributes (defined in FIA_ATD.1) are protected via access -control list. When a user requests to perform an action on an object, the TOE verifies the role -associated with the user name. Access is granted if the user (or group of users) has the specific -rights required for the type of operation requested on the object. -Identity Manager can enforce password policies on incoming passwords from connected -systems and on passwords set or changed through the User Application password self-service. -If the new password does not comply, you can specify that Identity Manager not accept the -password. This also means that passwords that don't comply with your policies are not -distributed to other connected systems. -In addition, can enforce password policies on connected systems. If the password being -published to the Identity Vault does not comply with rules in a policy, you can specify that -Identity Manager not only does not accept the password for distribution, but actually resets the -noncompliant password on the connected system by using the current Distribution password in -the Identity Vault. -The User Data Protection function is designed to satisfy the following security functional -requirements: - FDP_ACC.1 - FDP_ACF.1 - FPT_TDC.1 -Security Management -The TOE maintains the operator roles described in the following table. The individual roles are -categorized into two main roles: the Administrator and the User. -ROLE MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS -Administrator A user who has rights to configure and manage all aspects of the TOE -User The user's capabilities can be configured to: -View hierarchical relationships between User objects -View and edit user information (with appropriate rights). -Search for users or resources using advanced search criteria -(which can be saved for later reuse). -Recover forgotten passwords. -Table 24 Roles and Functions -Only an Administrator can determine the behavior of, disable, enable, and modify the behavior -of the functions that implement the Discretionary Access Control SFP. The TPE ensures only -secure values are accepted for the security attributes listed with Discretionary Access Control -SFP. -The Security Management function is designed to satisfy the following security functional -requirements: - FMT_MTD.1 - FMT_MSA.1 - FMT_MSA.2 - FMT_MSA.3 - FMT_SMF.1 - FMT_SMR.1 - June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST -NetIQ Corporation Page 35 of 36 -Trusted Path / Channels -The Trusted Path/Channels function is designed to satisfy the following security functional -requirements: - FTP_ITC.1 the TOE supports establishment of trusted channels for communicating -TOE entities using HTTPS. - FTP_TRP.1 the TOE provides a trusted path for TOE Users, using HTTPS -Trusted Channel -The TOE provides a trusted channel between the TOE and external web servers. -Trusted channels are implemented using HTTPS. The TOE supports TLS v1.1 and TLS v1.2. The -TOE supports the following TLS cipher suites, as defined in RFC 2246, RFC 4346 and RFC 5246: - TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA - TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 - TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA - TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 - TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_ CBC_SHA - TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -Trusted Path: -The TOE provides a trusted path for TOE administrators and TOE users to communicate with -the TOE. The trusted path is implemented using HTTPS. The TOE's implementation of TLS is -described in the previous section (Trusted Channel). -Cryptographic Support -Cryptographic protection of data in transit between the TOE and remote users, and between -the TOE and external web servers is provided by the OpenSSL FIPS Object Module software -version 2.0.10 (Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) certificate number 1747) -libraries. -The following table identifies the CAVP algorithm certificates. -Operation Algorithm CAVP Certificate -Encryption and Decryption in -support of TLS -AES (Advanced Encryption -Standard) -AES 3264 -Key Generation in support of -TLS -DRBG (Deterministic -Random Bit Generation) -DRBG 723 -Key agreement in support of -TLS -Key Agreement Schemes -(KAS) and Key Confirmation -CVL 472 -Keyed-Hash Message -Authentication in support of -TLS -HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA2- -256, HMAC-SHA2-384 -HMAC 2063 -Secure Hash in support of TLS SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384 SHS 2702 - June 1, 2020 NetIQ Identity Manager 4.7 ST -NetIQ Corporation Page 36 of 36 -Asymmetric cryptography in -support of TLS -RSA RSA 1664 -Authentication algorithm in -support of TLS -ECDSA ECDSA 620 -Table 25 CAVP -The Cryptographic Support function is designed to satisfy the following security functional -requirements: - FCS_CKM.1 - FCS_CKM.4 - FCS_COP.1 - \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/test_cc_oop.py b/tests/test_cc_oop.py index 9c863599..6ad145a6 100644 --- a/tests/test_cc_oop.py +++ b/tests/test_cc_oop.py @@ -103,8 +103,8 @@ class TestCommonCriteriaOOP(TestCase): "8cf86948f02f047d": "3c8614338899d956e9e56f1aa88d90e37df86f3310b875d9d14ec0f71e4759be", } - self.template_report_txt_path = self.test_data_dir / "report_869415cc4b91282e.txt" - self.template_target_txt_path = self.test_data_dir / "target_869415cc4b91282e.txt" + self.template_report_txt_path = self.test_data_dir / "report_309ac2fd7f2dcf17.txt" + self.template_target_txt_path = self.test_data_dir / "target_309ac2fd7f2dcf17.txt" def test_certificate_input_sanity(self): self.assertEqual( -- cgit v1.3.1