Updated to Marc MERLIN's latest version, which adds setgid() calls.

Minor edits by Barry to the docstring, and fixed one typo (missing
parens in an fp.close() call).

1 files changed, 17 insertions, 15 deletions

diff --git a/contrib/securelinux_fix.py b/contrib/securelinux_fix.py
index fc28b97c4..784bbc6d8 100644
--- a/contrib/securelinux_fix.py
+++ b/contrib/securelinux_fix.py
@@ -16,22 +16,23 @@
 # along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software 
 # Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA.
 
-"""If you use  Solar Designer's secure-linux patch, it prevents  a process from
-linking (hard link) to a file it  doesn't own. As a result mailman has to be
-changed so that the whole tree is owned by mailman, and the CGIs and some of
-the programs in the  bin tree (the ones that lock  config.db files) are SUID
-mailman.
-The idea  is that config.db files  have to be  owned by the mailman  UID and
-only touched by programs that are UID mailman.
+"""Fixes for running Mailman under the `secure-linux' patch.
+
+If you use Solar Designer's secure-linux patch, it prevents a process from
+linking (hard link) to a file it doesn't own.  As a result Mailman has to be
+changed so that the whole tree is owned by Mailman, and the CGIs and some of
+the programs in the bin tree (the ones that lock config.db files) are SUID
+Mailman.  The idea is that config.db files have to be owned by the mailman UID
+and only touched by programs that are UID mailman.
  
-If you have to  run check_perms -f, make sure to also  run %(PROGRAM) -f, which
+If you have to run check_perms -f, make sure to also run %(PROGRAM) -f, which
 applies the necessary permission fixes
  
-As a  result, to  prevent anyone from  running priviledged  mailman commands
-(since the  scripts are suid), binary  commands that are changed  to be SUID
-are also unreadable and unrunable by people who aren't in the mailman group.
-This shouldn't affect  much since most of those commands  would fail work if
-you weren't part of the mailman group anyway.
+As a result, to prevent anyone from running priviledged Mailman commands
+\(since the scripts are suid), binary commands that are changed to be SUID are
+also unreadable and unrunable by people who aren't in the mailman group.  This
+shouldn't affect much since most of those commands would fail work if you
+weren't part of the mailman group anyway.
 
 Marc <marcsoft@merlins.org>/<marc_bts@valinux.com> 2000/10/27
 """
@@ -66,17 +67,18 @@ def main(argv):
 	fp = open(droplib, 'w', 0644)
 	fp.write("""import sys
 import os
-from Mailman.mm_cfg import MAILMAN_UID
+from Mailman.mm_cfg import MAILMAN_UID, MAILMAN_GID
 
 class CheckFixUid:
     if os.geteuid() == 0:
+	os.setgid(MAILMAN_GID)
 	os.setuid(MAILMAN_UID)
     if os.geteuid() != MAILMAN_UID:
 	print "You need to run this script as root or mailman because it was configured to run"
 	print "on a linux system with the secure-linux patch which restricts hard links"
 	sys.exit()
 """)
-	fp.close
+	fp.close()
     else:
 	print "Skipping creation of " + droplib