1 files changed, 13 insertions, 52 deletions

diff --git a/Mailman/SecurityManager.py b/Mailman/SecurityManager.py
index 3865071b5..6740a958f 100644
--- a/Mailman/SecurityManager.py
+++ b/Mailman/SecurityManager.py
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
 #
 # Each cookie has the following ingredients: the authorization context's
 # secret (i.e. the password, and a timestamp.  We generate an SHA1 hex
-# digest of these ingredients, which we call the `mac'.  We then marshal
+# digest of these ingredients, which we call the 'mac'.  We then marshal
 # up a tuple of the timestamp and the mac, hexlify that and return that as
 # a cookie keyed off the authcontext.  Note that authenticating the user
 # also requires the user's email address to be included in the cookie.
@@ -48,7 +48,6 @@
 
 import os
 import re
-import md5
 import sha
 import time
 import urllib
@@ -64,19 +63,15 @@ from Mailman import Errors
 from Mailman import Utils
 from Mailman.configuration import config
 
-try:
-    import crypt
-except ImportError:
-    crypt = None
-
 log = logging.getLogger('mailman.error')
+dlog = logging.getLogger('mailman.debug')
+
+SLASH = '/'
 
 
 
 class SecurityManager:
     def InitVars(self):
-        # We used to set self.password here, from a crypted_password argument,
-        # but that's been removed when we generalized the mixin architecture.
         # self.password is really a SecurityManager attribute, but it's set in
         # MailList.InitVars().
         self.mod_password = None
@@ -144,50 +139,15 @@ class SecurityManager:
                 if ok:
                     return Defaults.AuthSiteAdmin
             elif ac == Defaults.AuthListAdmin:
-                def cryptmatchp(response, secret):
-                    try:
-                        salt = secret[:2]
-                        if crypt and crypt.crypt(response, salt) == secret:
-                            return True
-                        return False
-                    except TypeError:
-                        # BAW: Hard to say why we can get a TypeError here.
-                        # SF bug report #585776 says crypt.crypt() can raise
-                        # this if salt contains null bytes, although I don't
-                        # know how that can happen (perhaps if a MM2.0 list
-                        # with USE_CRYPT = 0 has been updated?  Doubtful.
-                        return False
                 # The password for the list admin and list moderator are not
                 # kept as plain text, but instead as an sha hexdigest.  The
                 # response being passed in is plain text, so we need to
-                # digestify it first.  Note however, that for backwards
-                # compatibility reasons, we'll also check the admin response
-                # against the crypted and md5'd passwords, and if they match,
-                # we'll auto-migrate the passwords to sha.
+                # digestify it first.
                 key, secret = self.AuthContextInfo(ac)
                 if secret is None:
                     continue
                 sharesponse = sha.new(response).hexdigest()
-                upgrade = ok = False
                 if sharesponse == secret:
-                    ok = True
-                elif md5.new(response).digest() == secret:
-                    ok = upgrade = True
-                elif cryptmatchp(response, secret):
-                    ok = upgrade = True
-                if upgrade:
-                    save_and_unlock = False
-                    if not self.Locked():
-                        self.Lock()
-                        save_and_unlock = True
-                    try:
-                        self.password = sharesponse
-                        if save_and_unlock:
-                            self.Save()
-                    finally:
-                        if save_and_unlock:
-                            self.Unlock()
-                if ok:
                     return ac
             elif ac == Defaults.AuthListModerator:
                 # The list moderator password must be sha'd
@@ -227,21 +187,22 @@ class SecurityManager:
         return False
 
     def _cookie_path(self):
-        return '/'.join(os.environ['SCRIPT_NAME'].split('/')[:-1]) + '/'
+        script_name = os.environ.get('SCRIPT_NAME', '')
+        return SLASH.join(script_name.split(SLASH)[:-1]) + SLASH
 
     def MakeCookie(self, authcontext, user=None):
         key, secret = self.AuthContextInfo(authcontext, user)
-        if key is None or secret is None or not isinstance(secret, str):
+        if key is None or secret is None or not isinstance(secret, basestring):
             raise ValueError
         # Timestamp
         issued = int(time.time())
         # Get a digest of the secret, plus other information.
-        mac = sha.new(secret + `issued`).hexdigest()
+        mac = sha.new(secret + repr(issued)).hexdigest()
         # Create the cookie object.
         c = Cookie.SimpleCookie()
         c[key] = binascii.hexlify(marshal.dumps((issued, mac)))
         c[key]['path'] = self._cookie_path()
-        # We use session cookies, so don't set `expires' or `max-age' keys.
+        # We use session cookies, so don't set 'expires' or 'max-age' keys.
         # Set the RFC 2109 required header.
         c[key]['version'] = 1
         return c
@@ -290,7 +251,7 @@ class SecurityManager:
                 for k in c.keys():
                     if k.startswith(prefix):
                         usernames.append(k[len(prefix):])
-            # If any check out, we're golden.  Note: `@'s are no longer legal
+            # If any check out, we're golden.  Note: '@'s are no longer legal
             # values in cookie keys.
             for user in [Utils.UnobscureEmail(u) for u in usernames]:
                 ok = self.__checkone(c, authcontext, user)
@@ -307,7 +268,7 @@ class SecurityManager:
             key, secret = self.AuthContextInfo(authcontext, user)
         except Errors.NotAMemberError:
             return False
-        if not c.has_key(key) or not isinstance(secret, str):
+        if key not in c or not isinstance(secret, basestring):
             return False
         # Undo the encoding we performed in MakeCookie() above.  BAW: I
         # believe this is safe from exploit because marshal can't be forced to
@@ -329,7 +290,7 @@ class SecurityManager:
             return False
         # Calculate what the mac ought to be based on the cookie's timestamp
         # and the shared secret.
-        mac = sha.new(secret + `issued`).hexdigest()
+        mac = sha.new(secret + repr(issued)).hexdigest()
         if mac <> received_mac:
             return False
         # Authenticated!